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[T]he law cannot hope to sustain [its] compound burden of stabil-
ity, flexibility, and transparency unless it pays scrupulous attention to 
its own taxonomy . . . . [T]he understanding of the natural world has 
depended on patient, self-critical classification. Lawyers deceive them-
selves if they think they are exempt from the same elementary intellec-
tual burden. This was already obvious to Gaius in the second century 
and still obvious to Blackstone in the 18th. The law simply could not be 
understood unless it took care to classify itself ‘methodically.’ If it did 
not properly understand itself, its decision-making would be erratic and 
doomed to ridicule.1 
INTRODUCTION 
OR generations, American constitutional theorists and judges have 
struggled with problems of constitutional interpretation, exploring 
how meaning is properly derived from the Constitution and, insofar as 
the answer may be different, how courts ought to derive such meaning. 
Recent years, however, have seen an upsurge in scholarship addressed to 
a related but distinct subject. Without entirely abandoning debates over 
constitutional interpretation, constitutional theorists have started increas-
ingly to wonder about those judicial outputs that feature in the enterprise 
of constitutional adjudication and yet are something other than a court’s 
determination as to what any given provision of the Constitution means. 
Theorists have turned their attention from constitutional meaning to 
what we may call, at least on a first pass, constitutional doctrine. 
Obviously, constitutional scholars have always been interested in doc-
trine in the sense of caring to elucidate, clarify, rationalize, or propose re-
visions to the rules governing some area of constitutional law. This de-
scribes the dominant mode of constitutional scholarship for most of the 
history of the field. And although arguably endangered, it is far from ex-
tinct. Think of, say, Douglas Laycock, Donald Regan, David Shapiro, 
and, in much of his work, Laurence Tribe.2 But the previous paragraph 
aims to draw attention to a different genre of scholarship. The growing 
genre that I will contrast with scholarship dedicated to methods of 
constitutional interpretation examines, not any given body of doctrine 
(such as First Amendment doctrine or Commerce Clause doctrine), but 
some of the potentialities and challenges that arise from the claimed exis- 
1 Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 3 (2000). 
2 To name names in this context is perilous, of course, because the scholars who could with 
equal or even greater justice be included on such a list must number in the dozens. I provide 
these illustrations simply to make clearer the nature of the contrasts I wish to draw. 
F 
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the potentialities and challenges that arise from the claimed existence of 
doctrine, conceived as a category of judicial work product—
interpretations, reasons, mediating principles, and implementing frame-
works—more comprehensive than judge-interpreted constitutional mean-
ing.3 Insofar as this strain of scholarship concerns itself with the fact of 
doctrine but not with its particular content, we may fairly term it meta-
doctrinal. 
Especially notable early examples of metadoctrinalism were Henry 
Monaghan’s 1975 Harvard Law Review Foreword, “Constitutional Com-
mon Law,”4 and, following two volumes later in the same journal, Larry 
Sager’s “Fair Measure.”5 Monaghan’s Foreword had two basic objectives: to 
draw attention to the fact “that a surprising amount of what passes as au-
thoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best understood as something of 
a quite different order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and re-
medial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required 
by, various constitutional provisions;”6 and to argue for this body’s legiti-
macy.7 Sager brought a different focus to essentially the same phenomenon 
by examining what is entailed by the existence of “underenforced constitu-
tional norms”—the fact that judge-made constitutional doctrine could be 
less extensive than constitutional meaning.8 Yet, despite the wide audiences 
that these articles deservedly won, for many years the field that they com-
bined to help mark attracted little sustained attention from constitutional 
 
3 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 79 (2000) (“Article III proclaims that the Constitution 
is to be enforced as justiciable law in ordinary lawsuits. The document thus envisions that in 
deciding cases arising under it, judges will offer interpretations of its meaning, give reasons for 
those interpretations, develop mediating principles, and craft implementing frameworks ena-
bling the document to work as in-court law. These interpretations, reasons, principles, and 
frameworks are, in a word, doctrine.”) (internal citations omitted); Charles Fried, Constitu-
tional Doctrine, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1140, 1140 (1994) (describing “constitutional doctrine” as 
the “rules and principles of constitutional law . . . that are capable of statement and that gen-
erally guide the decisions of courts, the conduct of government officials, and the arguments 
and counsel of lawyers”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883 (1996) (defining “doctrine” as “an elaborate structure of precedents 
built up over time by the courts”). 
4 Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common 
Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). 
5 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978). 
6 Monaghan, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
7 Id. 
8 Sager, supra note 5, at 1213. For a contemporary exploration in a similar vein see Paul 
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 
585 (1975). 
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theorists who continued to struggle principally with problems of interpreta-
tion as debates raged under such broad banners as “interpretivism,” 
“originalism,” “textualism,” and “representation-reinforcement.” 
Seeds of change may be in the air, for much of the most provocative 
recent work in constitutional theory is centrally concerned with problem-
atics of constitutional doctrine—what it is, how it compares to constitu-
tional meaning, whether it is legitimate, how it should be employed, and 
what consequences follow. Though this is not a claim that could be sub-
stantiated in short order, even a cursory review of recent Harvard Law 
Review Forewords9 suggests metadoctrinal ascendance. No doubt the 
most conspicuous example is Richard Fallon’s 1997 Foreword, “Imple-
menting the Constitution,” subsequently developed into a book of the 
same name.10 “[T]he central focus” of Fallon’s Foreword is to draw atten-
tion to the fact that “[i]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution is not 
the Court’s only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to implement 
the Constitution successfully. In service of this mission, the Court often 
must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect 
the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”11 But if Fallon’s article is a particu-
larly clear instance of metadoctrinalism, it is not a lonely one. Metadoc-
trinalism is close to the surface of Cass Sunstein’s 1996 Foreword, “Leav-
ing Things Undecided,”12 which introduced and defended the concept of 
judicial “minimalism” (“the phenomenon of saying no more than neces-
sary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided”13); 
Michael Dorf’s 1998 contribution, arguing that the Court should “worry 
less about finding the ‘true’ meaning of authoritative texts [statutes and 
 
9 “Within the community of scholars of constitutional law the ‘Forewords’ are widely taken 
to be good indications of the state of the field. The Foreword project defines a vision of the 
field of constitutional scholarship.” Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Har-
vard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 Const. Comment. 463, 463 (1994–95). 
This is not inconsistent with the authors’ further observation that “[t]he constraints of the se-
lection process and of time mean that Forewords are systematically likely to be disappoint-
ing.” Id. at 470. 
10 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Harvard Foreword]; Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution (2001) [hereinafter Fallon, Implementing the Con-
stitution]. 
11 Fallon, Harvard Foreword, supra note 10, at 57. 
12 Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Unde-
cided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided]. This was 
developed into Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme 
Court (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Judicial Minimalism]. 
13 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 12, at 6. 
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the Constitution], and instead—while sensitive to its own institutional 
limitations— . . . focus on finding provisional, workable solutions to the 
complex and rapidly changing legal problems of our age”;14 and “The 
Document and the Doctrine,”15 Akhil Amar’s 1999 exhortation that 
scholars and judges shift their focus from the body of judicial precedent 
construing and implementing the Constitution back to the Constitution 
itself.16 
Moreover, heightened sensitivity to the complexities of the relation-
ship between constitutional meaning and constitutional doctrine has not 
been limited to the academy. To the contrary, the United States Supreme 
Court has divided precisely over issues that can best be understood as 
metadoctrinal in several important and seemingly disparate recent deci-
sions. In Dickerson v. United States,17 for example, the Court reaf-
firmed Miranda v. Arizona’s18 warnings requirement19 over Justice 
Scalia’s passionate charge that Miranda had announced an illegitimate 
“prophylactic” rule, instead of having engaged in bona fide constitutional 
interpretation.20 In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett the Court held that Congress lacked power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Americans with Disabilities Act,21 
over Justice Breyer’s insistence that the Court misapplied the congruence 
and proportionality test of City of Boerne v. Flores22 because it confused 
equal protection doctrine for equal protection meaning.23 And in Atwater 
 
14 Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic De-
liberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 9 (1998) (internal citations omitted). 
15 Amar, supra note 3. 
16 This is a representative but far from exhaustive list of influential recent works that exhibit 
significant concern with the fact that the judicial work product in constitutional law is much 
more complex and multifaceted than references to constitutional interpretation would indi-
cate. For an additional example of this interest among recent Harvard Law Review Fore-
words, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 26 (1992) (attributing divisions on the Court to, in 
substantial part, varying preferences among the Reagan and Bush appointees for rules versus 
standards, and particularly observing that the debate over rules versus standards “occurred at 
three levels: first, what force to give constitutional precedent; second, how to read the Consti-
tution; and third, how to fashion the operative constitutional doctrines, tests, and formulas 
that guide the lower courts and the Court itself in future cases”); id. at 83–95. 
17 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
18 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
19 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. 
20 Id. at 445–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
21 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
22 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
23 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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v. City of Lago Vista, Justice O’Connor’s dissent accused the majority of 
inappropriately employing doctrine to underenforce the Fourth Amend-
ment’s correct meaning.24 
This growing attention to the judicial creation and manipulation of 
constitutional “doctrine” provides a much-needed corrective to an at-
times obsessional focus on the judicial production of constitutional 
“meaning” precisely because, as Fallon has persuasively argued, courts 
are engaged in a project of constitutional implementation broader than 
what references to constitutional interpretation seem to signify.25 And 
yet, constitutional scholars’ collective understanding of the taxonomy, or 
conceptual structure, of constitutional doctrine has been little advanced. 
Monaghan, as we have seen, described constitutional common law in 
terms of “substantive, procedural, and remedial rules,”26 but this was 
plainly just a way of gesturing toward the breadth of what he considered 
constitutional common law. He made no effort to explain what principles 
distinguished one sort of rule from another or why the distinctions might 
matter.27 Fallon sorted constitutional doctrine into a large number of 
 
24 532 U.S. 318, 360–62 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
25 To see the point in another light, consider Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf’s valuable 
book, now more than a decade old, On Reading the Constitution (1991). Tribe and Dorf begin 
by asking: “What does it mean to read this Constitution? What is it that we do when we inter-
pret it? Why is there so much controversy over how it should be interpreted[?]” Id. at 3. 
Those are appropriate questions. Sensitivity to constitutional doctrine spurs us to raise an ad-
ditional question, however: How should the Court create doctrine to implement its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution? 
26 Monaghan, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
27 Future work did not make attention to this trichotomy look like a promising way to con-
ceptualize constitutional doctrine. Is the exclusionary rule substantive or remedial? Are the 
standing doctrines substantive or procedural? What about rebuttable presumptions? While 
some commentators pay little attention to these difficulties, others try to resolve them by pro-
posing their own idiosyncratic definitions. Thus Daryl Levinson defines “[r]emedies” simply 
and expansively “as rules for implementing constitutional rights and preventing or punishing 
their violation,” Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
Colum. L. Rev. 857, 861 (1999) (internal citation omitted), a definition that would seem to 
moot any other categories of constitutional common law. See also id. at 869 n.47 (reiterating 
that “‘remedy’ . . . encompass[es] the implementation, detection, and prevention of constitu-
tional violations (as distinct from identifying the scope of the constitutional right at stake)”). 
Dan Coenen, to take another example, would label a rule “substantive” if it “foreclose[s] to 
the government a substantive policy choice” rather than allowing (as a “structural” rule would 
do) that the government try again so long as it exhibits the proper sort of deliberation and 
clarity. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values 
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1575, 1596 (2001). 
 The difficulties that the substance/procedure distinction have posed for operationalizing the 
doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), hardly require mention. See 
generally 19 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & 
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categories—balancing tests, “suspect-content” tests, purpose tests, and 
the like28—but candidly acknowledged that his laundry list was “a bit of a 
hodgepodge” of no particular conceptual significance.29 
This Article is animated by the belief that, now that scholars and courts 
have come increasingly to appreciate that judge-created constitutional 
doctrine is not identical to judge-interpreted constitutional meaning (or 
at least may not be), it is high time to concentrate on developing a func-
tional taxonomy of that doctrine.30 Let me caution at the outset, however, 
that this Article does not purport to have accomplished that imposing 
task—in part because the job is immense, and in part because taxonomies 
are always, in any event, works in progress. A taxonomy is a tool. Its util-
ity, and therefore its truth, is a function of, among other things, the needs 
of its consumers, the features of the phenomenon being taxonomized, 
and the characteristics of its social and institutional context. No taxon-
omy of a subject as complex and vibrant as constitutional law, then, can 
hope to survive unchanged for very long. For this reason alone (although 
surely there are others), contributions to a taxonomy of constitutional 
doctrine may well prove valuable even if piecemeal. With the hope this 
will prove true, this Article will offer a first cut. 
That cut will dissever constitutional doctrines that are simply judicial 
determinations of what the Constitution means from those conceptually 
distinct doctrinal rules that direct how courts—faced, as they inevitably 
are, with epistemic uncertainty—are to determine whether the constitu-
tional meaning has been complied with. To coin some terms, let us call 
constitutional doctrines that represent the judiciary’s understanding of 
the proper meaning of a constitutional power, right, duty, or other sort of 
provision “constitutional operative propositions”; doctrines that direct 
courts how to decide whether a constitutional operative proposition is 
satisfied I will term “constitutional decision rules.”31 
 
Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters §§ 4508–10 (2d ed. 1996) (summarizing the cases 
in which the Court has dealt with and developed the Erie doctrine). 
28 Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at ch. 5. 
29 Id. at 77. 
30 Cf. Michael Conant, Constitutional Structure and Purposes: Critical Commentary 6 (2001) 
(arguing that “the progress characteristic of the natural and physical sciences in the last 100 
years could not occur in legal reasoning, because of its epistemic inadequacies,” and attribut-
ing those inadequacies, in part, to the paucity of discussion in legal scholarship “on the mean-
ing of basic terms and primary relationships that is necessary for one generation of scholars to 
build on the published learning of previous generations”). 
31 There are reasons for this vocabulary. See infra note 192. For the moment it is enough to 
caution that what I will call a “constitutional decision rule” is not the same as a “rule of deci-
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An example will help. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o 
state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.”32 The courts are called upon, in the process of adjudica-
tion, to determine what this provision means. In performing that task, the 
courts may rely on any number of interpretive considerations, including 
such “modalities” as text, history, precedent, structure, moral judgment, 
and the like.33 Suppose the federal judiciary interprets the provision to 
mean that government may not classify individuals in ways not reasona-
bly designed to promote a legitimate state interest. Such, then, is the con-
stitutional operative proposition.34 But that is not the whole of judge-
made constitutional doctrine. A court cannot implement this operative 
proposition without some sort of procedure (perhaps implicit) for deter-
mining whether to adjudge the operative proposition satisfied when, as 
will always be the case, the court lacks unmediated access to the true fact 
of the matter.35 It needs, that is to say, a constitutional decision rule. 
The most obvious decision rule—indeed so obvious as to be almost in-
visible—is simply the preponderance of the evidence standard of review.36 
 
sion” for purposes of the Rules of Decision Act, The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 
73, 92. 
32 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
33 See generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982) [here-
inafter Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate]. The term “modality” is introduced in Philip Bobbitt, 
Constitutional Interpretation 11 (1991). 
34 As is true in this example, the constitutional operative proposition is very rarely identical 
to the constitutional text—at least outside the Constitution’s housekeeping provisions. Where, 
for instance, the Constitution itself provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion,” U.S. Const. amend. I, the constitutional operative proposition will 
necessarily furnish some elaboration of what a “law respecting an establishment of religion” 
means. I will therefore treat “constitutional operative proposition” and “judge-interpreted 
constitutional meaning” synonymously. 
35 A caution: It is the fact of epistemic uncertainty that makes decision rules (or something 
functionally equivalent) unavoidable. But it does not follow that decision rules must be de-
signed for the sole purpose of minimizing the total adjudicatory errors that epistemic uncer-
tainty produces. Whether courts should have legitimate authority to consider values other 
than error minimization when crafting decision rules is a matter I take up later. See infra Sec-
tion IV.A.2.a. Even if the better answer to that question is “no,” however, that answer must 
be supported by argument; it does not flow as a mere logical entailment of the conditions that 
necessarily produce decision rules in the first place. 
36 The preponderance of the evidence standard is, of course, directed to fact finders. As we 
will see, though, the questions that must be answered in order to apply judicially interpreted 
constitutional meanings are very often matters resolved by courts as though they were matters 
of law. I would say that they are “constitutional facts,” except that that term is generally used 
to refer to circumstances in which appellate courts ought not accord deference in their review 
of trial court findings. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 
Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985) (exploring such situations). 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
2004] Constitutional Decision Rules 11 
Applied to this imagined judicial determination of the meaning of the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection, such a standard would 
amount to a direction that courts should conclude that the challenged ac-
tion classifies individuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a 
legitimate state interest if and only if they believe it more likely than not 
that the action classifies individuals in ways not reasonably designed to 
promote a legitimate state interest. But—and this is the crucial point—it 
is not conceptually necessary that the constitutional decision rule must be 
the simple preponderance standard. Moreover, even if the preponder-
ance standard does serve as a general default decision rule, it is possible 
for the courts (most notably the Supreme Court) to displace this default 
decision rule with a different decision rule crafted for a particular con-
text. To return to our example, the decision rule of equal protection doc-
trine could direct courts to conclude that a challenged action classifies in-
dividuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state 
interest if and only if persuaded of this by clear and convincing evidence. 
Or, to make matters still more interesting, the decision rule could cor-
respond to the operative proposition in a rather different way. Instead of 
simply announcing the amount of confidence a court need have before it 
may conclude that the operative proposition is satisfied (or violated), the 
decision rule could articulate some different proposition that, if adjudged 
satisfied by a specified degree of confidence, will permit or require a par-
ticular conclusion with respect to the operative proposition. Suppose, for 
example, that the Court believes each of the following: (1) that racial 
classifications are often designed—that is, actually intended—to promote 
illegitimate interests; (2) that such classifications will nonetheless almost 
always further some conceivable legitimate interest too; and that (3) re-
viewing courts are generally unable on a case-by-case basis to determine 
when the permissible interest to which the classification reasonably re-
lates was the real one. Under such circumstances, the Court might direct, 
as a decision rule, that courts conclude that the equal protection opera-
tive proposition is violated (i.e., that the state has discriminated among 
individuals in a manner not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate 
state interest) if persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence either (a) 
that this is so, or (b) that the challenged action contains a facial racial 
classification which is not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
governmental interest.37 
 
37 This, of course, was Ely’s rationalization of equal protection doctrine. See John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust 145–48 (1980). Unlike Ely, however, I mean to express no views at 
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As this example illustrates, we should resist the temptation to natural-
ize the preponderance standard as an inevitable constitutional decision 
rule. As a conceptual matter, the number and variety of options in the 
making of constitutional decision rules is limited only by judicial imagina-
tion and by the (ever-changing) constraining norms of professional prac-
tice. And as a positive matter, I will argue, this imagination has indeed 
been exercised: Much of existing constitutional doctrine is better under-
stood not as judicial statements of constitutional meaning (i.e., as consti-
tutional operative propositions) but rather as judicial directions regarding 
how courts should decide whether such operative propositions have been 
satisfied (i.e., as constitutional decision rules). 
This distinction between operative propositions and decision rules 
would not, I reiterate, comprise the whole of a useful taxonomy of consti-
tutional doctrine. The dichotomy is likely to be supplemented, at the 
least, by remedial rules that direct what a court should do when applica-
tion of a decision rule yields the conclusion that the operative proposition 
has been, or will be, violated. And the taxonomy could become a great 
deal bushier or more nuanced. It is not necessary to speculate along these 
lines now, however, for this single conceptual distinction—between op-
 
present regarding whether strict scrutiny is best understood as the conjunction of the particu-
lar operative proposition and decision rule hypothesized in the text. The discussion in the text 
assumes a posture of forward-engineering: It shows how the Court could come to create dif-
ferent sorts of decision rules as part of its constitutional doctrine. The point, in other words, is 
that if the Court were to interpret the Equal Protection Clause to mean that government may 
not classify persons in ways not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state interest, it 
could implement that operative proposition by means of a decision rule markedly different 
from the simple preponderance-of-the-evidence decision rule. But determining how existing 
doctrine is best unpacked is an exercise in reverse-engineering. It is undeniable both that the 
present judge-announced equal protection doctrine could be unpacked in ways different from 
those described in the text and that the Court has in fact sent conflicting signals. See Amar, 
supra note 3, at 46 n.64. For example, even if the strict scrutiny that current doctrine com-
mands for racial classifications is best understood as a decision rule, it could be in service of 
somewhat different operative propositions. Ely seems to assume, for example, that (what I am 
calling) the equal protection operative proposition demands merely that every classification 
have been rationally chosen to promote a legitimate state interest. But the operative proposi-
tion could itself demand that every classification be justified on the strength of an end, and a 
fit, commensurate with the social harm that it imposes—which is essentially Justice Stevens’s 
long-standing position. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). And I am not prepared even to rule out that strict scrutiny for racial classifications is 
itself part of the operative proposition. I will revisit the strict scrutiny component of equal 
protection doctrine, infra notes 252–55 and accompanying text. For now, readers would do 
well to keep in mind the difference between forward- and reverse-engineering; a taxonomy of 
constitutional doctrine might prove useful going forward even if correct classification of any 
existing doctrine according to that proposed taxonomy remains contested. 
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erative propositions and decision rules—is likely to lie at the core of any 
sensible taxonomy of constitutional doctrine drawn on functional princi-
ples, and is of sufficient importance alone to warrant careful elaboration 
and defense. Or so I will maintain. Put another way, I will argue that 
judges, scholars, and litigators should make greater efforts to distinguish 
whether a constitutional rule is an announcement of constitutional mean-
ing (i.e., a constitutional operative proposition) or, instead, is a constitu-
tional decision rule, and should pay attention, in the making of constitu-
tional decision rules, to the particular considerations that might justify its 
construction. 
 This argument does not reflect a mere fetish for conceptualism. Atten-
tion to the distinction promises substantially to improve the project of 
constitutional adjudication and can richly enhance our understanding of 
it. For example, courts will be enabled to more sensibly revise and refine 
their own doctrines if they pay attention to the respects in which such 
doctrines communicate a decision rule as opposed to an operative propo-
sition. Moreover, the scope of legitimate action for legislators and execu-
tive agents should depend not so much on judge-announced constitu-
tional doctrine full stop, but on the particular content of one component 
of that doctrine, namely the judge-announced operative propositions. 
As the preceding remarks may suggest, the ambition of this Article is 
to integrate theory and practice, the abstract and the concrete. The struc-
ture of argument, however, is neither simply top-down nor bottom-up.  
Part I will seek to motivate the inquiry into doctrinal conceptualization 
in a very concrete fashion by introducing what is, jurisprudentially, very 
possibly the single most important constitutional decision in a generation. 
That decision is Dickerson. Miranda itself had a claim to being among the 
most important decisions of a prior generation. Although the debate over 
Miranda’s legitimacy had proceeded along a variety of argumentative 
lines, battle had been joined most relentlessly on the question of whether 
Miranda announced a “prophylactic rule” in lieu of having engaged in 
constitutional interpretation. By the time of Dickerson, many constitu-
tional theorists had become persuaded by David Strauss’s careful and 
powerful argument that prophylactic rules indistinguishable from 
Miranda are ubiquitous and legitimate.38 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia 
(joined by Justice Thomas) objected, saying that prophylactic rules were 
unconstitutional. Justice Scalia, it is true, wrote in dissent. But the major-
 
38 David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190 (1988). See 
infra note 76. 
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ity conspicuously failed to defend prophylactic rules as such, choosing in-
stead to reaffirm Miranda solely on grounds of stare decisis. Dickerson 
thereby left open a question of profound importance. If Miranda an-
nounced a prophylactic rule and if prophylactic rules are both prevalent 
and illegitimate, a potential ocean of constitutional doctrine was at risk. 
To resolve the debate left hanging from Dickerson, we need to know, 
of course, what prophylactic rules are, a question that will be explored in 
Part II. Because the term is susceptible to a great many interpretations, a 
clarification is needed at the outset. We will not be searching for the 
“true” meaning of “prophylactic rules,” or even the most common or 
most useful definition. We need to know what a “prophylactic rule” 
means to those—Justices Scalia and Thomas among them—who believe 
that to properly classify particular constitutional doctrine as a prophylac-
tic rule is inconsistent with its legitimacy. 
Happily, discovering what Justice Scalia meant by the term is not diffi-
cult. He seemed to understand prophylactic rules as a species of what 
Monaghan had dubbed “constitutional common law” (in contradistinc-
tion to a “constitutional interpretation”), or what Sager had termed a 
“constitutional rule” (in contradistinction to a “constitutional norm”), or 
what Fallon had called “constitutional doctrine” (in contradistinction to 
“constitutional meaning”). In particular, Justice Scalia seemed to treat 
prophylactic rules as that species of constitutional common law or consti-
tutional rule or constitutional doctrine that overprotects or “overen-
forces” judge-interpreted constitutional meaning. For Strauss and his fol-
lowers, however, the basic conceptual distinction upon which the Scalia 
position rested—a distinction that would divide the universe of “constitu-
tional doctrine” into “constitutional meaning” and something else of a 
materially different character—was itself illusory. Because “constitu-
tional interpretation” was shot through with judicial attention to practi-
cal, policy-oriented, and interest-balancing sorts of considerations, they 
seemed to argue, no important conceptual distinctions could be drawn 
within the general domain of constitutional doctrine. The upshot of Part 
II, then, is that the debate over prophylactic rules is as much conceptual 
as normative. It is, in the first instance, a debate over the logical structure 
of constitutional adjudication or, put another way, over the taxonomy of 
constitutional doctrine—whether that doctrine consists of meaningfully 
different sorts of judge-announced rules. 
The core insight of this Article, which will be introduced, developed 
and defended in Parts III and IV, is that we can resolve this taxonomic 
challenge by carving constitutional doctrine at a new joint—the joint that 
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separates constitutional operative propositions (judicial statements of 
what the Constitution means) from constitutional decision rules (judicial 
statements of how courts should decide whether the operative proposi-
tions have been complied with). Put another way, my central claim is that 
taxonomists like Monaghan, Sager, and Fallon were on the right track in 
seeking to disaggregate “constitutional doctrine” into conceptually dis-
tinct components, but that the great value of doing so will become appar-
ent only once we execute that disaggregation in a somewhat different 
way. In brief, these two Parts will show: first, that constitutional decision 
rules are a ubiquitous feature of constitutional doctrine; second, that to 
recognize the distinction between operative propositions and decision 
rules does not depend upon (though is not incompatible with) an assump-
tion that courts derive “constitutional meaning” in a fashion uninfluenced 
by pragmatic or instrumental calculations; and third, that the classifica-
tory exercise has substantial—though of course limited39 —practical 
value. 
Perhaps the most obvious dividend of my proposed distinction—yet far 
from the only one—is that intelligent extra-judicial discussions about con-
stitutional governance will be much advanced by separating out from the 
great complex mass of judge-announced constitutional doctrine those 
doctrines—the operative propositions—that embody what the courts 
think the Constitution means. Of course, persons anticipating litigation, 
be they citizens, legislators, or executive agents, need to know how courts 
will resolve the constitutional disputes that reach them. So they need to 
know the full doctrines—the operative propositions and the decision 
rules (and any other sorts of doctrine, such as the remedial rules). But 
given the singular role that the Constitution plays in our political culture, 
collective interest in constitutional meaning is not limited to predictions 
about the outcome of litigation. That is, we do not want the actual, pre-
dicted, or imagined outcome of litigation to be conclusive of our argu-
ments about whether any particular, actual, or proposed course of gov-
ernmental action conforms to constitutional demands. And yet, many 
people might think they can benefit from, and maybe even defer to, the 
courts’ expert judgments on constitutional meaning. If that is so, we 
might find our political culture enriched by being able to contemplate 
 
39 This point merits emphasis lest the reader conclude that I think the conceptualization ad-
vanced in this Article is a hammer and the world of constitutional law a nail. I do not. I will 
strive to demonstrate that the operative proposition/decision rule distinction is illuminating 
and useful. But when an attempt to categorize any particular doctrine in these terms appears 
unilluminating and/or useless, I do not recommend that anyone persist in the effort. 
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constitutional operative propositions alone, divorced from the constitu-
tional decision rules which are designed solely to govern litigation. 
What about constitutional doctrine even as it operates in the courts? In 
a variety of ways, distinguishing operative propositions from decision 
rules can help here too. Consider, for one thing, the perpetual debate 
over how much the courts ought to defer to constitutional judgments 
reached by the coordinate branches. Outside of a few limited contexts, 
the Court has tended to accord little or no deference to other branches’ 
constitutional interpretations, and has made clear that it will not give ef-
fect to legislation “which alters the meaning” of a constitutional provi-
sion, as the Court has construed it.40 But this stance, whether right or 
wrong, does not resolve the separate questions of whether, and under 
what circumstances, Congress should be entitled to substitute its judg-
ment for the courts’ regarding how best to implement court-interpreted 
meaning. Perhaps judicial judgments about the shape of constitutional 
decision rules ought to be congressionally defeasible in ways that the op-
erative propositions are not. To carefully separate judge-announced con-
stitutional doctrine into operative propositions and decision rules, then, is 
a first step toward identifying the full latitude that Congress should 
rightly enjoy in the shaping of in-court doctrine. 
Furthermore, courts should reasonably care whether particular aspects 
of doctrine are better understood in operative or decisional terms even 
when not contemplating inter-branch dialogue and cooperation. This 
matter is complex. To note just one example, however, it is plausible 
(though admittedly not inevitable) for courts to come to think it appro-
priate to accord differential stare decisis weight to the two sorts of doc-
trine. 
Part V will return to the beginning by showing that the Dickerson ma-
jority could have responded to Justice Scalia’s dissent by dividing the 
complex doctrine announced by the Miranda Court into an operative 
proposition to be administered via a decision rule: The operative proposi-
tion providing that courts may not admit extra-judicial statements that 
state agents had compelled from the criminal defendant, the decision rule 
directing that courts must presume unwarned statements made during 
custodial interrogation to have been compelled (in the constitutionally 
 
40 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
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relevant sense).41 Although Miranda contains too many ambiguous and 
even contradictory elements to permit us ever to be certain just what 
Chief Justice Warren intended to convey,42 this characterization of 
Miranda is, I will argue, more faithful to that decision than are any other 
of the other leading contenders. Additionally, this characterization has 
cash value. To understand Miranda in this way both buttresses its legiti-
macy (which is not to say its wisdom) and bears upon various of 
Miranda’s progeny, such as cases that address the admissibility of “fruits 
of a Miranda violation”43—an issue that the Court will revisit, in light of 
Dickerson, this upcoming Term44—and that announce an emergency ex-
ception.45 By journeying in this roundabout fashion, from the concrete 
problem presented by Miranda and Dickerson, to the theoretical or ab-
stract, and back to the concrete, this Article hopes both to reinforce the 
general importance of conceptualizing constitutional doctrine taxonomi-
cally and to demonstrate some of the value of beginning such a taxonomy 
by distinguishing operative propositions from decision rules. 
I. DICKERSON, MIRANDA, AND THE PROPHYLACTIC RULES DEBATE 
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona.46 The case held 
that a criminal defendant’s statements made during custodial interrogation 
could not be admitted into evidence against him unless police officers issued 
the now-famous Miranda warnings.47 Like Brown v. Board of Education48 
before it and like Roe v. Wade49 to follow, Miranda excited passionate politi-
cal and social criticism. Also like Brown and Roe, Miranda presented a 
 
41 It is true, but not directly relevant, that the Court specified that a different decision rule 
could apply if Congress or a given state took other steps to reduce the possibility that courts 
would admit compelled statements into evidence. See infra note 324. 
42 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to 
Remain Silent, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2625, 2629 (1996) (“No one really knows what Miranda 
means.”). 
43 E.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 
(1974). 
44 United States v Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Dickerson overturns 
the Elstad-Tucker doctrine on fruits of un-Mirandized interrogations), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 
1788 (2003); Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted 123 S. Ct. 
2091 (2003) (holding that a deliberate failure to issue Miranda warnings requires suppression 
of statements elicited during a second interrogation that was preceded by warnings). 
45 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984). 
46 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
47 Id. at 444–45. 
48 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
49 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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jurisprudential puzzle, even for its sympathizers. Much as Herbert Wechsler 
questioned the neutrality of Brown50 and John Hart Ely was to challenge the 
legitimacy of Roe,51 even political liberals like Judge Henry Friendly doubted 
the propriety of Miranda.52 This Part sketches the jurisprudential debate and 
demonstrates that despite the Court’s reaffirmance of Miranda in Dickerson 
v. United States,53 the case for Miranda’s legitimacy remains surprisingly un-
clear. In effect, this Part employs Dickerson as a particularly salient illustra-
tion of Peter Birks’s claim that constitutional doctrine “simply [can] not be 
understood unless it [takes] care to classify itself ‘methodically.’”54 
A. The Miranda Controversy in a Nutshell 
As we will see in Part V, the Miranda decision is rife with ambiguity. 
For present purposes, it is enough to observe that Miranda announced a 
new rule governing the admissibility of statements made during custodial 
interrogation. Before initiating any such interrogation, the Court de-
clared, police should warn the suspect, 
[T]hat he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be 
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence 
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be ap-
pointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.55 
If the police failed to issue these warnings, or if the protections they 
announced were not validly waived, the Court held, the Fifth Amend-
ment’s privilege against self-incrimination would render any state-
ments the suspect thereafter made inadmissible against him at his sub-
sequent trial.56 
The decision provoked a hailstorm of protest from law enforcement 
officials who predicted that the rule would “handcuff the police,” and 
 
50 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
31–34 (1959). 
51 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 
(1973). 
52 Henry J. Friendly, A Postscript on Miranda, in Benchmarks 266 (1967). 
53 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
54 Birks, supra note 1, at 3. 
55 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
56 Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V (providing that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself”). The Court had made the privilege applicable against 
the states just two years earlier in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), thereby overruling two 
earlier refusals to do so. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1947); Twining v. 
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908). 
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from academic critics who charged that the decision was a wholly ille-
gitimate exercise of judicial power. This is not constitutional interpre-
tation, opponents decried, but legislation from the bench.57 In almost 
immediate response,58 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. Section 3501, which 
provided that, in federal criminal prosecutions, a confession shall be ad-
missible if voluntary and that “[t]he trial judge in determining the issue of 
voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances sur-
rounding the giving of the confession.”59 But Section 3501 was widely per-
ceived as an effort to legislatively overrule Miranda, hence invalid under 
Marbury v. Madison,60 and was therefore disavowed by the Department 
of Justice and ignored by the courts. 
Without the benefit of Section 3501, law enforcement concerns were 
accommodated in two ways. First, police were surprised to learn that they 
could live with Miranda, for a great many suspects confessed notwith-
standing having been warned of their rights to remain silent and to an at-
torney.61 Second, the Burger and then Rehnquist Courts pared down 
Miranda’s scope or curbed its potential. For instance, the Court held that 
custodial statements taken without warnings could be used by the state 
 
57 Justice Harlan had pressed this view in his Miranda dissent. See 384 U.S. at 504–14 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Other especially prominent assaults included Fred P. Graham, The 
Self-Inflicted Wound (1970); Sam J. Erwin, Jr., Miranda v. Arizona: A Decision Based on Ex-
cessive and Visionary Solicitude for the Accused, 5 Am. Crim. L.Q. 125, 128 (1967) 
(“Miranda has left the police handcuffed.”); Raymond L. Spring, The Nebulous Nexus: Esco-
bedo, Miranda, and the New 5th Amendment, 6 Washburn L.J. 428, 442 (1967) (“[T]he court 
has allowed its moral judgment to force it beyond interpretation of the Constitution and into 
the realm of amendment.”). 
58 For a good discussion of the context and legislative history, see Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) 
Congress “Overrule” Miranda, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 883, 887–906 (2000). 
59 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2000). The statute proceeded to offer a nonexhaustive list of factors 
that warranted consideration, and emphasized that this was an all-things-considered analysis 
by concluding that “[t]he presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors . . . need 
not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.” Id. 
60 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
61 One careful study found that seventy-eight percent of suspects waived their rights. Rich-
ard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266, 276 (1996). 
This is not to assert, however, that Miranda was socially costless, a question that has been vig-
orously debated, and with respect to which this Article takes no position. Compare, e.g., Paul 
G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on 
Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1055 (1998), and Paul G. 
Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1084 (1996), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits 
and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500 (1996).  
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for impeachment purposes;62 grafted a “public safety” exception onto the 
requirement that warnings be given as a precondition to admissibility;63 
and strongly suggested (without squarely holding) that the fruits of un-
warned custodial statements were generally admissible.64 
Of course, these decisions were not greeted everywhere with approval. 
But it was not only the results that dismayed Miranda supporters. 
Equally or more inflammatory was the language these cases used to de-
scribe Miranda. For example, when holding admissible the testimony of a 
witness whose identity was discovered as a result of an unwarned custo-
dial statement, the Court in Michigan v. Tucker, per then-Justice 
Rehnquist, deemed it critical that “the police conduct at issue here did 
not abridge respondent’s constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later 
laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.”65 And 
Justice O’Connor observed for the Oregon v. Elstad Court that “[t]he 
Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps 
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.”66 
Partisans on both sides seemed to recognize that the language of pro-
phylaxis threatened Miranda’s legitimacy. For example, Justice Douglas, 
dissenting in Tucker, rejected the majority’s characterization of Miranda 
as having announced “prophylactic standards,” insisting instead that 
“[t]he Court is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation ab-
sent a constitutional basis.”67 Justice Stevens similarly denied in his Elstad 
dissent that Miranda sweeps more broadly than the Constitution: 
 
62 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975) (holding statements given in response to po-
lice questioning after suspect had received warnings and had asserted right to lawyer admissi-
ble for impeachment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding statements 
made after receipt of defective Miranda warnings admissible for impeachment). 
63 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984). 
64 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317–18 (1985) (holding that fact of a first custodial state-
ment given without warnings does not render inadmissible subsequent statement given after 
Miranda warnings properly administered); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450–51 (1974) 
(holding that poisonous fruits doctrine does not bar testimony of witness whose identity was 
discovered as result of custodial statement obtained without warnings, where the custodial 
interrogation had occurred prior to the Miranda decision). 
65 417 U.S. at 445–46. 
66 470 U.S. at 306. These are not isolated examples. Others are canvassed in Richard H.W. 
Maloy, Can a Rule Be Prophylactic and Yet Constitutional?, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 2465, 
2471–74 (2001). 
67 417 U.S. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 465–66 (“Miranda’s purpose was 
not promulgation of judicially preferred standards for police interrogation, a function we are 
quite powerless to perform; the decision enunciated ‘constitutional standards for protection of 
the privilege’ against self-incrimination.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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This Court’s power to require state courts to exclude probative self-
incriminatory statements rests entirely on the premise that the use of 
such evidence violates the Federal Constitution . . . . If the Court does 
not accept that premise, it must regard the holding in the Miranda case 
itself, as well as all of the federal jurisprudence that has evolved from 
that decision, as nothing more than an illegitimate exercise of raw judi-
cial power.68 
Echoing this sentiment, academic defenders of the warnings requirement 
complained that the language of prophylaxis “cut the doctrinal heart out 
of Miranda.”69 For long-time Miranda critic Joseph Grano, by contrast, 
the prophylactic characterization of Miranda was both correct and fatal.70 
The general consensus that viewing Miranda in prophylactic terms was 
inconsistent with its legitimacy was challenged fifteen years ago by David 
Strauss. In “The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,”71 Strauss accepted that 
Miranda announced a prophylactic rule but denied that it mattered. 
“‘[P]rophylactic’ rules are not exceptional measures of questionable le-
gitimacy,” he argued, “but are a central and necessary feature of constitu-
tional law. Indeed, constitutional law consists, to a significant degree, in 
the elaboration of doctrines that are universally accepted as legitimate, 
but that have the same ‘prophylactic’ character as the Miranda rule.”72 
“‘Prophylactic’ rules are, in an important sense, the norm, not the excep-
tion,” Strauss explained, because the intensely practical considerations 
upon which they are thought to rely undergird all of constitutional doc-
trine.73 “As a theoretical exercise, one could try to identify what the real, 
noumenal Constitution would require if governments had different ten-
dencies or the courts had different capacities. But usually that would be a 
 
68 470 U.S. at 370–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
69 Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days 
of Police Interrogation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 740 (1987); see also, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The “Po-
lice Practice” Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in 
The Burger Years 143, 152–57 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987) (arguing that language in Tucker, 
Quarles, and Elstad may have paved the way for overruling Miranda); Larry J. Ritchie, Com-
pulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court’s Definition, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 
383, 417–18 (1977) (arguing that Harris v. New York and Tucker can be seen as cautious steps 
toward overruling Miranda); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 
1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 119–20, 123 (describing Tucker as laying the groundwork for overruling 
Miranda). 
70 See Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article 
III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985). 
71 Strauss, supra note 38. 
72 Id. at 190. 
73 Id. at 195. 
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pointless task.”74 In short, “in deciding constitutional cases, the courts 
constantly consider institutional capacities and propensities. That is, to a 
large extent, what constitutional law consists of: courts create constitu-
tional doctrine by taking into account both the principles and values re-
flected in the relevant constitutional provisions and institutional reali-
ties.”75 
B. Dickerson’s Failure to Resolve Miranda’s Status and Legitimacy 
Strauss’s argument won an enthusiastic reception,76 but did not per-
suade everyone.77 Thirty years after Miranda, accordingly, doubts about 
that decision’s legitimacy had found themselves on the back burner but 
not fully resolved. They were revived four years ago in Dickerson.78 In 
1999, in an otherwise insignificant case, the Fourth Circuit dusted off Sec-
tion 3501 to hold a defendant’s confession admissible despite the district 
court’s finding that the police had elicited the confession during custodial 
interrogation without having first issued the warnings required by 
Miranda.79 The panel held that the confession was nonetheless “volun-
tary,” all things considered, and hence admissible under Section 3501.80 
 
74 Id. at 207–08. 
75 Id. at 207 (emphasis in original). 
76 For a sampling of scholars who appeared to have become persuaded of the prevalence and 
legitimacy of “prophylactic rules,” see Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, 
at 141 n.34; David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Con-
gressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31, 55–56; Dorf, supra note 
14, at 71; David Huitema, Miranda: Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the 
Fifth Amendment, 18 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 261, 263–64 (2000); John C. Jeffries, The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 113 n.98 (1999); Yale Kamisar, Confes-
sions, Search and Seizure, and the Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa L. Rev. 465, 471 (1999); Levin-
son, supra note 27, at 904. 
77 Grano, for one, remained unconvinced. See Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the 
Law 173 (1993) [hereinafter Grano, Confessions]; Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional 
Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 174, 187 (1988) [hereinafter 
Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties]. 
78 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
79 Id. 
80 Dickerson himself had not mentioned § 3501, and the United States, following long-
standing practice, contended that the statute was unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit granted 
the motion of amicus curiae Professor Paul Cassell, a long-time critic of Miranda, to share 
oral argument time with the government for the purpose of defending the statute’s constitu-
tionality. See 166 F.3d at 680 n.14. For one debate over whether the Fourth Circuit, and then 
the Supreme Court, acted appropriately in considering § 3501, compare Neal Devins, Asking 
the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the Separation of Powers By Reconsidering 
Miranda, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251 (2000), with Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have 
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In the last week of the 1999 Term, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Fourth Circuit by the surprisingly wide margin of 7-2.81 In a further sur-
prise, Chief Justice Rehnquist, long a critic of Miranda, wrote the major-
ity opinion. The case, he wrote, raises the question “whether Congress 
has constitutional authority to . . . supersede Miranda.”82 And the answer 
“turns on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or 
merely exercised its supervisory authority [over the federal courts] to 
regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction.”83 Section 
3501 is valid law if the latter because supervisory rules are subject to ul-
timate control by Congress. But if the former, then Section 3501 runs 
afoul of Marbury. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that language from Miranda could 
be found to support either view. The decisive factor demonstrating “that 
Miranda is a constitutional decision,” however, “is that both Miranda and 
two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state 
courts.”84 Furthermore, the Court had consistently applied Miranda’s rule 
to state courts thereafter, both on direct review and on habeas.85 Deeming 
it “beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the 
courts of the several States,”86 the majority felt compelled to conclude 
“that Miranda is constitutionally based.”87 Congress, therefore, lacked 
constitutional power to supersede it by legislation. Section 3501 was inva-
lid. 
Writing for himself and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia dissented. 
Whereas the majority essentially presumed that Miranda was legitimate 
and then concluded, by process of eliminating the possibility that it was a 
supervisory rule over the federal courts, that it must be a “constitutional 
rule,” Justice Scalia worked from the ground up. The first question, he 
said, was whether the Miranda warnings are true Marbury-shielded con-
stitutional interpretation. 
 
Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 287 (2000). 
81 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 430. 
82 Id. at 437. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 438. 
85 Id. at 438, 439 n.3. 
86 Id. at 438. 
87 Id. at 440. In the Fourth Circuit, Judge Michael had made the same point in dissent. 
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 697 (Michael, J., dissenting in part). The panel majority, however, had 
brushed it away with the observation that it raised “an interesting academic question.” Id. at 
691 n.21. 
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The Court today insists that the decision in Miranda is a “constitu-
tional” one; that it has “constitutional underpinnings”; a “constitutional 
basis” and a “constitutional origin”; that it was “constitutionally based”; 
and that it announced a “constitutional rule.” It is fine to play these 
word games; but what makes a decision “constitutional” in the only 
sense relevant here—in the sense that renders it impervious to su-
persession by congressional legislation such as § 3501—is the determi-
nation that the Constitution requires the result that the decision an-
nounces and the statute ignores.88 
Justice Scalia concluded that the majority does not say that Miranda was 
“constitutional” in that sense because they do not believe it.89 That, at 
least, was a good thing, for “the decision in Miranda, if read as an explica-
tion of what the Constitution requires is preposterous.”90 
If Miranda is not constitutional interpretation (even wrong constitu-
tional interpretation), the next question is whether it is otherwise sup-
portable. But if it is, Justice Scalia asserted, “the only thing that can pos-
sibly mean in the context of this case is that this Court has the power, not 
merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it re-
gards as useful ‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States.”91 
In response to the Straussian contention advanced by Dickerson and by 
the United States “that there is nothing at all exceptional, much less un-
constitutional, about the Court’s adopting prophylactic rules to buttress 
constitutional rights, and enforcing them against Congress and the 
States,”92 Justice Scalia concluded that it was both exceptional and uncon-
stitutional: “That is an immense and frightening anti-democratic power, 
and it does not exist.”93 
Unfortunately, the majority did not engage Justice Scalia’s attack.94 Af-
ter noting the dissent’s argument “that it is judicial overreaching for this 
 
88 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
89 Id. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 448 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 457 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia thereby goes further than did the Fourth 
Circuit. Under his view, Miranda’s warnings requirement is not merely “overrulable” by stat-
ute, but invalid ab initio—at least as applied against the states. 
94 This is a wholly unoriginal observation, one frequently expressed by those who applaud, 
as well as by those who decry, the outcome in Dickerson. See, for example, most of the con-
tributions to Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law, 99 Mich. 
L. Rev. 879–1247 (2001). Donald Dripps archly captured the frustration of many commenta-
tors: “Once the Court granted the petition in December of 1999, court-watchers knew the 
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Court to hold Section 3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that the 
Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution, in the sense that 
nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements,” the ma-
jority rejoined lamely that they “need not go further than Miranda to de-
cide this case.”95 Noting more candidly than the Fourth Circuit had done96 
that Section 3501 merely reinstated the totality test for voluntariness that 
Miranda had rejected as inadequate, the majority concluded that the 
statute “cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law.”97 And 
whether Miranda is to remain the law presented, for the majority, simply 
a question of stare decisis. “Whether or not we would agree with 
Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule,” Chief Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained, “the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it 
now.”98 
But the force of stare decisis in this case is debatable. Agreeing with 
the majority’s view that precedents are properly overruled when “inter-
 
hour had come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate Miranda, repudiate the 
prophylactic-rule cases, or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, doesn’t “have to” do anything, as the deci-
sion in Dickerson once again reminds us.” Donald Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal 
Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1, 33 (2001). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reticence was especially noteworthy be-
cause he had previously been among the most aggressive of the Justices in characterizing 
Miranda as a prophylactic rule. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993); 
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); 
Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 638–41 
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653–54, 657 (1984); 
Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers on application for 
stay); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974). 
95 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442. 
96 To be sure, the Fourth Circuit majority did frankly (and fairly) deem it “perfectly clear 
that Congress enacted § 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and 
restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court.” Dickerson, 530 
F.3d at 686. But that court’s further assertions that “Congress did not completely abandon the 
central holding of Miranda, i.e., the four warnings are important safeguards in protecting the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,” id. at 686–87, and “that Congress . . . 
acted in response to the Court’s invitation,” id. at 691, are hard to take seriously, as was the 
court’s claimed inability to “say that Congress’s decision to eliminate the irrebuttable pre-
sumption created by Miranda lessens the protections afforded by the privilege.” Id. Indeed, 
given the Fourth Circuit’s plain intimation that § 3501 was the product of a constitutionally 
responsible Congress, I hope it not too parochial to note that “not a single constitutional law 
professor or criminal law professor had been given an opportunity to testify [at the subcom-
mittee hearings on the Crime Bill of which § 3501 was a part] on the wisdom or constitutional-
ity of this proposal.” Kamisar, supra note 58, at 901. Whether this fact has any bearing on the 
likely constitutionality of § 3501 I leave to the reader’s unbiased judgment. 
97 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. 
98 Id. 
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vening development of the law . . . ha[s] removed or weakened the con-
ceptual underpinnings from the prior decision,”99 Justice Scalia argued 
that the insistence by Miranda’s progeny that Miranda was not constitu-
tional interpretation worked precisely such a change.100 Furthermore, al-
though Justice Scalia does not explicitly develop this argument, one im-
plication of his interpretation of Miranda might present a more profound 
challenge to the majority’s reliance on stare decisis. After all, Justice 
Scalia had not merely challenged Miranda’s reasoning. He had insisted 
that the Miranda Court had lacked constitutional power to announce its 
rule (at least once the true nature of that rule as extraconstitutional is ac-
knowledged). And if that Court had acted ultra vires, its rule might be 
deemed invalid ab initio, rendering stare decisis analysis consequently in-
appropriate.101 
 
99 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (cited by the majority in 
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443). 
100 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 462–63 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Grano, Confessions, supra 
note 77, at 204–06. As Joseph Grano argues, the prophylactic interpretation of Miranda con-
tradicts the many cases that have disclaimed supervisory authority over the state courts. Be-
cause the Court is therefore “in a position where it must choose between two lines of author-
ity,” overruling Miranda is as consistent with stare decisis as is maintaining it. Id. at 206 
(internal quotation omitted). 
101 Justice Scalia does not develop this point as clearly as he might have. His argument with 
respect to stare decisis seems to be essentially this: Because Miranda presented itself as 
engaging in constitutional interpretation, not as crafting a prophylactic rule, that critical “con-
ceptual underpinning” has been removed by the many progeny that recharacterized Miranda 
in prophylactic as opposed to constitutional terms. Yet this is not wholly persuasive for at 
least two reasons. First, the claim that Miranda itself purported to derive its rule regarding 
warnings as an exercise of constitutional interpretation, as opposed to prophylactic rule-
making (loosely understood), is highly contestable. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 
306 n.1 (1985) (contending that “[t]he Miranda Court itself recognized [the prophylactic char-
acter of its ruling] when it disclaimed any intent to create a ‘constitutional straitjacket’ and 
invited Congress and the States to suggest ‘potential alternatives for protecting the privi-
lege’”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). Indeed, in a slight concession, even Justice Scalia 
describes that reading of Miranda as merely “the fairest reading,” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 447 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), not the explicit or unambiguous one. Second, it is far from clear that 
Justice Scalia’s vision of what constitutes a requisite “conceptual underpinning” in the rele-
vant sense is the right one. That is, even were the majority to concede that Miranda is most 
fairly read as conceiving of itself as engaged in constitutional interpretation, it is not at all ob-
vious why it should not frankly construe Miranda as announcing a prophylactic rule and then 
afford it stare decisis deference on that rationale. This question cannot be answered without 
elaborating the justifications for stare decisis in the first place. 
 Given these difficulties with what seems at first blush to be Justice Scalia’s reason for not 
retaining Miranda as a matter of stare decisis, we might expect him to rely on additional ar-
guments for overruling that case. Some predictable ones are that if Miranda is understood as 
announcing a prophylactic rule either it cannot warrant stare decisis deference at all because 
it is invalid as opposed to wrong, or that whatever stare decisis deference it can enjoy is over-
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For these reasons, the majority’s failure to address whether Miranda 
engaged in a legitimate exercise of judicial power in the first instance is 
profoundly frustrating. By ignoring Justice Scalia’s arguments, the major-
ity leaves open a series of questions that would seem to demand an an-
swer: Was Miranda a prophylactic rule or not? If so, what makes it le-
gitimate? If not, why is it not a prophylactic rule? That is, once we strip 
away the majority’s hazy references to the “constitutional dimension” or 
“constitutional basis” for Miranda, what is the precise nature of the warn-
ings requirement, and how does that differ from a prophylactic rule? 
Most importantly, what makes this type of rule legitimate if a prophylac-
tic rule is not (or may not be)?102 If, as Strauss had argued, prophylactic 
rules are ubiquitous, the potential magnitude of these questions can 
hardly be overemphasized. Yet not only was there no response in the 
Court’s opinion, not a single member of the seven-Justice majority wrote 
separately to rehabilitate prophylactic rules from Justice Scalia’s attack—
a striking silence given the much-noted penchant of modern Justices to 
pen separate concurrences.103 Grano found his champion in Justice Scalia. 
Why did Strauss find none? Could all seven Justices have thought Justice 
Scalia’s condemnation of prophylactic rules not important enough to 
warrant rebuttal? Or could they find nothing persuasive to say?104 
 
ridden by the wrongness of that decision. In fact, arguments of this sort are suggested by Jus-
tice Scalia’s conclusion: 
In imposing its Court-made code upon the States, the original [Miranda] opinion at 
least asserted that it was demanded by the Constitution. Today’s decision does not pre-
tend that it is—and yet still asserts the right to impose it against the will of the people’s 
representatives in Congress. Far from believing that stare decisis compels this result, I 
believe we cannot allow to remain on the books even a celebrated decision—especially 
a celebrated decision—that has come to stand for the proposition that the Supreme 
Court has power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon Congress and the 
States. 
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
102 For a similar criticism leveled at the Court’s treatment of Miranda a quarter century ago, 
see Stone, supra note 69, at 123 (noting that Tucker “deprived Miranda of a constitutional ba-
sis but did not explain what other basis for it there might be”). 
103 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 133, 
147 (1990); Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 
79, 124 nn.153–54 (1994); Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of Con-
currences by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 777 (1990). 
104 Yale Kamisar suggests, without significant elaboration, that nobody wrote separately out 
of concern that doing so would have caused a chain reaction “and the 7-2 majority would have 
splintered badly.” Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . . , 99 
Mich. L. Rev. 879, 893 (2001). It is not at all apparent, however, why the existence of a sepa-
rate concurrence that advanced a Straussian argument for the legitimacy of prophylactic rules 
would have undermined whatever reasons the other members of the majority must have had 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
28 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
II. THE PROPHYLACTIC RULES DEBATE 
To resolve questions regarding the prevalence and legitimacy of pro-
phylactic rules we need, of course, a fair grasp on just what they are.105 
But our need to nail down the meaning of prophylactic rules might pro-
voke concern, for commentators have proposed a wealth of sometimes 
widely divergent definitions.106 In fact, though, the variety of extant defi-
nitions should not trouble us, for we are not looking for the best defini-
tion, or the modal definition; we only need to know what a prophylactic 
rule is in the minds of those—Justice Scalia and Professor Grano most 
vocally—who employ the term with a normative edge. What makes a 
judge-announced rule “prophylactic” in a sense that is supposed to ren-
der it illegitimate? 
The core idea from Justice Scalia’s Dickerson v. United States dissent, 
as well as from progeny of Miranda v. Arizona that had preceded 
Dickerson,107 seems to have two components, a genus and a differentia. 
First, a prophylactic rule is a judicial work product somehow distinguish-
able from judicial interpretation of the Constitution. As Justice Scalia 
 
for joining Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, even if some of them then felt compelled to 
write a concurrence too. To be sure, the Chief Justice, along with Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy, might have agreed in large measure with Justices Scalia and Thomas, and voted as 
they did for essentially pragmatic reasons. Justice Ginsburg’s silence might be explained at 
least in part by a prejudice against concurrence-writing. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1191 (1992) (criticizing “too frequent 
resort to separate opinions”). And Justice Stevens had previously denied that the Court had 
authority to announce prophylactic rules. See supra text accompanying note 68. The heart of 
the question thus becomes why neither Justice Souter nor Justice Breyer took Justice Scalia’s 
bait. One possibility (suggested by Professor Kamisar in a personal communication) is that a 
concurrence defending prophylactic rules might have provoked others in the majority to have 
foregrounded what Rehnquist’s opinion left in the background, namely that although § 3501 
was invalid, Congress remained free to propose other alternatives to the specific warning re-
quirement. 
105 I am speaking here only of definitions of prophylactic rules as they function in constitu-
tional adjudication. Many commentators recognize that the phrase or close synonyms are 
used in a wide variety of ways in other contexts. 
106 For one extraordinarily expansive definition of the term, see Michael Abramowicz, 
Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 43 (2001) (defining a prophylactic rule as “a 
rule of law beyond what the text of the Constitution explicitly requires”); see also id. at 8 
(calling a rule prophylactic if it is “more expansive than what the Constitution would seem on 
an original reading to say”). On this view, every judge-announced constitutional rule that 
rests on interpretive modalities other than text—original meaning or intent, structure, 
precedent, etc.—is a prophylactic rule. Plainly, most scholars do not use the term so broadly. 
See infra note 115 (collecting more standard definitions). Still, this should convey a quick and 
dirty sense of the wide range of ways the phrase is understood. 
107 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 64–66. 
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emphasized, a prophylactic rule is something other than “an explication 
of what the Constitution requires.”108 Second, it is that sort of extraconsti-
tutional rule that overenforces what the Constitution, as judicially inter-
preted, would itself require; it “expand[s]”109 or “sweeps more broadly 
than”110 the constitutional constraints that do or would emerge from 
straightforward judicial interpretation. Grano, the leading theorist among 
Miranda’s critics,111 conveys this same two-part idea when explaining that 
what “distinguishes a prophylactic rule from a true constitutional rule”112 
is that “[a] prophylactic rule . . . is a court-created rule that can be vio-
lated without violating the Constitution itself”113 and “that functions as a 
preventive safeguard to insure that constitutional violations will not oc-
cur.”114 
This definition, or something much like it, appears widely in the schol-
arly literature on prophylactic rules,115 and is probably clear enough to 
 
108 See supra text accompanying note 90. 
109 See supra text accompanying note 91. 
110 See supra text accompanying note 66. 
111 Yale Kamisar, the preeminent academic defender of the Warren Court’s criminal proce-
dure revolution, has lauded Grano’s work on Miranda as “brilliant,” and conceded that 
Grano has made “a plausible doctrinal case against Miranda and a better case than anyone 
else had made up to that time. A better case than I thought anyone could make.” Yale 
Kamisar, Joe Grano: The “Kid from South Philly” Who Educated Us All, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 
1231, 1255 (2000). For confirmation of Grano’s status among his fellow Miranda critics, see, 
for example, Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Over-
hauling of Miranda, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 175 (1999); Paul G. Cassell, A Tribute to Joe Grano: 
He Kept the Flame Alive, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1219 (2000); Michael Edmond O’Neill, Undoing 
Miranda, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 185, 265 (2000). 
112 Grano, supra note 70, at 105 & n.23. 
113 Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 77, at 176–77. 
114 Grano, supra note 70, at 105 & n.23. 
115 See, e.g., 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 2.9(e), at 673–74 (2d ed. 1999) 
[hereinafter LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure] (defining prophylactic rule as a rule that 
“does not announce a requirement mandated by the underlying constitutional provision, but a 
requirement adopted in the Court’s exercise of its authority to draft remedies and procedures 
that facilitate its adjudicatory responsibility”) (internal citation omitted); Evan H. Caminker, 
Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 1 n.2 & 28 n.93 
(2001) (defining the term—only to urge its retirement—“to refer to doctrinal rules self-
consciously crafted by courts for the instrumental purpose of improving the detection of 
and/or otherwise safeguarding against the violation of constitutional norms”); Susan Klein, 
Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1030, 1032 (2001) (“A ‘constitutional 
prophylactic rule’ is a judicially-created doctrinal rule or legal requirement determined by the 
Court as appropriate for deciding whether an explicit or ‘true’ federal constitutional rule is 
applicable.”); Wayne R. LaFave, Constitutional Rules for Police: A Matter of Style, 41 Syra-
cuse L. Rev. 849, 856 (1990) [hereinafter LaFave, Constitutional Rules] (describing prophy-
lactic rules as “procedural safeguards to protect a certain constitutional interest, even though 
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most readers. Still, we will be enabled to more fully grasp the Straussian 
defense of prophylactic rules against the Scalian critique if we pause to 
situate this conception of prophylactic rules within more general explora-
tions of the taxonomic or conceptual structure of constitutional doctrine. 
A. Background: Two Models of Constitutional Adjudication 
The “power of judicial review,” as Alexander Bickel described it, is the 
judicial “authority to determine the meaning and application of a written 
constitution.”116 From this conventional perspective,117 judicial review is 
 
that interest is not inevitably compromised when the prescribed procedure is absent”); Brian 
K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic 
Rules, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 925, 926 (1999) (defining as prophylactic “risk-avoidance rules that 
are not directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure 
that the government follows constitutionally sanctioned or required rules”). 
 Despite variations in language, one constant among these definitions is plain: Prophylactic 
rules issue, in some sense, from an exercise of judicial creativity distinguishable in character 
from the courts’ familiar power to interpret the Constitution. That is, the definitions recognize 
a distinction between “true constitutional rules” and “judicially-created doctrinal rules.” Be-
yond this core of agreement lie differences. The most conspicuous is that the LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure, supra, at 673–74, would apparently allow that a court-adopted rule could 
“facilitate its adjudicatory responsibility,” hence qualifying as prophylactic, even if the conse-
quence is a slight underenforcement of the rule’s “underlying constitutional provision,” accord 
Strauss, supra note 38, at 207, whereas most other commentators believe that prophylactic 
rules can overenforce the Constitution but not underenforce it. See, e.g., Landsberg, supra, at 
927 (specifying that “prophylactic rules build a fence around the Constitution”). A second 
variation is whether prophylactic rules can include deterrent remedies like the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule. They can in Caminker’s definition, but not for Klein or Grano. 
In Klein’s vocabulary, the exclusionary rule is an example not of a prophylactic rule, but of “a 
‘constitutional incidental right,’ a judicially-created procedure determined by the Court as the 
appropriate relief for the violation of an explicit or ‘true’ constitutional rule or a prophylactic 
rule.” Klein, supra, at 1033; cf. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1027 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as a contingent consequence of the Consti-
tution); Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionary Rule be Saved?, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 310 (1993) (developing Kaplan’s argument into a theory of “contingent constitutional ob-
ligations”). 
116 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 1 (1962). 
117 See, e.g., Mark E. Brandon, Free in the World: American Slavery and Constitutional 
Failure 89 (1998) (describing judicial review as the process through which courts “identify law, 
interpret it, apply it to facts presented in cases, and offer reasons for the result in a case”); 
Shelly L. Dowling & Mary C. Custy, The Jurisprudence of United States Constitutional Inter-
pretation: An Annotated Bibliography 3 (1999) (labeling the process of American constitu-
tionalism “the jurisprudence of constitutional interpretation”); Kermit L. Hall, The Supreme 
Court and Judicial Review in American History 1 (1985) (“Judicial review is the practice by 
which the Supreme Court scrutinizes state and federal legislation and the acts of state and 
federal executive officers and courts in order to determine whether they are in conflict with 
the Constitution.”); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 213 (3d ed. 2000) (de-
fining judicial review as “the power of federal courts independently to interpret and apply the 
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essentially a two-step process: First, a court interprets the Constitution; 
second, it applies that interpretation to the facts of the case to reach a 
constitutional holding.118 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court (1) inter-
prets Article I, Section 8 to provide that Congress has constitutional au-
thority to regulate intrastate activity if it would be rational to believe that 
the activity, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce, 
and then (2) applies that rule by determining whether Congress could ra-
tionally conclude that the farming of wheat for personal consumption has 
the requisite effect.119 Or, the Court (1) interprets the Equal Protection 
Clause to forbid departures from only a certain sort of formal equality, 
and then (2) applies that understanding to hold (a) that a Louisiana stat-
ute requiring railroad companies to provide “equal but separate accom-
modations for the white and colored races” affords such equal protec-
 
Constitution”). It is characteristic of the extent to which this image has seeped unexamined 
into our consciousness, I think, that a book subtitled The Supreme Court and the Process of 
Adjudication would be titled Interpreting the Constitution as though the Supreme Court’s role 
in the process of constitutional adjudication is just one of interpretation. Harry H. Wellington, 
Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication (1990). 
118 This description of judicial review is agnostic with respect to a host of corollary matters 
(often intertwined) such as how much deference courts should give the interpretive judgments 
reached by the coordinate branches of the federal government or by the states, and whether 
constitutional judgments announced by the courts (deferential or not) should be understood 
to bind these other governmental actors. The literature on these issues—under headings like 
“extrajudicial constitutional interpretation” and “judicial supremacy”—is already vast and, in 
this year of Marbury’s bicentennial, seemingly growing by the day. For one recent contribu-
tion that usefully summarizes some of the debates, see Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 773 (2002). 
 These are normative questions. In the past fifteen years, historians have made substantial 
progress on the related question of how our present understanding of judicial review com-
pares to the conception of the power as announced in Marbury. Path-breaking works were 
Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (1989) and Sylvia Snowiss, 
Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution (1990). As Michael Klarman helpfully sum-
marizes: 
[T]he judicial review power first exercised by the Supreme Court in Marbury was far 
more restricted in scope than is our modern understanding of the practice. Most people 
who contemplated judicial review in the early years of the republic understood it to be 
cabined by two important qualifications. Courts were empowered to strike down only 
“clearly unconstitutional” laws; if reasonable people could differ, courts had to sustain 
the statute. Moreover, courts could invalidate only those laws that fell within the special 
purview of the judiciary—for example, a law restricting access to jury trials—and not 
any old piece of legislation. 
Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 Va. L. Rev. 
1111, 1120–21 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 
119 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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tion,120 or (b) that Texas’s establishment of separate all-white and all-
black law schools does not.121 
Of course, the actual practice of constitutional adjudication is far more 
complicated than this austere view contemplates.122 For one thing, the 
proverbial Martian could not make full sense of our practice without 
some understanding of the relevant institutional and socio-legal con-
text—matters like the organization of the federal judiciary and the spe-
cial role of the Supreme Court, the politics of judicial nomination, and 
Congress’s influence, actual and latent, on federal jurisdiction. Further-
more, and of much greater relevance for the present study, courts employ 
a very large number of rules, principles, and customs when actually carry-
ing out constitutional adjudication. Matters that function internal to the 
adjudicatory practice include the accepted methods of constitutional in-
terpretation, the principle of stare decisis, the rules of justiciability and 
certiorari, canons of constitutional avoidance, customs to resolve deci-
sional paradoxes that can arise on multimember bodies, a court’s author-
ity to remedy what it determines to be constitutional violations, and 
surely much more besides. All this is meaningfully part of the “practice” 
or “institution” of judicial review. 
This Article is not the place to attempt to catalogue all relevant fea-
tures of the practice, let alone to model their workings.123 Here I should 
like only to emphasize the single most conspicuous respect in which the 
actual practice of judicial review, or the actual structure of constitutional 
adjudication, has been claimed to be more complicated than the two-step 
model suggests. According to this view, the conventional picture ignores 
 
120 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896). 
121 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
122 Gadamerians might object that the actual structure is less complicated insofar as 
“[u]nderstanding . . . is always application.” Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 275 
(Garnett Barden & John Cumming eds., Sheed and Ward trans., The Seabury Press 1975) 
(1965). True, to understand what a provision means is to understand how it would apply to at 
least some hypothetical set of facts. It is not, however, to understand how it applies in the ac-
tual factual circumstances of the given case. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, We the People: the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court 34–35 (1999). Interestingly, for jurists from 
Justice Holmes to Judge Posner who emphasize a judge’s tendency to intuit the “right” result 
before intuiting the legal rule under which that result falls, the converse might seem more 
nearly true: Application is always understanding. 
123 The literature on such matters as those mentioned in the previous paragraph are too large 
and diverse to justify citation to representative contributions. For one recent discussion that 
ambitiously canvasses a large number of the features relevant to the practice of judicial re-
view, see, Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on Judging: 
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16 (2002). 
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that the application of constitutional meaning to the facts of a given “case 
or controversy” is often mediated by judge-made tests of constitutional 
law that are not most fairly understood as themselves products of judicial 
constitutional interpretation. For many years, this claim was perhaps 
most widely associated with Monaghan’s distinction between “Marbury-
shielded constitutional exegesis” and “constitutional common law.”124 But 
it appears as well in Sager’s demonstration that, in lieu of applying what 
they take as the interpreted meaning of constitutional norms, courts often 
interpose judge-announced “institutional constructs” that do not fully en-
force those presumed norms.125 More recently, Fallon has developed a de-
tailed critique of the simple two-step model of constitutional adjudication 
in urging judges and commentators to think of judicial review in terms of 
constitutional “implementation” because “‘implementation’ is a more 
aptly encompassing term than ‘interpretation,’ capable of subsuming two 
conceptually distinctive functions: one of identifying constitutional norms 
and specifying their meaning and another of crafting doctrine or develop-
ing standards of review.”126 
 
124 See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 31. 
125 I think that the distinction between judge-created constitutional tests and judge-
interpreted constitutional meaning may be more easily missed in Sager’s work than in Mona-
ghan’s because of the many subtle distinctions that Sager introduces—distinctions between 
“constitutional norms” and “constitutional rules,” concepts and conceptions, “analytical con-
structs” and “institutional constructs.” His core insight, though, is that constitutional norms 
(concepts) get worked out during adjudication into court-announced constructs (rules or con-
ceptions), which are of two different sorts: analytical (“based upon an understanding of the 
concept itself”) and institutional (“based upon questions of propriety or capacity”). Sager, su-
pra note 5, at 1217–18. Although a cursory reading might suggest that these are simply alter-
native ways to implement the constitutional norm, it is more perspicuous, I believe, to view 
analytical constructs as always logically prior to institutional ones. That is, even if the judi-
cially announced constitutional doctrine consists of an institutional construct, not an analytical 
one, that institutional construct is based on at least an implicit understanding of the analytical 
construct—what, in the court’s view, the constitutional norm means. Thus, when Sager refers 
to the underenforcement of constitutional norms, he does not mean to include those judge-
announced analytical constructs that underenforce the “true” or ideally understood constitu-
tional norms; he refers only to those judge-announced institutional constructs that underen-
force the (perhaps implicit) judicial view of the constitutional norm, i.e., the (actual or hypo-
thetical) judge-announced analytical construct. Were the case otherwise, the 
underenforcement thesis would be far less novel and important than it is, for it would amount, 
in large measure, to the prosaic argument that non-judicial actors should adhere to their own 
interpretation of the Constitution when they conclude that the courts’ interpretation is too 
generous to state power. See infra note 133. 
126 Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 38. Although, as here, Fallon 
usually defines constitutional doctrine in contradistinction to constitutional meaning, in places 
he seems to employ the phrase in the broader sense we have been using thus far, as signifying 
the universe of judicial outputs broad enough to include meaning. See id. at 41 (defining 
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It would be mistaken to suppose that Monaghan, Sager, and Fallon 
were endeavoring to communicate the very same vision, just with differ-
ent words. Still, a detailed study of the similarities and differences among 
these three accounts of the constitutional adjudicatory practice ought not 
detain us. The essential point at present is that each would break down 
the broad and otherwise undifferentiated mass of judge-announced con-
stitutional law into two conceptually distinct components—constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional common law, or analytical constructs 
and institutional constructs, or constitutional meaning and constitutional 
doctrine. 
In an effort to keep attention fixed on the commonality uniting these 
accounts—that there exists a conceptual distinction between two sorts of 
judicial work product each of which is integral to the functioning of con-
stitutional adjudication—and not on the singularity of any one,127 let us 
not adopt whole hog the particular vocabulary advanced by any one these 
theorists. Instead, let us distinguish between “constitutional meanings” 
and “constitutional rules,” where meanings and rules are two different 
types of “constitutional doctrine.”128 That is to say, judge-announced con-
 
“constitutional doctrine . . . to embrace not only the holdings of cases, but also the analytical 
frameworks and tests that precedents establish”) (internal citation omitted). 
127 Not only might it hamper appreciation of the unifying thread to privilege language that 
readers are apt to strongly associate with just one or another of these visions, but there are 
independent reasons to be dissatisfied with the nomenclature just offered. I explore some of 
these considerations in the next footnote. 
128 Insofar as Sager would split the universe of constitutional doctrine into “norms” and 
“rules” of constitutional law, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Symposium: The Emergence of State 
Constitutional Law, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and 
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959 (1985), and Fallon distinguishes between 
“constitutional meaning” and “constitutional doctrine,” see Fallon, Implementing the Consti-
tution, supra note 10, at 38, my proposed nomenclature is a compromise between the two. In 
my view, “constitutional meanings” is a more auspicious term than is “constitutional norms” 
for the first judicial output because the notion of “constitutional norms” might imply those 
norms of political morality that the Constitution endorses, and thus would be an ingredient of 
the constitutional meaning, not the judge-determined meaning itself. Take, for example, Arti-
cle II’s dictate that no person is eligible to be President “who shall not have attained to the 
Age of thirty five Years.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Were the Court to determine that a 
challenge to the election of a thirty-year-old was justiciable, and then to declare the candidate 
ineligible on the ground that she had not “attained to the Age of thirty five Years,” it would 
be applying straightforward constitutional “meaning.” Yet Sager’s norm/rule distinction might 
treat this as the application of a constitutional “rule” designed to effectuate an underlying 
“norm” that Presidents should have a requisite degree of maturity and life experience. Put 
another way, the norm/rule distinction might suggest that the relevant distinction to be drawn 
distinguishes between what is, and what is not, “law” in some meaningful sense: The judge-
created constitutional “rule” fashions a constitutional “norm” of political morality into recog-
nizable law. But this is not the distinction that I mean to capture. 
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stitutional doctrine (what most lawyers have in mind when they speak of 
“constitutional law”) consists of judge-interpreted constitutional mean-
ings supplemented or supplanted by judge-made constitutional rules. 
Conspicuous (and oft-commented upon) illustrations of the latter are 
likely to include the complex tiers of First Amendment and Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence, the Miranda rule, and Roe v. Wade’s trimester frame-
work. But, as many scholars have observed, constitutional rules in this 
sense are ubiquitous.129 Of course, this is a positive claim that need not 
concede their legitimacy. 
Merely recognizing the mediating function that constitutional rules 
play between the logically prior judicial announcement of constitutional 
meaning and the logically subsequent application of law to facts suggests 
the following schematic vision of the practice: A court interprets the 
 
 I prefer “constitutional rule” to Fallon’s use of “constitutional doctrine” as a label for the 
second output because, as noted earlier, see supra note 3, the phrase “constitutional doctrine” 
is already in broad use to signify the entire range of judicial work products that operate in the 
practice of constitutional adjudication. In short, what Fallon calls “constitutional doctrine” to 
be distinguished from “constitutional meaning,” and to refer to a specific step in the concep-
tual logic of constitutional adjudication, is only one element of what most scholars think of as 
“constitutional doctrine.” Indeed, common parlance is plainly on the side of a broader usage. 
A reference, say, to “existing free exercise doctrine” is not, customarily, intended or taken as 
prejudging whether the rules of constitutional law that currently govern the Free Exercise 
Clause are better classified as “doctrine” as opposed to (mere) “constitutional meaning.” Al-
though it is familiar enough to use the same term to refer both to a given genus and to one 
species within that genus (as just noted, rules are sometimes subdivided into rules and stan-
dards), taxonomic synecdoche of this sort predictably invites confusion and therefore should 
not be adopted complacently. 
 I have eschewed Monaghan’s vocabulary. “Constitutional common law” is, for one thing, 
cumbersome. More importantly, Monaghan treats it as “subject to amendment, modification, 
or even reversal by Congress” by definition. Monaghan, supra note 4, at 3; see also, e.g., id. at 
31 (distinguishing between “Marbury-shielded constitutional exegesis and congressionally re-
versible constitutional law”). This vision of what is necessarily entailed by the “common law” 
appellation resonates broadly. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment codified a “common law” conception of state 
sovereign immunity and therefore is necessarily subject to congressional override). But, as a 
necessary characteristic of what I will call “constitutional rules,” that is something I very much 
wish to deny. See infra Section IV.A.2.c; see also, e.g., Sager, supra, at 966 n.19 (arguing that 
judicially recognized strategic rights are “products of a pervasive, legitimate aspect of federal 
constitutional decisionmaking,” which should not be wholly subordinated to the legislature). 
For similar reasons, I refrain from calling the outputs that I have labeled “meanings” and 
“rules,” respectively, “constitutional law” and extraconstitutional or subconstitutional law. 
Each of the latter terms might be read to connote (as Monaghan assumed) defeasibility by 
Congress. Additionally, they might be thought to imply eliminability whereas Fallon, at least, 
is keen to insist that the construction of what he calls “constitutional doctrine” is as essential a 
part of judicial review, as is the divination of “constitutional meaning.” 
129 In addition to the authorities discussed, see, for example, Fried, supra note 3. 
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Constitution to yield a (judicial) statement of constitutional meaning, on 
the back of which it may construct a constitutional rule, which rule it then 
applies to the facts to yield a constitutional holding, by which I mean, 
quintessentially, a declaration that challenged governmental conduct is, 
or is not, constitutionally permissible.130 In this picture, two distinct judi-
cial outputs function logically prior to the announcement of holdings: 
constitutional meanings and constitutional rules.131 This is contrasted with 
the simple model in which there exists only a single mediating output. 
(See Figure 1.) 
 
130 See also Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 199, 199–200 (1971) (suggesting a similar image). 
131 Following standard conventions, the ovals represent the starting and ending points, rec-
tangles represent processes, and parallelograms represent the intermediate outputs. 
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The Logical Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: Two Models 
(Figure 1) 
 



































BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
38 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
B. Prophylactic Rules and Overprotection 
Many questions and challenges can be raised against this more com-
plex model, but as it is not my goal to defend it, we need not address 
them now. A rough picture is sufficient for our purpose.132 If this image is 
approximately correct, then “prophylactic rules” (as conceived of by 
most scholars) reside among what we have designated “constitutional 
rules.” This is what Grano means in claiming that they are “court-
created,” not “true constitutional rules.”133 “Prophylactic rules” and “con-
stitutional rules” are not simply synonyms, however. If we can speak sen-
sibly about the extensional relation that obtains between any given con-
stitutional rule and its supporting or generating (court-interpreted) 
constitutional meaning,134 three sorts of relationships can exist: (1) the 
constitutional rule can overenforce meaning; (2) it can underenforce 
meaning; and (3) it can overenforce in some parts while underenforcing 
in others.135 (See Figure 2.) 
 
132 That purpose, to reiterate, is to appreciate as fully as possible the contending positions in 
the debate over the legitimacy of prophylactic rules. To preview what is to come, I will argue 
that our collective understanding of the nature and (il)legitimacy of prophylactic rules is in-
firm because neither the simple two-step model of judicial review nor the more complex 
three-step model—as currently conceived—faithfully captures the logic of constitutional ad-
judication. 
133 Surely Grano misspeaks when distinguishing violations of a prophylactic rule from viola-
tions of “the Constitution itself.” See supra text accompanying note 113. Any rule of constitu-
tional law can be violated without violating the Constitution itself insofar as the rule can mis-
takenly interpret a constitutional restraint on state power more broadly than a “correct” (or 
better) interpretation would warrant. See, e.g., Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 184. By 
distinguishing “constitutional rules” from “the Constitution,” we see that Grano must mean 
that prophylactic rules can be violated without one’s having violated the Constitution as judi-
cially interpreted (even if that interpretation is only implicit). Translated into our stipulated 
vocabulary, Grano and Justice Scalia are condemning, as “prophylactic,” those “constitutional 
rules” that overenforce judge-interpreted constitutional meanings. 
134 One of the insights gained from carving doctrine into operative propositions and decision 
rules is that this predicate (that it makes sense to think in terms of extensional relationships) 
is more vexed than the standard conceptualizations of constitutional doctrine would suggest. 
As a consequence, determining whether given doctrine overprotects what the Court takes the 
Constitution to mean is often more complicated than contributors to the prophylaxis litera-
ture have appreciated. See infra Section V.B. 
135 Actually, five relationships are theoretically possible. In the fourth, all that the rule pro-
hibits the Constitution (as interpreted) allows, and all that the Constitution (as interpreted) 
prohibits, the rule allows. In the fifth, the constitutional rule and the constitutional meaning 
are perfectly coextensive. Both of these possibilities, however, are of only theoretical interest. 
When a constitutional rule and its corresponding constitutional meaning share no content at 
all it is hard to see in what sense the governing rule could be classified as constitutional doc-
trine at all. When rule and meaning are extensionally identical, they qualify as different things 
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only where their intensional meanings differ, which, in this context, is not likely to be a real 
prospect. 
136 Different but analogous representations appear in Klein, supra note 115, at 1079–80. 
Also, for roughly comparable arguments about the ways that remedies can overenforce or 
underenforce a right, see Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies 279–89 (3d ed. 
2002); David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing 
the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 627 (1988). 
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It is definitional of prophylactic rules—at least for Grano and Justice 
Scalia—that they overenforce judge-determined constitutional mean-
ing.137 As far as the three images contained in Figure 2 are concerned, 
then, only image (1) represents a prophylactic rule.138 (Let us say that im-
age (2) depicts an “underenforcement rule”139 and image (3) an “overlap-
ping rule.”) 
C. Prophylactic Rules Defended (or Denied) 
To this point we have expended some effort clarifying what, in the es-
timation of their critics, prophylactic rules are, without yet exploring what 
 
137 See, e.g., Grano, supra note 70, at 104 (“While prophylactic rules also may be intended, at 
least in part, to prevent future constitutional violations, they result in suppression of evidence 
or appellate reversal even when the Constitution has not actually been violated. By contrast, 
deterrent remedies, such as the exclusionary rule, apply only after an actual constitutional vio-
lation has occurred.”) (internal citation omitted). As noted earlier, see supra note 115, 
Grano’s claim that it is definitional of prophylactic rules that they have this particular exten-
sional relationship to what courts view as the true constitutional rule is not as widely accepted 
as is the proposition that prophylactic rules are something other than judge-interpreted con-
stitutional meaning. 
138 Paul Cassell contends that “[r]ules required by the Constitution, and rules beyond those 
required by the Constitution together exhaust the universe of rules.” Paul G. Cassell, The 
Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 898, 906 
(2001). This proposition is correct, if “beyond those required by the Constitution” means 
merely “other than those required by the Constitution.” But an alternative reading would take 
“beyond” to refer to the rule’s extensional scope. Indeed, that is the reading Cassell seems to 
have in mind, as he distinguishes rules required by the Constitution from rules that afford 
“protection beyond what the Constitution requires.” Id. at 905. Rules required by the Consti-
tution and rules that overprotect what is required by the Constitution do not exhaust the uni-
verse of rules. As Sager taught a quarter century ago, courts also create rules that underpro-
tect what is required by the Constitution. Sager, supra note 5. 
139 Scholars have proposed varying language for this sort of constitutional doctrine. Stephen 
Schulhofer calls it a “reverse prophylactic rule[],” Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering 
Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 449 (1987), a construction that has some undeniable merit 
but unfortunately privileges overprotection relative to underprotection, and also implies that 
constitutional rules are of only two sorts, not three. Susan Klein calls it a “safe harbor” rule. 
Klein, supra note 115. This terminology has value too. I think it is potentially misleading, 
though, insofar as it implies not only that there exists a particular extensional relationship be-
tween constitutional rule and constitutional meaning but also that that relationship was 
adopted for a particular purpose. It may connote, that is, that the doctrine was adopted for 
what I have termed “preventive” considerations. See infra Section IV.A.2.a. (Of course, call-
ing the reverse of this sort of rule “prophylactic” instead of “overinclusive” or “overenforce-
ment” might bear a similar connotation—in this case, that the rule was adopted for “deter-
rent” purposes. See infra Section IV.A.2.a. So even if “safe harbor rule” is less apt than 
“underenforcement rule,” it is arguably on closer par with “prophylactic rule.”) In any event, 
given the importance and widespread familiarity of Sager’s “underenforcement” vocabulary, 
“underenforcement rule” seems especially appropriate. 
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is supposed to make them illegitimate. Most generally, the question will 
be whether it is the fact of overprotection itself that is thought to render 
them illegitimate (in which case underenforcing constitutional rules 
would be legitimate and overlapping constitutional rules might be too) 
or, alternatively, whether their illegitimacy is just entailed by the sup-
posed illegitimacy of all constitutional rules.140 Let us bracket this ques-
tion, though, and turn attention instead to the arguments of those who 
defend prophylactic rules, most notably David Strauss. If Strauss’s view 
of prophylactic rules mirrored that of his opponents, the ubiquity thesis 
must be that constitutional doctrine consists in substantial part of consti-
tutional rules that overenforce judge-interpreted constitutional meaning. 
In fact, though, that is not his claim. And to understand why it is not will 
be to see what is most centrally at issue in the dispute over prophylactic 
rules. 
As the graphic representation of the complex model of constitutional 
adjudication in Figure 1 indicates, the difference between constitutional 
rules (of which prophylactic rules are one variety) and constitutional 
meanings rests upon differences in the modes of production. Judge-
interpreted constitutional meaning is a product of “constitutional inter-
pretation,” whereas constitutional rules are the product of “constitutional 
rule-making.” The labels, of course, are unimportant.141 What is impor-
 
140 It seems late in the day to contend that constitutional rules are categorically illegitimate, 
that constitutional adjudication must always apply constitutional meaning unmediated to the 
facts of the case to reach a holding. In any event, if Justice Scalia means to denounce constitu-
tional rules full stop, we can fairly demand a more sustained and straightforward argument 
against it than is supplied merely by inferences from his rejection of prophylactic rules alone. 
 If Justice Scalia is not willing to declare illegitimate all judge-announced constitutional doc-
trine that is nonidentical to judicially interpreted constitutional meaning, perhaps his blanket 
denunciation of prophylactic rules is predicated on the view that doctrine must always under-
enforce meaning. As applied to doctrine implementing individual rights, this position system-
atically favors majoritarianism over individual liberty. It says, for example, that the Court may 
underenforce the rights of speech, or religious exercise or equal protection, but may not over-
enforce them—even though such underenforcement doctrines are at least as illiberal as pro-
phylactic rules are antidemocratic. This is peculiar. Furthermore, the hypothetical proposition 
that underenforcement rules are permissible while prophylactic rules are not becomes even 
more puzzling when applied to paradigmatically structural provisions governing the allocation 
of powers between state governments and the federal government or between Congress and 
the President. What neutral, constitutionally mandated principle would produce the asymme-
try that the federal judiciary may underenforce limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, but 
not overenforce them? 
141 Indeed, what Figure 1 designates as constitutional interpretation may be even more faith-
fully understood as consisting of discrete subprocesses, a claim suggested, for example, by 
Keith Whittington’s recent contrast between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitu-
tional construction.” See generally Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
42 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
tant, at least in Strauss’s account, is that the existence of two conceptually 
distinct outputs—which, recall, is a logically necessary predicate for there 
being such things as “prophylactic rules” in the normatively loaded sense 
endorsed by Grano and Justice Scalia—depends upon there existing con-
ceptually distinct processes of output-creation.142 That is, the processes 
that our diagram (arbitrarily) labels “interpretation” and “rule-making” 
must themselves be distinguishable. But, Strauss argues, this distinction is 
false: “[I]n deciding constitutional cases, the courts constantly consider 
institutional capacities and propensities. That is, to a large extent, what 
constitutional law consists of: courts create constitutional doctrine by tak-
ing into account both the principles and values reflected in the relevant 
constitutional provisions and institutional realities.”143 If the processes of 
interpretation and its putative sibling are indistinguishable, the argument 
appears to run, it is meaningless to distinguish judge-interpreted constitu-
 
Powers and Constitutional Meaning (1999) [hereinafter Whittington, Constitutional Con-
struction]; Keith Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original In-
tent, and Judicial Review (1999) [hereinafter Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation]; cf. 
Chester James Antieau, Constitutional Construction xxiii (1982) (defining “construction . . . to 
embrace both the task of ascertaining meaning of words employed by those responsible for 
the constitutions, and the far larger and more important duty of assigning the appropriate le-
gal significances to clauses and words used in the basic laws”). As Whittington puts it: 
Although the clauses and structures that make up the [constitutional] text cannot be 
simply empty of meaning, . . . the meaning that they do convey may be so broad and 
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful reduction to legal rules. This is not so 
much a problem of a given clause possessing absolutely no judicially formalizable mean-
ing as it is the inability of the judiciary to define exhaustively the meaning of the text. 
Regardless of the extent of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution, 
there will remain an impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered. 
The judiciary may be able to delimit textual meaning, hedging in the possibilities, but 
after all judgments have been rendered specifying discoverable meaning, major inde-
terminacies may remain. The specification of a single governing meaning from these 
possibilities requires an act of creativity beyond interpretation. . . . This additional step 
is the construction of meaning. 
Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra, at 7. For Whittington, then, construction is 
a second step in the identification of what I term “meaning”: Construction specifies a particu-
lar meaning from among the range of possibilities that other forms of interpretation have left 
available. For a broadly similar argument, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 (2003) (discussing founding-era expectations that subse-
quent interpretations would “fix” the meaning of vague or ambiguous constitutional provi-
sions). 
142 But see Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 41 (contending that it is 
“misleading to suggest that the Court’s function consists exclusively in the search for constitu-
tional ‘meaning,’” but observing as well that his “central claims . . . could be accepted even by 
someone whose conception of ‘interpretation’ was broad enough to subsume the varied ele-
ments of what I call ‘implementation’”). 
143 Strauss, supra note 38, at 207. 
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tional meanings and judge-created constitutional rules because the very 
same sorts of pragmatic, institution-sensitive considerations are always 
potentially at work. In sum, Strauss rebuts the charge that prophylactic 
rules like the Miranda doctrine are illegitimate by denying the underlying 
premise that there exist two analytically discrete outputs. Prophylactic 
rules are ubiquitous, he says, not because court-announced doctrine con-
sists of lots of outputs that overprotect court-interpreted constitutional 
meaning, but because there is only one sort of output—“constitutional 
doctrine”—much of which has the same “prophylactic” relationship to 
“the real, noumenal Constitution”144 as does Miranda.145 Viewed in this 
 
144 Id. at 207–08. 
145 Michael Dorf and Barry Friedman misunderstand Strauss’s analysis when they describe 
his position on prophylactic rules as an effort “to understand Miranda in . . . subconstitutional 
terms.” Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 61, 64–65 (2001). Instead, they argue, “[T]he case can be explained equally effec-
tively without raising the legitimacy concerns that prophylaxis and constitutional common law 
trigger: Miranda can be justified purely in terms of the Court’s incontestable power to inter-
pret the Constitution.” Id. Perhaps so. But this is not an alternative to Strauss’s argument; it is 
Strauss’s argument. Or, to put the point another way, Dorf and Friedman err when criticizing 
Strauss on the grounds “that the analytic value of the concept of prophylaxis is limited be-
cause ultimately it asks the wrong question.” Id. at 75. The question the concept of prophy-
laxis asks, Dorf and Friedman think, is “how to justify judicial rulings that go beyond what the 
text and history of the Constitution strictly require.” Id. at 75–76. And that is mistaken, they 
maintain, because “[i]n a post-Realist world, there is no shortage of justifications for courts 
making law.” Id. at 76. Yet this, of course, was precisely Strauss’s point. Recall that Strauss 
did not originate prophylaxis talk; he responded to it. And his response, in essence, was that 
the vocabulary, along with the normative claims that rode upon it, foundered on the mistaken 
assumption that there existed any meaningful category of nonprophylactic constitutional in-
terpretation. 
 Dorf and Friedman may have been misled by Strauss’s 1996 article “Common Law Consti-
tutional Interpretation,” supra note 3, which is, in an important sense, a companion piece to 
“The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,” supra note 38. One might anticipate, given the similar-
ity in titles, that Strauss would be arguing along the lines set out by Monaghan twenty years 
earlier in “Constitutional Common Law,” supra note 4. If so, one would be mistaken. Strauss 
appropriated the phrase “constitutional common law” to signify, not a particular output in the 
logical structure of constitutional adjudication (as Monaghan had used the term), but rather a 
method of deriving those outputs. As he explains it, common law constitutional interpretation 
is the process of deriving constitutional meaning not “from some authoritative source,” but 
“instead in understandings that evolve over time,” especially in the steady accretion of judicial 
precedent. Strauss, supra note 3, at 879. Strauss very rarely uses the phrase “constitutional 
common law” to describe either his favored interpretive method or the body of law it pro-
duces, opting instead for such formulations as “common law constitutional interpretation,” 
“the common law approach to constitutional interpretation,” and “common law constitution-
alism.” See id.  
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light, then, Strauss’s contention is not so much that prophylactic rules (in 
Grano’s sense) are ubiquitous, but that they are nonexistent.146 
Daryl Levinson pressed this Straussian argument with vigor in a highly 
regarded recent article, criticizing what, he dubbed “rights essentialism,” 
and identified as the dominant vision of constitutional adjudication. “The 
rights-essentialist picture, in which courts begin with the pure, Platonic 
ideal of a constitutional right and only then pragmatically apply the right 
through the vehicles of implementation and remediation, bears little re-
semblance to the actual practice of rights-construction,” Levinson ar-
gued.147 The attempt to carve constitutional doctrine into (what I have la-
beled) constitutional meanings and constitutional rules “assume[s] that 
constitutional rights have ‘true’ scopes which, while often lost in the un-
differentiated judicial doctrine that courts produce in the course of decid-
ing actual cases, comprise what the Constitution really means, as opposed 
to how it is used in constitutional adjudication.”148 This, he contends, is 
just wrong. “Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their applica-
tion to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.”149 
The truth—“remedial equilibration”—is that “constitutional rights are 
inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns. Constitutional 
 
146 Revealingly, Justice Scalia’s Dickerson dissent relies on just the distinction that Strauss 
denies when responding to examples marshaled in the government’s brief offered to support 
the ubiquity thesis. Translated into our vocabulary, his argument, in effect, is that many of 
these purported prophylactic rules are really examples of judge-announced constitutional 
meanings that are prophylactic relative to their animating norms of political morality, not 
constitutional rules that are prophylactic relative to constitutional meanings. See, e.g., 
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing that in various First Amendment 
contexts, “the Court has acknowledged that in order to guarantee that protected speech is not 
‘chilled’ and thus forgone, it is in some instances necessary to incorporate in our substantive 
rules a ‘measure of strategic protection,’” but explaining “that is because the Court has 
viewed the importation of ‘chill’ as itself a violation of the First Amendment—not because the 
Court thought it could go beyond what the First Amendment demanded in order to provide 
some prophylaxis”); see also, e.g., Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 77, 
at 189 (arguing “the first amendment may prohibit standardless licensing discretion not as an 
evil in itself but because of a concern that such discretion too easily will permit license denials 
for the ‘wrong’ reasons”). Perhaps because Strauss resists dividing constitutional doctrine into 
conceptually distinct sorts—what I have thus far called “constitutional meanings” and “consti-
tutional rules”—he appears in a post-Dickerson article not fully to appreciate Justice Scalia’s 
argument. See David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 
958, 965–66 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress]. 
147 Levinson, supra note 27, at 873. But see id. at 861 n.9 (“The ‘essentialism’ in rights essen-
tialism alludes to the qualitative distinction between rights and remedies, not to any claim that 
rights are objective, ahistorical Platonic Forms.”). 
148 Id. at 869–70. 
149 Id. at 858. 
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adjudication is functional not just at the level of remedies, but all the way 
up.”150 
Do not fixate on the right/remedy vocabulary. It takes no imagination 
to translate Levinson’s argument to the supposed distinction between 
constitutional meanings and constitutional rules,151 for rights in Levinson’s 
view just are those things that are supposed to reside in constitutional 
meaning, “while remedies are consigned to the banausic sphere of policy, 
pragmatism, and politics”152—the sphere of constitutional rule-making. In 
short, Levinson is advancing a two-part claim: first, that the distinction 
between judge-determined “constitutional meanings” and judge-made 
“constitutional rules” has become dominant in constitutional theory; and 
second, that the distinction is misguided because it assumes that prag-
matic judgments about how meaning can be implemented most effec-
tively in the real world are not inescapably part of constitutional interpre-
tation, and thus can be relegated or reserved to a conceptually distinct, 
logically subsequent, or less valued, dimension. 
Strauss and Levinson are not, I want to make clear, isolated voices.153 
They represent a phalanx of scholars challenging the effort to subdivide 
“constitutional doctrine” along conceptual lines. Indeed, the challenge 
had been mounted even prior to “The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,” 
in forceful works questioning the coherence of Monaghan’s distinction 
between constitutional exegesis and constitutional common law.154 It also 
 
150 Id. at 873. 
151 See id. at 860 (identifying Monaghan’s theory of constitutional common law and Sager’s 
underenforcement analysis as leading examples of rights-essentialism); id. at 866–70 (discuss-
ing Monaghan and Sager in more detail). 
152 Id. at 857. 
153 For further confirmation of the tight link between them, however, see id. at 904 (“Consti-
tutional doctrine, in order to have any useful meaning in governing the primary behavior of 
government, must be more rule-like than any of the most abstract standards that might be put 
forward as the basic principle of any given constitutional right. Consequently, like all legal 
rules (as opposed to standards), constitutional law will be both overinclusive (i.e., prophylac-
tic) and underinclusive relative to an ultimate purpose. The degree of over- and underinclu-
siveness of any given constitutional rule will depend on such factors as the administrability 
and expense of a more precise rule and the error costs of false negatives and false positives. 
Nothing in the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, and no amount of philosophizing 
about values or principles, will help courts to balance such remedial concerns. Yet every con-
stitutional rule takes account of them.”). 
154 The leading examples, appearing a year apart, were by Martha Field and Thomas Merrill. 
See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 
881, 890 (1986) (defining “federal common law” as “any rule of federal law created by a court 
(usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly sug-
gested by federal enactments—constitutional or congressional”) (internal citation omitted); id. 
at 892, 895 (acknowledging that “[s]ome will believe that the proposed definition is so broad 
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undergirds Evan Caminker’s recommendation “that we jettison the 
phrase ‘prophylactic rule’ from our vocabulary, because there really isn’t 
any such thing as a distinctively prophylactic rule that is in any important 
way distinguishable from the more run-of-the-mill doctrine that courts 
routinely establish and implement regarding every constitutional 
norm.”155 In language that could have been penned just as easily by 
Strauss or Levinson, Caminker argued: 
The terminology misleadingly suggests that so-called prophylactic rules 
differ in kind from so-called “ordinary” doctrinal rules. But if the ar-
gument is that prophylactic rules are different because they rest on 
some institutional judgments concerning the capacity of courts to en-
force constitutional norms, rather than merely on some “pure” inter-
pretation of those norms, this is just wrong—such institutional judg-
ments are precisely the stuff of which most constitutional law is made.156 
Rick Hills sought to capture this burgeoning attitude in a recent mani-
festo attacking what he calls “anti-Pragmatist” constitutional theory—
“any constitutional theory that rests on a dichotomy between ‘principle’ 
and ‘policy,’ where the former category is the locus of abstract armchair 
reasoning about value and the latter is the site of messy, empirical analy-
sis of causal relationships and instrumental rationality.”157 Notwithstand-
ing the prevalence of anti-Pragmatism, Hills argues, “the most promising 
legal scholarship since roughly the late 1980s has discredited” it.158 That 
promising scholarship, as Hills describes it, starts with Strauss’s “Ubiquity 
of Prophylactic Rules,” and reaches its apogee in Levinson’s “Rights Es-
 
as to make meaningless the whole concept of federal common law; it includes too much that is 
clearly ‘just interpretation’”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal 
Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1985) (cautioning against the “danger of assuming away im-
portant questions at the definitional stage,” while proposing to define “federal common law” 
to “mean[] any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative 
federal text” and acknowledging that, under this definition, “most modern constitutional law 
is indistinguishable from what courts call federal common law”). 
 The Field and Merrill lines of argument should not be confused with those critiques of 
Monaghan that accepted the conceptual distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional common law only to deny the latter’s legitimacy. See, e.g., Thomas S. Schrock 
& Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117 
(1978). 
155 Evan H. Caminker, Lecture, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 1, 25 (2001). 
156 Id. 
157 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Exorcizing Anti-Pragmatism from Constitutional Theory 1 (Mar. 
23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
158 Id. at 4. 
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sentialism.”159 Surely the claimed distinction between judge-interpreted 
constitutional meaning and judge-made constitutional rules lies at the 
heart of anti-Pragmatist constitutional theory. If so, “[t]he most promis-
ing and important trend in constitutional theory over the last two dec-
ades,” writes Hills, has been to demonstrate that the distinction presents 
“a false and incoherent picture of constitutional law.”160 
The point, in short, is that the debate over prophylactic rules is para-
sitic upon a more fundamental contest over the logical structure of consti-
tutional adjudication. The terms of the debate are ever-shifting: from 
“constitutional common law” to “constitutional doctrine,” from norms 
and rules to rights and remedies. No matter what the terminology, 
though, the central question is whether it is meaningful to carve the uni-
verse of constitutional doctrine into conceptually distinct pieces. It is a 
debate that pits “Taxonomists” (like Monaghan, Sager, and Fallon) who 
advocate something like the “complex” model of constitutional adjudica-
tion against “Pragmatists”161 (like Strauss, Levinson, Caminker, and Hills) 
who insist that constitutional adjudication is instrumental “all the way 
up.” 162 
III. A DIFFERENT WAY TO DIVIDE THE TERRAIN: 
CARVING DOCTRINE INTO OPERATIVE PROPOSITIONS  
AND DECISION RULES 
The instant question (keeping, for the moment, the debate over “pro-
phylactic” constitutional rules in the background) is whether we can have 
Taxonomy and Pragmatism too. Can we offer coherent dividing lines 
within the sprawling sphere of constitutional doctrine—a domain thought 
 
159 See id. at 4–5. Hills also identifies work by Fred Schauer, Daniel Halberstam, and John 
Garvey. Id. at 5. 
160 Id. at 1. 
161 The “Pragmatist” label is notoriously slippery and contested. I use the term here to signal 
a stance that rejects distinctions of the sort—for example, between principle and policy, val-
ues and facts—on which the taxonomic enterprise is thought by some to rely. This sense of the 
term is distinct from (though not incompatible with) the sense associated today with Judge 
Richard Posner, who defines “pragmatic adjudication” as “adjudication guided by a compari-
son of the consequences of alternative resolutions of the case rather than by an algorithm,” 
and as “a practical tool of social ordering” which prefers “the decision that has the better con-
sequences for society.” Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the 
Constitution, and the Courts 186 (2001); see also, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 
4–15 (1995) (describing the pragmatic approach to law as, inter alia, instrumental, experimen-
tal, forward-looking, activist, antiessentialist, and antidogmatic). 
162 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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to encompass interpretations, reasons, mediating principles, and imple-
menting frameworks163—in a way that does not depend upon the anti-
Pragmatist assumption that a meaningful sort of constitutional interpreta-
tion exists which does not involve “practical” or “instrumental” consid-
erations? And, if so, is there a point to the enterprise? The central aim of 
the remainder of this Article is to demonstrate that the answer to each 
question is “yes.” 
Relying on Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,164 
a much commented-upon case decided the Term following Dickerson v. 
United States, this Part introduces a conceptual distinction between con-
stitutional operative propositions (essentially, judge-interpreted constitu-
tional meaning) and constitutional decision rules (rules that direct courts 
how to decide whether a given operative proposition has been, or will be, 
complied with). It then elucidates the distinction by applying it to a vari-
ety of doctrines that range across constitutional law. Defense of the dis-
tinction’s utility is reserved for the next two Parts. Part IV offers explora-
tory arguments about the distinction’s likely value. Part V presents a 
concrete demonstration of the distinction’s coherence and utility by di-
viding one intensively scrutinized nugget of constitutional law—the 
Miranda doctrine—into its operative-proposition and decision-rule com-
ponents, and by showing that the exercise advances debates about that 
decision’s legitimacy and proper scope. 
A. Garrett and the Distinction Between Operative Propositions and 
Decision Rules 
The facts of Garrett could not be much further afield from those of 
Dickerson. The case arose after Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse who 
was being treated for cancer, was removed from her position as Direc-
tor of Nursing at the University of Alabama’s Birmingham Hospital be-
cause of her substantial leaves of absence for medical treatment.165 
Garrett sued the University of Alabama, alleging that her demotion vio-
lated the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which re-
quires that employers, including states, provide “reasonable accommo-
dations” for their disabled employees.166 Consistent with the ADA’s 
 
163 See supra note 3 (quoting formulations by Amar, Fried, and Strauss). 
164 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
165 Id. at 362. 
166 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (requiring specified categories of employers to 
“mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an oth-
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explicit authorization,167 she sought money damages. The University of 
Alabama moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the Eleventh Amend-
ment barred Congress from making states liable for money damages in 
suits alleging violations of the ADA. 
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or eq-
uity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”168 
Notwithstanding this plain language, however, the Supreme Court had 
held over a century ago that the Amendment confers state sovereign im-
munity even from federal question suits brought by its own citizens.169 
Alabama would therefore prevail against Garrett unless the Constitution 
authorized Congress to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from 
damages suits under the ADA. Analysis of this question, in turn, was 
shaped by the Court’s 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida.170 
Seminole Tribe had held that Congress has no authority under Article I 
of the Constitution to subject states to suits for money damages.171 At the 
same time, though, the Court reaffirmed its earlier holding172 that Con-
gress could abrogate a state’s immunity when validly exercising its en-
forcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.173 Be-
 
erwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the em-
ployer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the [employer’s] business”). This is Title I of the Act. The Court reserved com-
ment on whether Title II, which concerns the “services, programs, or activities of a public en-
tity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000), can also cover claims of employment discrimination. Garrett, 
531 U.S. at 360 n.1. 
167 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (allowing victims of employment discrimination under the 
ADA the same relief granted to victims of employment discrimination under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000) (abrogating state sovereign im-
munity). 
168 U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
169 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
170 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
171 Id. 
172 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
173 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Section 5 provides: “The Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. 
It is not entirely clear just why Congress has abrogation power under § 5 but not under Arti-
cle I. Some possibilities are briefly canvassed in Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & 
Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How To 
“Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1037, 1049–50 (2001). Whether this 
distinction—or any other aspect of present sovereign immunity jurisprudence—is sensible is 
irrelevant for present purposes. 
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cause Congress had invoked Section 5 as one of its bases for enacting the 
ADA,174 Garrett turned upon whether the ADA was valid Section 5 legis-
lation. 
Applying the test it had announced four years earlier in City of Boerne 
v. Flores,175 a slim majority of the Supreme Court held that it was not. 
Boerne had emphasized that it was the responsibility of the Court, not 
Congress, to interpret the substantive reach of constitutional provisions.176 
Accordingly, the Court must be vigilant to ensure that Congress did not 
engage in substantive constitutional (re)interpretation under the guise of 
“enforcing” the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees. To this end, 
Boerne announced a two-part test governing legislation purporting to rest 
upon Section 5: First, the legislation must be designed to prevent or rem-
edy actual constitutional violations; and second, it must exhibit “congru-
ence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end.”177 The Garrett majority, in an opin-
ion again written by the Chief Justice, concluded that, if designed to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no State “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” the ADA 
failed the Boerne test.178 
The crux of the Court’s reasoning is straightforward. Because the 
Court had already determined that the disabled are not a suspect or 
quasi-suspect group,179 any state classification that serves to disadvantage 
them “‘cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a ra-
 
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000). 
175 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
176 Id. at 519–24. 
177 Id. at 520. Neither Boerne itself nor the several cases that have applied its test have speci-
fied how, if at all, the “congruence” and “proportionality” requirements differ, nor have the 
decisions made clear just what function or functions the test is designed to perform. Does it 
serve, in an evidentiary manner, to flush out whether given legislation really was intended to 
“enforce” the Amendment’s substantive provisions, and not to reinterpret them, or does it 
give effect to the § 5 requirement that any legislation actually designed to enforce the substan-
tive provisions adopt “appropriate” means? See Berman, Reese, & Young, supra note 173, at 
1160 n.565. These questions have attracted significant scholarly comment. See, e.g., J. Randy 
Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-Ends Relationships, 36 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 407 (2003); Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 
Powers, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1127 (2001); Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for 
Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 Ind. L.J. 567 
(2003). We need not resolve these questions to understand Garrett (though answers to them 
would help determine how the Boerne doctrine itself could best be redescribed in operative-
proposition and decision-rule terms). 
178 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. 
179 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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tional relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legiti-
mate governmental purpose.’”180 Furthermore, the Court explained, in ac-
cord with well-settled precedent,181 “the State need not articulate its rea-
soning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is 
upon the challenging party to negative any reasonably conceivable state 
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”182 
The ADA was constitutionally infirm, the Court concluded, because 
Congress failed to identify a pattern of employment discrimination 
against disabled persons by the states that violated this test. While ac-
knowledging that Congress had identified “[s]everal . . . incidents [that] 
undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to 
make the sort of accommodations for the disabled required by the 
ADA,” the Court insisted that “these incidents taken together fall far 
short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on 
which § 5 legislation must be based.”183 Moreover, “even were it possible 
to squeeze out of [the legislative record] a pattern of unconstitutional dis-
crimination by the States,” the ADA-imposed duty of reasonable ac-
commodation too far exceeded what the Fourteenth Amendment would 
of its own force require of the states to satisfy Boerne’s requirements of 
congruence and proportionality.184 For these reasons, the statute could 
not be predicated upon Section 5. 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dis-
sented. According to the dissent, the majority understated the extent of 
state employment practices disadvantaging the disabled that Congress 
could have found to violate the Equal Protection Clause and, as a conse-
quence, overstated the extent to which the prohibitions and duties of the 
ADA exceed what the Constitution independently requires of the states. 
The dissent’s complex argument is not, in all respects, a model of clarity. 
From a metadoctrinal perspective, however, we need understand only the 
dissent’s core reason for concluding that Congress could have concluded 
that far more state practices violate the Constitution than the majority 
was willing to credit. 
 
180 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). 
181 The precedent was well-settled by the time of Garrett, but long controversial. For a co-
gent summary of the history of the rational basis test, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional 
Law: Principles and Policies 651–63 (2d ed. 2002). For a more detailed analysis, if dated in 
some respects, see Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial 
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1049 (1979). 
182 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
183 Id. at 370. 
184 Id. at 372. 
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The heart of Justice Breyer’s argument is that the majority erred in 
“hold[ing] Congress to a strict, judicially created evidentiary standard.”185 
At a minimum, he explained, the constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection forbids economic or social legislation that is in fact motivated by 
“negative attitudes, fear, or irrational prejudice.”186 But this is not the test 
that courts directly or straightforwardly apply. Instead, “‘if any state of 
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain’ challenged legisla-
tion, then ‘there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, 
and one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing 
that the action is arbitrary.’”187 That is to say, the party challenging a clas-
sification in court does not prevail by simply persuading the reviewing 
court that, more likely than not, the classification was in fact adopted be-
cause of irrational prejudice; instead, she must demonstrate that no “con-
ceivable state of facts . . . could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion.”188 The consequence, Justice Breyer explains, is to increase the 
possibility (which, concededly, cannot be avoided) that a given classifica-
tion would, because motivated only by irrational prejudice or because 
failing to promote any legitimate state interest, actually violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, yet not be judicially invalidated.189 
 
185 Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 379–80 (“As the Court notes, those who 
presented instances of discrimination [to Congress] rarely provided additional, independent 
evidence sufficient to prove in court that, in each instance, the discrimination they suffered 
lacked justification from a judicial standpoint. . . . But a legislature is not a court of law.”). 
186 Id. at 381 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This view of what the Equal Protec-
tion Clause commands seems to be shared by Justices Kennedy and O’Connor—in Garrett 
itself, see 531 U.S. at 374–75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that “[p]rejudice . . . may 
result . . . from insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational reflection” and that 
“persons with mental or physical impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem 
from indifference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill will”); id. at 375–76 (seeming to 
acknowledge that “the States [would] transgress[] the Fourteenth Amendment by . . . lack of 
concern for those with impairments”); and elsewhere, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 
(1996) (asserting that treatment “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” de-
nies equal protection). The Garrett majority opinion—which, oddly, both Justice Kennedy 
and Justice O’Connor joined—apparently rejects this view. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (con-
tending that classifications reflecting “negative attitudes” or “fear” do not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause so long as they are rationally related to furthering the purpose claimed by 
the state). 
187 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 382–83 (quoting Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 
185 (1935)) (quotation internal to Pac. States Box omitted). 
188 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
189 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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If this looks much like the now-familiar claim that the Court’s equal 
protection doctrine underenforces the relevant constitutional norm,190 
that is no accident. Plainly, Justice Breyer throws his lot in with the Tax-
onomists. He is not merely claiming, after all, that Congress should be 
free to decide for itself what equal protection means. He is saying that the 
Court has determined what the constitutional guarantee means and has 
 
190 Indeed, Sager had specifically employed equal protection doctrine to illustrate his under-
enforcement thesis more than two decades earlier, see Sager, supra note 5, at 1215–17, and 
the argument had since been developed at length by Stephen Ross. Stephen F. Ross, Legisla-
tive Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 311 (1987); see also, e.g., Strauss, su-
pra note 38, at 204–07. 
 Several years prior to Sager’s influential work, Justice Brennan had provided this especially 
clear judicial articulation of the rational basis test in underenforcement terms: 
As we have often indicated, questions of constitutional power frequently turn in the last 
analysis on questions of fact. This is particularly the case when an assertion of state 
power is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For although equal protection requires that all persons “under like circumstances and 
conditions” be treated alike, such a formulation merely raises, but does not answer the 
question whether a legislative classification has resulted in different treatment of per-
sons who are in fact “under like circumstances and conditions.” 
 Legislatures, as well as courts, are bound by the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. When a state legislative classification is subjected to judicial challenge as 
violating the Equal Protection Clause, it comes before the courts cloaked by the pre-
sumption that the legislature has, as it should, acted within constitutional limitations. 
Accordingly, “[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal 
protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” 
 But, as we have consistently held, this limitation on judicial review of state legislative 
classifications is a limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth Amendment itself, but 
from the nature of judicial review. It is simply a “salutary principle of judicial decision,” 
one of the “self-imposed restraints intended to protect [the Court] and the state against 
irresponsible exercise of [the Court’s] unappealable power.” The nature of the judicial 
process makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual ques-
tions of the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication. Courts, therefore, will 
overturn a legislative determination of a factual question only if the legislature’s finding 
is so clearly wrong that it may be characterized as “arbitrary,” “irrational,” or “unrea-
sonable.” Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, however, have 
no application to Congress. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
“[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article.” Should Congress, pursuant to that power, undertake an investigation in 
order to determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative dis-
crimination actually exists, it need not stop once it determines that some reasonable 
men could believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers Congress to make its 
own determination on the matter. It should hardly be necessary to add that if the as-
serted factual basis necessary to support a given state discrimination does not exist, § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment vests Congress with power to remove the discrimination 
by appropriate means. 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 246–48 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (internal citations omitted). 
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determined what the in-court doctrine should be and that these are not, 
and need not be, the same thing.191 With the Taxonomists, then, Justice 
Breyer is arguing that court-announced constitutional doctrine can con-
sist of two analytically distinct outputs. But the particular principle of di-
vision upon which he implicitly relies seems new. Justice Breyer’s line is 
drawn between judicial determinations of the meaning of a constitutional 
provision and announcements of the rule courts should apply when called 
upon to decide whether the judicially interpreted meaning is complied 
with. For ease of exposition, let us coin some terms. Call the courts’ de-
termination of constitutional meaning a “constitutional operative propo-
sition,” and call the judicial direction regarding how courts are to decide 
whether an operative proposition has been complied with a “constitu-
tional decision rule.”192 
 
191 This is my reading of Justice Breyer’s Garrett dissent. Other critics of the decision, how-
ever, construe it as an argument that the Constitution lacks a univocal or invariant meaning, 
and therefore that Congress and the courts should share interpretive authority. See, e.g., id. at 
18 n.83 (arguing that Justice Breyer’s dissent “persuasively attacked” the majority’s erroneous 
“assum[ption] that the Fourteenth Amendment has a singular and universal meaning”). See 
generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: 
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1 (2003) (examining the constitu-
tional theory that underlies the Court’s claim to exclusive interpretive authority). In contrast, 
to be clear, I read Justice Breyer’s dissent to claim not that constitutional meaning differs de-
pending upon the vantage point from which it is viewed (though this could be true) but that, 
even insofar as courts can stake a claim to being the privileged expositors of invariant consti-
tutional meaning, the constitutional doctrine that they announce consists of devices additional 
to any such supposed interpreted meanings. Ultimately, of course, the taxonomic distinction 
between operative propositions and decision rules that this Article develops and defends does 
not stand or fall on one’s preferred reading of the opinions in Garrett. 
192 A few words about this nomenclature. I am taking the term “constitutional operative 
proposition” to signify the same thing as “judge-interpreted constitutional meaning,” where 
“meaning” is agnostic regarding the means of deriving meaning, or the particular conception 
of meaning that the judge employs (original meaning, plain meaning, judicially constructed 
meaning, etc.). A constitutional decision rule is the judicially announced rule that directs 
courts how to “decide” whether the operative proposition is satisfied. Although this usage of 
the term “decision rule” should be clear enough to one who comes to the term fresh, federal 
courts scholars are apt to confuse “constitutional decision rules” with the “rules of decision” 
as that term is used in the Rules of Decision Act, which provided that “the laws of the several 
states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at law in the courts of the United 
States in cases where they apply.” The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. A 
“rule of decision” for purposes of that Act means nothing more than “the governing law.” It is 
not what I mean by “constitutional decision rule.” Instead of trying to figure out how “rules of 
decision” map onto my proposed distinction between operative propositions and decision 
rules, it would be best, I think, for readers to try to put that former phrase entirely out of 
mind. If you are unable to do so, feel free to substitute mentally the phrase “application rule” 
wherever you see “decision rule.” 
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The significance of this way of carving the doctrine lies in its implicit 
response to the Pragmatists. The reason the distinction is important, for 
Justice Breyer, is not because these two species of doctrine are supposed 
to rest on different sorts of considerations. The importance, rather, is that 
they serve different sorts of functions. Notice that Justice Breyer is happy 
to endorse the equal protection decision rule as a “paradigm of judicial 
restraint.”193 But decision rules are designed to bind courts, not the politi-
cal branches.194 In Garrett itself, Justice Breyer deemed it important to 
 
 Readers who are comfortable with my usage of the term “constitutional decision rule” 
might nonetheless wonder about pairing that phrase with the neologism “constitutional op-
erative propositions” when the familiar distinction between decision rules and conduct rules, 
see, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984), would seem so handy. For two reasons, however, 
an “operative proposition” is not more felicitously described as a “conduct rule” for our pur-
poses. 
 Most importantly, it is generally thought that decision rules are addressed to judges while 
constitutional conduct rules are addressed to other governmental actors. See, e.g., Carol S. 
Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?: Two Audiences, Two 
Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2469–70 (1996). It is true that, under my proposed taxonomic 
division, decision rules are addressed to judges alone, but some of what I am calling operative 
propositions are likewise addressed to them, not to any other governmental actor. (As we will 
see, the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause is an example. The operative proposi-
tion is that judges must not admit into evidence statements that have been compelled from 
the defendant.) The fact that judge-interpreted constitutional meaning will on occasion apply 
directly to judges will be obscured if we divide doctrine into decision rules and conduct rules. 
The conduct rule/decision rule distinction is unpromising, additionally, insofar as it might be 
read to import Dan-Cohen’s acoustic separation gloss. I do not propose that judges, scholars, 
and lawyers classify doctrine as operative or decisional by trying to imagine where it would be 
classified in a hypothetical regime in which decision rules were kept invisible to non-judicial 
actors. Perfectly good decision rules can be predicated upon the assumption that non-judicial 
actors are aware of them and will alter their behavior in light of them. See infra Section IV.B. 
 Of course, the unsatisfactoriness of adopting the term “conduct rules” as a contrast to “de-
cision rules” cannot itself make a case for the unlovely term “operative propositions.” I would 
be happy to consider other labels. To readers who might be disposed to come forward with 
friendly (or even not-so-friendly) amendments, however, let me add two final thoughts. First, 
the obvious alternative of “substantive rules” is undesirable because it risks implying a con-
trast with “procedural” and “remedial” rules. Viewed through the lens of this common 
trichotomy, many “operative propositions” would not be “substantive rules.” Second, I think 
it is somewhat more apt (if even less catchy) to describe judicial interpretations of constitu-
tional meaning as operative propositions than as operative rules because such interpretations 
can assume very un-rule-like shape; it might look more like a standard or perhaps even a 
principle. (I am indebted to Larry Sager for persuading me on this last point.) 
193 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)) (emphasis in Garrett). 
194 For indirect confirmation that Justice Breyer was right, consider the Court’s own explana-
tion in Beach Communications for crediting any post hoc rationale for a statutory classifica-
tion: “[B]ecause we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, 
it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the chal-
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separate the operative proposition from the decision rule not for the rea-
son the Pragmatists charge and reject—namely, that the former necessar-
ily reflects “pure principle”—but because proper application of Boerne 
requires courts to assess the fit between challenged legislation and the 
constitutional operative proposition, not between the statute and the de-
cision rule. That is, Congress is not obligated to accord any deferential 
presumptions contained in the decision rule when ascertaining how often 
the states violate the Equal Protection Clause, and thus, how pressing the 
need for federal enforcement legislation. Consequently, when determin-
ing whether a statute designed to enforce the substantive guarantees of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is “appropriate legislation,” a court must fo-
cus on how well that legislation promotes the constitutional operative 
proposition—a rule, recall, that is itself a judicial product—not the deci-
sion rule adopted to facilitate judicial implementation of the constitu-
tional operative proposition. Because they believed that Congress could 
reasonably have concluded, based on the record before it, that states en-
gaged in substantial conduct that violated the operative proposition of 
equal protection doctrine (and not merely Congress’s own understanding 
of what equal protection means), the dissenters would have upheld the 
ADA as a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power. 
To be sure, merely to appreciate the distinction between operative 
propositions and decision rules is not necessarily to resolve the issue pre-
sented in Garrett. One could, after all, agree with the dissent that applica-
tion of the Boerne “congruence and proportionality” test must measure 
challenged legislation against the constitutional operative proposition, 
yet nonetheless conclude, with the majority, that too much of what the 
ADA prohibits is constitutional under that rule to render the statute ap-
propriate enforcement legislation. But the constitutionality of the ADA’s 
remedial provisions is not our concern. The lesson from Justice Breyer’s 
Garrett dissent is only that we can carve up constitutional doctrine into 
two sorts of rules—what we have termed, respectively, operative proposi-
tions and decision rules—even while conceding the legitimacy of each, 
and without staking ourselves to any claims about the sorts of considera-
 
lenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.” 508 U.S. at 315. This would be a non 
sequitur if the Court meant that, because the judiciary does not “require a legislature to ar-
ticulate its reasons,” the true reasons for a legislature’s actions are irrelevant to whether it has 
in fact violated the Constitution. All the Court can sensibly mean is that a legislature’s actual 
reasons are, under deferential rational basis scrutiny, irrelevant for purposes of the constitu-
tional decision rule. 
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tions upon which courts might rely in the derivation and formulation of 
either.195 
B. The Ubiquity of Constitutional Decision Rules 
Garrett highlights in especially stark fashion that constitutional doc-
trine can consist of “operative propositions” that constitute judicial de-
terminations of constitutional meaning, as well as analytically distinct de-
vices—“decision rules”—that establish the particular inquiry that courts 
should undertake when applying an operative proposition in the course 
of constitutional adjudication. But the “any conceivable purpose” gloss 
on equal protection doctrine is not exceptional. To the contrary, I will ar-
gue, constitutional decision rules are a ubiquitous component of constitu-
tional doctrine. Of course, because this terminology is new and the un-
derlying taxonomic distinction is at best inchoate, whether any given 
constitutional doctrine is better conceptualized as an operative proposi-
tion or a decision rule (or something else entirely) will often be contest-
able. What difficulties—or opportunities—this fact presents are explored 
in Part IV. This Section seeks only to solidify the basic distinction by of-
fering a few additional illustrations of doctrine whose proper conceptu-
alization in decision rule terms should appear particularly plausible 
(though not, it bears emphasis, incontrovertible).196 
 
195 Unfortunately, this lesson seemed all but lost by last Term’s decision in Nevada Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), in which Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O’Connor joined the four Garrett dissenters to uphold, as a valid exercise of Con-
gress’s § 5 power, application of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) against the 
states. In relevant part, the FMLA entitles eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of 
annual unpaid leave to care for family members with serious health problems. This, the Court 
said in an opinion by the Chief Justice, was a congruent and proportional means to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clause. Distinguishing Garrett, among other cases, Rehnquist explained 
that in the FMLA, 
Congress directed its attention to state gender discrimination, which triggers a height-
ened level of scrutiny. . . . Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality 
of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test . . . 
it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations. 
Id. at 1982 (internal citations omitted). This is not an understanding of the significance of the 
tiers of scrutiny in equal protection doctrine that should have been acceptable to the Garrett 
dissenters, three of whom nonetheless joined the majority opinion while signaling their dis-
quiet on this score in a brief and somewhat cryptic concurrence. See id. at 1984 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
196 Innumerable additional illustrations could be chosen. But whatever defects this Article 
may have, that it’s “not long enough” is probably not among them. For my own analysis of 
how the operative proposition/decision rule distinction can help make sense of the Court’s 
current struggles over Commerce Clause doctrine, see Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gul-
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To start, though, it may be useful to have in mind a graphic image of 
this model of constitutional adjudication. Accordingly, Figure 3 offers 
one possible representation of the way that operative propositions and 
decision rules function in adjudication, contrasting this vision with the 
complex model that had been introduced in Figure 1. The critical lesson 
to take away from this rendering is that the operative proposition and the 
decision rule are jointly necessary for “constitutional doctrine” to be ap-
plied. As a consequence, the decision-rule model escapes the principal 
objection to other complex three-step models of constitutional adjudica-
tion—namely, that courts have no warrant to replace judge-interpreted 
“constitutional meaning” with something else when applying the Consti-
tution. 
 
libility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2004). For penetrating analyses of voting rights laws whose potential for profitable reinterpre-
tation in decision rule terms will be evident, compare Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering 
and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (2002) (advocating broader use of what the author 
calls “prophylactic rules” in election law jurisprudence), with Melissa L. Saunders, Reconsid-
ering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 Yale L.J. 1603 (2000) (identify-
ing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) as setting forth a Miranda-like “prophylactic rule” but 
criticizing the particular rule as not workable). Worthwhile examinations of criminal proce-
dure doctrines that likewise map easily onto the operative proposition/decision rule distinc-
tion appear in Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the Majority 
and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 387, 412–21 (2001); Klein, supra note 
115. 
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1. The Due Process “Some Evidence” Rule 
An apt illustration of a constitutional decision rule—one closely re-
sembling the rational basis “any conceivable purpose” decision rule—is 
the due process “some evidence” rule that the Court has applied in a 
range of administrative contexts for nearly ninety years.197 As explained in 
one 1985 prison case: 
[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence sup-
ports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time 
credits. . . . Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not re-
quire examination of the entire record . . . . Instead, the relevant ques-
tion is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support 
the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.198 
This may or may not be sound constitutional doctrine. But surely, as 
Fallon has explained: 
If viewed as a measure of the “meaning” of due process, the “some evi-
dence” standard would make no sense. An official who maliciously de-
prived an inmate of liberty or property, knowing that this was a wrong-
ful decision in light of all the properly presented evidence, would fail to 
provide “due process of law” in the most basic sense. . . . Rather than 
furnishing an interpretive judgment about the Constitution’s meaning, 
the “some evidence” test is a standard of review that largely trusts ad-
ministrative officials to follow the Constitution and provides for judicial 
redress only in relatively egregious circumstances.199 
Put in our terms, insofar as a deprivation of a protected liberty or 
property interest will be presumed to provide constitutionally adequate 
process so long as “some” or “any” evidence in the record supports it,200 
the doctrine is a constitutional decision rule. 
 
197 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evidence,” 
25 San Diego L. Rev. 631, 663–64 (1988) (arguing that the “some evidence” requirement is a 
standard of review, not a procedural requirement applicable to the original tribunal). 
198 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985). 
199 Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 6; see also id. at 38 (arguing that 
“the ‘some evidence’ test is an ususually stark example of a standard of review that is distinct 
from the constitutional norms it is crafted to enforce”). 
200 In fact, though, this may no longer be an entirely accurate statement of existing doctrine. 
The Court recently explained that the some evidence rule applies only “when the basis for at-
tacking the judgment is . . . insufficiency of the evidence,” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 
648 (1997), indicating that where an inmate alleges that an adverse decision stemmed from 
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2. The Pearce Resentencing Rule 
Although he does not speak directly to the question, Fallon seems to 
view “standards of review,” like the “some evidence” rule, as represent-
ing a fairly narrow category of the constitutional doctrine that is some-
thing other than a judicial statement of constitutional meaning.201 A key 
thrust of my argument, in contrast, will be that an ocean of constitutional 
doctrine is conceptually indistinguishable from what Fallon calls “stan-
dards of review.” 
Consider, for example, North Carolina v. Pearce,202 one of the cases 
most frequently appearing in academic and judicial discussions of “consti-
tutional common law,” “prophylactic rules,” or “incidental powers.” 
Pearce raised a simple question: “When at the behest of the defendant a 
criminal conviction has been set aside and a new trial ordered, to what 
extent does the Constitution limit the imposition of a harsher sentence 
after conviction upon retrial?”203 The Court answered that imposition of a 
harsher sentence is not itself unconstitutional, but that imposing such a 
sentence for the “purpose of punishing the defendant for his having suc-
ceeded in getting his original conviction set aside” would be.204 The fol-
lowing statement, accordingly, was the Court’s interpretation of constitu-
tional meaning: “Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness 
against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction 
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.”205 
 
bias, malice or vindictiveness, the mere presence of some evidence in the record to support 
that decision is not enough to defeat the constitutional claim. 
201 See generally Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 32–41. 
202 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
203 Id. at 713. 
204 Id. at 723–24. 
205 Id. at 725. This is no more than the specific application of a more general principle that, I 
have argued elsewhere, applies to all constitutional rights. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion 
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo. L.J. 1, 32–36 
(2001) [hereinafter Berman, Coercion Without Baselines]. As I have previously summarized 
the proposition: 
Every constitutional right entails a claim-right that the state not penalize the exercise 
(or nonwaiver) of the constitutional right itself in the sense of imposing (or allowing to 
obtain) consequences upon the right-holder that are adverse relative to the consequences 
that the state would impose (or allow to obtain) but for the state’s purpose in having the 
right-holder experience the consequences as disagreeable. That is largely what it means to 
have a constitutional right. 
Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A 
Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 Vand. L. Rev. 693, 732–33 (2002) 
[hereinafter Berman, Commercial Speech]. 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
62 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
The Court did not stop there, though. “In order to assure the absence 
of such a motivation,” the majority announced, “whenever a judge im-
poses a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the rea-
sons for his doing so must affirmatively appear.”206 This, Justice Black 
complained in a lone dissent, was not constitutional interpretation.207 
“This is pure legislation if there ever was legislation.”208 Whether or not 
the majority had engaged in “pure legislation,” however (a charge impos-
sible to answer without more in the way of definition209), that the pre-
sumption it announced was not quite constitutional meaning seems all 
but indisputable. Surely the majority itself did not dispute it. Pearce an-
nounced a decision rule to adjudicate constitutional meaning. Of course, 
the Court’s choice was not between using this particular decision rule or 
doing without. A reviewing court would always need to know how to rule 
when faced with epistemic uncertainty regarding whether a sentencing 
judge had in fact imposed a more severe sentence for vindictive reasons. 
Preponderance of the evidence, presumably, would supply the default. 
But this was not an ideal solution. Recognizing that “[t]he existence of a 
retaliatory motivation would, of course, be extremely difficult to prove in 
any individual case,”210 the majority evidently believed that requiring a 
statement of reasons to appear in the new sentencing order would make 
it easier for reviewing courts to identify such motivation when it did exist. 
Moreover, it is hard to read the majority opinion without getting the im-
pression that the Justices thought the incidence of retaliatory motivation 
 
206 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. As announced by Pearce, the rule appears to be absolute. Put an-
other way, it is a conclusive presumption: A sentencing order that imposes a more severe sen-
tence than the defendant had previously received will be adjudged unconstitutional unless the 
reasons for the increase are stated in the order itself. The Court later converted this into a re-
buttable presumption of vindictiveness that could be overcome by any objective information 
that might justify the increased sentence. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986); U.S. v. 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982); see also, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) (holding 
that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not apply to increased sentences imposed 
after trial when defendant was initially sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea). 
207 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 741 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that 
“courts must of course set aside the punishment if they find, by the normal judicial process of 
fact-finding, that such a [vindictive] motivation exists,” but objecting that “the courts are not 
vested with any general power to prescribe particular devices ‘[i]n order to assure the absence 
of such a motivation’”). 
208 Id. (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
209 Clearly it was “legislation” in that it involved “formulation of rules for the future.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 899 (6th ed. 1990). But just as clearly that definition of legislation 
proves far too much. 
210 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 n.20. 
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alarmingly high,211 and hoped that imposing a requirement of reason-
giving would reduce it. For these reasons, the Court crafted a decision 
rule in the form of a conclusive presumption to administer the constitu-
tional operative proposition it had announced. 
3. Congress’s Tax Power and the Regulatory Effects Problem 
The Pearce decision rule was a response to the twin facts that the op-
erative proposition turned upon a governmental actor’s purposes and 
that the Court thought purposes hard to ascertain on a case-by-case basis. 
It would be surprising if the conjunction of these two facts was rare. Thus, 
whenever the Court has rejected an invitation to directly inquire into a 
governmental actor’s purposes or reasons for action, there is a chance 
that the resulting doctrine in fact reflects compound judgments: first, that 
the true constitutional meaning does turn upon the actor’s purposes, and 
second, that such meaning is best administered via a decision rule that 
conclusively presumes the absence (or presence) of such purposes under 
specified circumstances.212 
Congress’s Article I power “to lay and collect taxes”213 is an illustration. 
Early on, the Supreme Court seemed to interpret this provision to confer 
upon Congress the power to impose taxes for the purpose of raising 
revenue, but not for the purpose of regulating conduct that it could not 
regulate under its other enumerated powers.214 As a test of constitutional 
 
211 E.g., id. 
212 The proper role of purpose scrutiny in constitutional analysis is controversial. For a re-
cent introduction to the literature, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional 
Analysis, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 297 (1997). Critics of the practice have voiced many objections which 
this cannot be the place to rebut. I offer two points, though. First, claims that purposes are too 
hard to discover and that such scrutiny risks disrespecting other branches of government pro-
vide reasons (whether or not ultimately persuasive) not to incorporate purposes into the deci-
sion rule, but they do not address whether the operative proposition should turn upon pur-
poses. Cf. Paul Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1141, 1142 (1978) 
(“The principles underlying judicial review of unconstitutional motives are no less applicable 
to legislative enactments than to other official decisions. If the motives underlying an adminis-
trative decision or a legislative enactment should be insulated from judicial review, it must be 
for institutional rather than jurisprudential reasons—courts cannot properly undertake the 
inquiry or act on its findings.”). Second, the claim that the very notion of a purpose or motive 
is incoherent when applied to multi-member bodies would supply a reason not to interpret 
even the operative proposition to include a reference to “actual” or “subjective” purposes but 
provides no reason at all why the operative proposition could not constrain what are some-
times called “objective” purposes. 
213 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
214 See, e.g., Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541 (1869) (“There are, indeed, 
certain virtual limitations, arising from the principles of the Constitution itself. It would un-
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meaning, however, this interpretation is difficult to adjudicate because all 
taxes have regulatory effects. In not long, therefore, the Court announced 
that “the motives or purposes of Congress are [not] open to judicial in-
quiry in considering the power of that body to enact” laws that take the 
form of excise taxes.215 The key language, of course, is “judicial inquiry,” a 
characterization that can be read to signal the Court’s determination to 
implement a constitutional operative proposition that does depend upon 
Congress’s purposes (the tax must be adopted to raise revenue) via a de-
cision rule that conclusively presumes the presence of constitutionally 
permissible purposes so long as the challenged measure actually raises 
revenue.216 
Indeed, this way of breaking apart the doctrine helps make sense of the 
otherwise puzzling decision in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., in which a 
nearly unanimous Court struck down the Child Labor Tax Act 
(“CLTA”) precisely on the grounds “that the so-called tax” had a regula-
tory purpose.217 Although the Court attempted to distinguish the prece-
dents that proscribed judicial inquiry into Congress’s purposes for impos-
ing a tax, the effort was more lame than game. A better account is that 
the Bailey Court understood that the doctrine which purported to make 
Congress’s purposes immaterial was only a decision rule. And in light of 
the extreme provocation—the CLTA was transparently adopted to cir-
cumvent the Court’s decision, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,218 that Congress 
lacked power to regulate child labor—the Court thought application of a 
deferential decision rule inappropriate. Rather than simply ignoring the 
 
doubtedly be an abuse of the power . . . if exercised for ends inconsistent with the limited 
grants of power in the Constitution.”). Admittedly, this is an ambiguous passage. The thought 
could be either that certain purposes would render the exercise abusive albeit constitutional 
or that such purposes, because abusive, render the exercise unconstitutional. 
215 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 53 (1904); see also, e.g., United States v. Doremus, 
249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919) (observing that the claimed presence of certain motives “does not au-
thorize the courts to inquire into that subject”); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 
(1953) (holding that if an excise tax produces revenue, its regulatory effects do not render it 
invalid), overruled in other part by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968). 
216 Cf. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 60 (1999) (“A key 
term [in constitutional doctrine] is scrutiny. When you see it, you should know that the courts 
are talking about themselves, and that it would be a mistake for legislators to think about the 
constitutional implications of what they were about to do in the same terms.”). 
217 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) (“[A] court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is im-
posed to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and 
regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this. How can 
we properly shut our minds to it?”). 
218 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
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doctrine tout court, the Bailey Court just administered the operative 
proposition by the default preponderance-of-the-evidence decision rule.219 
4. Land Use Exactions 
Takings doctrine provides another example of a decision rule designed 
to adjudicate a purpose-oriented operative proposition.220 The Nollans, 
owners of a California beachfront lot, wanted to replace their existing 
bungalow with a three-bedroom house. California law required, however, 
that they obtain a development permit from the state coastal planning 
commission before proceeding with construction. The Commission 
granted the permit but only on condition that the Nollans convey a public 
easement across a portion of their private beach to allow beachgoers to 
travel between a public park a quarter mile to the north and a public 
beach to the south. The Nollans objected that the condition effected an 
unconstitutional taking. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the 
Supreme Court agreed.221 
Writing for the five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
condition could not stand because it was not germane to the legitimate 
purposes the Commission could have had for refusing the requested 
permit. Assuming that the Commission might have constitutionally de-
nied the Nollans a permit in order to advance a legitimate state interest 
in, among other things, the public’s visual access to the beach, Justice 
Scalia reasoned, the Commission could not threaten to withhold the per-
mit in order to secure lateral access for the public to cross the beach.222 
When the “essential nexus” between the purpose of the condition and the 
purpose of the prohibition is eliminated, the Court explained: 
[T]he situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting 
fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to 
contribute $100 to the state treasury. While a ban on shouting fire can 
be a core exercise of the State’s police power to protect the public 
safety, and can thus meet even our stringent standards for regulation of 
speech, adding the unrelated condition alters the purpose to one which, 
 
219 For a more detailed discussion of Bailey, see Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Get-
ting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-
Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 Ind. L.J. 459, 504–06 (2003). 
220 The following discussion is borrowed from Berman, Commercial Speech, supra note 205, 
at 733–35. A lengthier analysis, with citations to relevant cases and commentaries on takings 
law, appears in Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra note 205, at 89–98. 
221 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
222 See id. at 836–42. 
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while it may be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain the ban. . . . Similarly 
here, the lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose 
of the building restrictions converts that purpose to something other 
than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtain-
ing of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but 
without payment of compensation. . . . In short, unless the permit condi-
tion serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, 
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an out-
and-out plan of extortion.223 
This is a dense and puzzling passage, for the alchemical notion at its 
heart that “the lack of nexus between the condition and the original pur-
pose” of the development ban “converts” that original purpose “to some-
thing other than what it was” is more than a little mysterious. One thing 
clear is that the Commission’s purposes matter. But how? Suppose that a 
municipality imposes a building restriction for the bona fide purpose of 
promoting the public’s access to light. Plainly the Constitution is not of-
fended. Suppose further that a particular landowner subject to the restric-
tion offers to transfer some valuable interest to the public in exchange for 
a variance. The state may or may not accept. But whether it accepts can 
have no bearing on “the original purpose of the building restriction,” 
which, by hypothesis, was to promote the public’s access to light. And this 
is true whether the landowner’s offer is to submit to a restriction that 
would increase public access to light elsewhere or to convey an easement 
that would reduce pedestrian congestion. It is part of the business of 
planning commissions to make tradeoffs among these sorts of (arguably) 
incommensurable public interests. All this being so, the original purpose 
still cannot be converted to something other than it was if, during the 
process of negotiations for a variance, it is a commission staff member 
rather than the landowner who first hits upon the potentially efficiency-
maximizing idea that the commission grant the variance in exchange for 
the congestion-reducing easement. If, as we have supposed, the building 
restriction was originally devised to increase light, none of these ex post 
developments can render the original purpose something else. 
Of course, I have asked you to assume the Commission’s original pur-
pose was the legitimate one of promoting the public’s interest in light. 
Perhaps the Commission, believing that city light was fully adequate, im-
posed the height restrictions just so it could use the variance carrot as a 
 
223 Id. at 837 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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tool with which to extract other sorts of property rights from landowners 
without having to pay compensation. Now, that would be a constitution-
ally illegitimate purpose. The operative proposition of takings doctrine, 
then, must be something like this: The state may neither take property 
without just compensation nor withhold a development right it would 
otherwise provide for the purpose of discouraging exercise of a land-
owner refusal to waive her right to just compensation.224 
How is a reviewing court to know whether the withholding of a devel-
opment right was motivated by this unconstitutional purpose as opposed 
to any one of the almost limitless purposes that the Court has held consti-
tutionally permissible?225 Case-by-case resolutions under the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard would be likely to tell us more about the 
world view of the trial judge than about the historical facts. Nollan’s solu-
tion, in effect (though not in form), was to instruct courts to conclusively 
presume that withholding of an offered development right would be for 
the reason barred by the constitutional operative proposition “unless the 
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the develop-
ment ban.” Whether wise or foolish, the Nollan doctrine is a constitu-
tional decision rule. 
5. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine 
Not all decision rules are responses to the problem of discerning con-
stitutionally relevant motives or purposes.226 Indeed, one especially obvi-
ous (if little known) decision rule has nothing to do with the supposed 
difficulties of engaging in purpose scrutiny.227 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that a bill does not be-
come a law of the United States unless it “shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate” and either have been signed by the 
President or, if vetoed, repassed by two-thirds majorities in each house.228 
This is the Schoolhouse Rock version of legislation and accurate as far as 
 
224 Indeed, this follows directly from my proposed concept of an unconstitutional penalty. 
See supra note 205. 
225 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a development 
permit may be denied if doing so would substantially advance any legitimate state interest); 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (identifying broad range of legitimate state interests). 
226 Following prevailing practice, see Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra note 205, 
at 23 n.87, I am here treating “motive” and “purpose” as synonyms. 
227 The following discussion draws heavily from the clear and illuminating discussion in Mat-
thew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 
89 Va. L. Rev. 1105, 1172–82 (2003). 
228 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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it goes. One detail omitted concerns the “enrolled bill”: the document 
that the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate both sign, 
in attestation that the document has been approved by his respective 
house, and then forward to the President. It is this document that, if 
signed by the President, is forwarded to archives from which the Statutes 
at Large are copied and the United States Code subsequently compiled. 
This is a generally adequate system, no doubt, but not a foolproof one. 
What if the enrolled bill was never actually passed by Congress? What if 
by honest error or chicanery the document that makes it into the law 
books is not the same document as that on which Congress acted? 
The Court confronted precisely this question over a century ago in 
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark.229 Marshall Field and other importers ob-
jected to tariffs levied by the President on the ground, among others, that 
the enrolled bill pursuant to which the President acted was not the bill ac-
tually passed by Congress, and thus not a valid law. The Court agreed 
that a bill: 
[D]oes not become a law of the United States if it had not in fact been 
passed by Congress. . . . There is no authority in the presiding officers of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate to attest by their signa-
tures, nor in the President to approve, nor in the Secretary of State to 
receive and cause to be published, as a legislative act, any bill not 
passed by Congress.230 
But this, the Court said, was only half the question. “[I]t remain[ed] to 
inquire as to the nature of the evidence upon which a court may act when 
the issue is made as to whether a bill, originating in the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Senate, and asserted to have become a law, was or was 
not passed by Congress.”231 
The importers hoped to make their case by relying on journals of the 
proceedings of each house. Yet this the Court would not allow. Such an 
inquiry, the Court concluded: 
[I]s forbidden by the respect due to a coördinate branch of the govern-
ment. The evils that may result from the recognition of the principle 
that an enrolled act, in the custody of the Secretary of state, attested by 
the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, 
and the approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was 
 
229 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
230 Id. at 669. 
231 Id. at 670. 
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passed by Congress, according to the forms of the Constitution, would 
be far less than those that would certainly result from a rule making the 
validity of Congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which 
the journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate offi-
cers charged with the duty of keeping them.232 
This, then, is the operative proposition of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2: A 
bill, to become law, must be passed by both houses of Congress.233 The 
enrolled bill doctrine—directing that courts must conclusively presume 
that a bill signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the 
Senate in attestation of its passage was in fact passed by both houses—is 
a decision rule. 
6. The Nondelegation Doctrine 
Although Marshall Field birthed the enrolled bill doctrine, it is more 
often cited in connection with a different matter. In addition to contend-
ing that the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 was not the true law, the im-
porters had argued that the Act was unconstitutional because, in delegat-
ing to the president authority to suspend tariffs under certain conditions, 
it contravened the constitutional directive that “[a]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”234 The 
Court agreed “[t]hat congress cannot delegate legislative power to the 
president,”235 but denied that any power delegated by the Tariff Act was 
legislative. Justice Harlan explained: 
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the 
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and 
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised 
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the lat-
ter no valid objection can be made.236 
Though often quoted, the passage offers little guidance on the critical 
question—namely, what constitutes (permissible) execution. Thirty-six 
years later, the Court supplied an answer: “If Congress shall lay down by 
 
232 Id. at 673. 
233 That there may be room for debate over just what “passage” entails, see Adler & Dorf, 
supra note 227, at 1173 (noting that passage presumably means approval by a majority of a 
quorum, but that this is perhaps arguable), shows only that the operative proposition could in 
theory require further elucidation. 
234 U.S Const. art. I, § 1. 
235 Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 692. 
236 Id. at 693–94 (quoting R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs, 1 Ohio St. 88 (1852)). 
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legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [make further rules] is directed to conform, such legislative 
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”237 This is the 
nondelegation doctrine that governs to this day.238 What sense can be 
made of it? 
Of course, the nondelegation doctrine could be simply an operative 
proposition: A decisionmaking or rule-making authority subject to an 
“intelligible principle” is not a “legislative power” within the meaning of 
Article I, Section 1, and therefore need not be vested in Congress. But 
this view confronts difficulties. Consider some of the specific enumerated 
powers contained in Article I. Congress is explicitly empowered, for in-
stance, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”239 Surely this is an “intelligible 
principle.” Were this language to appear not as a constitutional grant of 
power from We the People to Congress but rather as a statutory grant of 
power from Congress to an administrative agency, there can be no doubt 
that the delegation would pass muster under the nondelegation doctrine. 
So if cabining a decisionmaking power with an intelligible principle were 
sufficient to make such power not “legislative” within the meaning of Ar-
ticle I, Section 1, then it would seem to follow that legislation enacted 
pursuant to Section 8, Clause 8 is not the exercise of Congress’s legisla-
tive power. That would be a decidedly odd conclusion. 
An alternative is to understand the nondelegation doctrine as consist-
ing of an operative proposition to be administered by a non-standard de-
cision rule. On this view, the decision rule directs that the operative 
proposition should be deemed satisfied so long as the delegation contains 
an “intelligible principle” that constrains the agency’s discretion. The 
task becomes to identify the precise operative proposition that (implic-
itly) is being administered via this decision rule. There are several possi-
bilities. One might think, for example, that the operative proposition is 
something like this: “Except in a few areas constitutionally committed to 
the Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing [the nation] 
 
237 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). In announcing this 
rule, the Court relied directly on Marshall Field, see id. at 410–11, a case with which the au-
thor of J.W. Hampton, Chief Justice Taft, had reason to be familiar. As Solicitor General, it 
was Taft who had defended the constitutionality of the 1890 Act against the importers’ chal-
lenge. 
238 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
239 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
2004] Constitutional Decision Rules 71 
are to be made by the Legislature.”240 Alternatively, the operative propo-
sition could be more context-dependent and standard-like, providing that 
whether a delegation of legislative authority is constitutional depends 
upon such considerations as the scope of the discretion delegated, the so-
cial importance of the decision, the feasibility of leaving the decision to 
congressional resolution, etc.241 
I have no strong opinion regarding how best to conceive of the implicit 
operative proposition to which the intelligible-principle decision rule is 
directed. It does seem to me, though, that to recognize that the nondele-
gation doctrine makes little sense as an operative proposition presses one 
to think about what the operative proposition is. And one’s answer to 
that question provides in turn a better vantage point from which to assess 
the intelligibility of the intelligible-principle decision rule itself. Indeed, 
Justice Thomas’s skepticism about the nondelegation doctrine seems to 
follow just this path. Interpreting the Constitution to prohibit significant 
exercises of rule-making authority by any body other than Congress, he 
suggests that the intelligible-principle decision rule fits this operative 
proposition too poorly to make for sound constitutional doctrine.242 
7. Standing and the “Imminent” Injury Requirement 
Turn, finally, from Article I to Article III. Relying largely on textual 
and structural interpretive principles, the Court has interpreted Article 
III to impose a variety of limits on the scope of the federal courts’ consti-
tutional authority. The Court has operationalized or channeled these lim-
its by means of rules going under such diverse headings as “standing,” 
“ripeness,” “mootness,” and “advisory opinions.” It is unlikely, however, 
that these rules are in all respects consistent with what the Court under-
 
240 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
241 This seems to be something like Justice Stevens’s view. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 
488–90 (Stevens, J., concurring) (intimating that Congress may delegate legislative powers so 
long as such delegations are “adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing statute,” and 
that courts should conclude that a delegation is adequately limited if it “provides a sufficiently 
intelligible principle”). 
242 See id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am not convinced that the intelligible principle 
doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power. I believe that there are cases in 
which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply 
too great to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”). Instead of just reading § 1 as provid-
ing that all basic decisions be made by Congress, Justice Thomas seems to reach that same 
conclusion via two discrete steps: first, § 1 provides that all “legislative” powers must be exer-
cised by Congress; and second, a power is “legislative” if it involves a basic decision. This two-
step process strikes me as just a way to give a textual fig-leaf to an interpretive judgment 
reached on structural grounds, but has no bearing on the basic point in text. 
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stands to be the underlying constitutional meaning. Take, for example, 
the standing requirement. The Court has “derived directly from the Con-
stitution” (by a process that appears to be run-of-the-mill constitutional 
interpretation) “[t]he requirement . . . [that a] plaintiff must allege per-
sonal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct 
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”243 In addition, how-
ever, current standing doctrine requires—as part of what the Court as-
serts is the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,”244 rather 
than one of its “prudential” add-ons—that the injury complained of be 
“actual or imminent.”245 
To be sure, a nonimminent complained-of injury is likely to be specula-
tive and may, for that reason alone, fall outside of the federal courts’ con-
stitutional authority. But it is surely possible that a complained-of injury 
is both likely and nonimminent.246 Accordingly, the imminence require-
ment seems most fairly understood not as a command of Article III itself 
(as judicially interpreted) but rather as a judicial invention added for an 
essentially evidentiary purpose: “to ensure that the alleged injury is not 
too speculative for Article III purposes.”247 The imminence requirement, 
therefore, is part of a decision rule. 
 
243 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
244 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
245 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
246 This can be illustrated with a slight variation on the facts of Lujan itself. The Court 
agreed that “the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, 
is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing,” id. at 562–63, but concluded that 
the evidence in the case did not “show[] how damage to the species will produce ‘imminent’ 
injury to [the plaintiffs]” because they had not alleged any specific present plans to visit the 
endangered animals’ habitats. Id. at 564. Imagine, though, that the plaintiffs lived near the 
animals and were challenging conduct that would almost certainly render the endangered 
animals incapable of reproducing. In this circumstance, it could be very probable—and surely 
not just “speculative”—that the challenged conduct would cause plaintiffs “injury in fact” by 
making it impossible for them to “use or observe” the animal species after it became extinct. 
But if the animals were themselves long-lived (like crocodiles or elephants), that particular 
injury, albeit nonspeculative, would not be “imminent.” The basic point that threatened 
harms could be nonspeculative—indeed, near-certain—even though not imminent has been 
recognized in other areas of law. For instance, the recognition that use of deadly force can on 
occasion be “necessary” to protect oneself from an injury that is not imminent provoked the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code to relax modestly the traditional imminence requirement in 
the law of self-defense. See Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) (1962) (justifying the use of force 
“when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protect-
ing himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion”). 
An argument for the wholesale elimination of an “imminence” or “immediacy” requirement 
for self-defense is pressed in Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women 
Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 371 (1993). 
247 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2. 
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IV. ELABORATING THE DISTINCTION: WHYS AND HOWS 
Supposing that the nature of the proposed distinction between consti-
tutional operative propositions and constitutional decision rules is rea-
sonably apparent, we might nonetheless expect that classifying constitu-
tional doctrine into its operative proposition and decision rule 
components will often be difficult and contestable, perhaps unresolvable. 
Indeed, not all readers will agree even with each of the examples pre-
sented in Part III. Take, for example, the taxing power. I have argued 
that present doctrine is best understood as an operative proposition that 
permits Congress to tax only for the purpose of raising revenue,248 imple-
mented via a decision rule that directs courts to conclusively presume 
that a challenged provision does issue from such a purpose so long as 
some revenue is actually raised. But this characterization is not self-
evidently correct. For example, one might prefer to view the doctrine as 
merely an operative proposition that Congress may use the taxing power 
to regulate behavior so long as the nominal tax raises some revenue, im-
plemented by the ordinary preponderance-of-the-evidence decision rule. 
Furthermore, if examples that I selected, non randomly, because I 
thought their use of a nonstandard decision rule (i.e., a decision rule 
other than the simple preponderance-of-the-evidence rule) was relatively 
obvious are in fact controversial, the effort to reverse engineer many 
other doctrines might excite even more controversy. And the more diffi-
cult it is to reach agreement on the proper characterization of extant doc-
trines, the greater is the worry that the basic conceptual distinction be-
tween operative and decision rules would thereby be rendered, if not 
illusory,249 then of precious little value. 
Worries of this sort naturally lead to two questions: (1) What sort of 
test or algorithm can we employ to properly classify aspects of doctrine as 
 
248 This is an admittedly rough articulation of what I deem the better conceptualization of 
the operative proposition. The basic point is that presence of a (substantial) revenue-
producing purpose is necessary for the tax to be constitutionally valid, not that the presence, 
in addition, of a regulatory purpose is necessarily fatal. So long as the operative proposition is 
administered via a nonstandard decision rule, it is very hard to formulate the operative propo-
sition with great precision. 
249 The stronger claim that the distinction is illusory or vacuous depends upon the proposi-
tion that all doctrine could be plausibly classified either as “either operative proposition or 
decision rule” or as “both operative proposition and decision rule.” This would be a difficult 
claim credibly to maintain, for it requires the proponent to deny, for example, even that the 
“any conceivable purpose” aspect of equal protection doctrine is more appropriately de-
scribed as a decision rule than as an operative proposition. I suspect that few if any theorists, 
even among the most committed “Pragmatists,” would be willing to bite that particular bullet. 
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decision rule or operative proposition? and (2) What values are served by 
undertaking the task? These questions assume a special urgency when 
raised from a particular minimalist-inspired perspective.250 Constitutional 
adjudication is hard. It is hard for even a single judge to do well, but the 
dynamics of multi-member tribunals make the enterprise that much more 
difficult. Judicial minimalists might protest, then, that an effort to tax-
onomize constitutional doctrine (along these or perhaps other lines) 
threatens to frustrate rather than facilitate the project of constitutional 
adjudication. To require, or even just to encourage, courts to sort consti-
tutional doctrine into operative propositions and decision rules (not to 
mention whatever additional taxonomic categories might be advanced 
over time) would, on this view, demand more than can reasonably be ex-
pected. 
I will address the first question first, because the answer to this is easy. 
There is no algorithm or litmus-paper test for correctly sorting existing 
doctrine into operative proposition and decision rule components. A con-
stitutional operative proposition is the judicial statement or understand-
ing of constitutional meaning; a constitutional decision rule states the test 
for deciding whether the terms of the operative proposition are satisfied. 
It follows, then, that whether a given piece of doctrine is an operative 
proposition depends on one’s account of constitutional meaning, which in 
part depends upon one’s theory of constitutional interpretation. Because 
there exist different plausible theories of proper constitutional interpreta-
tion, there exist different plausible conceptions of constitutional meaning. 
What one views as an operative proposition thus depends upon how one 
proposes to derive constitutional meaning, a matter that cannot be re-
solved (though it can be informed) by taxonomic explorations.251 
Again, an example will help. The Introduction showed how courts that 
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to have a certain meaning could 
 
250 See generally Sunstein, Judicial Minimalism, supra note 12 (describing judicial minimal-
ism and suggesting that the practice leaves more issues open to democratic resolution, allow-
ing for a more meaningful democratic debate). 
251 To speak even of the meanings of discrete constitutional provisions, as I often will, makes 
exposition easier, but at the risk of some misunderstanding I do not mean to convey that 
meaning must be linked to the Constitution in any narrowly clause-bound, or even textualist, 
way. It is precisely to avoid any such misconstrual that I do not speak of interpreting “the 
Constitutional text.” Rather, by “the Constitution,” I mean only what Richard Fallon usefully 
calls “the document denominated as ‘the Constitution’ in the National Archives.” Fallon, Im-
plementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 112. This way of putting things is intended to 
maintain agnosticism with respect to the full range of interpretive modalities in potentially 
legitimate play in our legal culture. 
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craft a decision rule that takes the form of conventional strict scrutiny.252 
But it did not claim that this particular path to strict scrutiny represented 
the only logically possible way to reach it. So the question remains 
whether the strict scrutiny component of existing equal protection doc-
trine is better understood as a judicial statement of constitutional mean-
ing or, rather, as a judicial direction for how courts are to decide whether 
constitutional meaning, itself articulated in different form, is satisfied. 
Because the Court’s own stated rationales for strict scrutiny can hardly be 
described as pellucid,253 this is a contestable matter of reverse-
 
252 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
253 Consider, for example, the Court’s most recent defense of strict scrutiny: 
[1] The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., Amend. 14, § 2. [2] Be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not groups,” all “governmental 
action based on race—a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances 
irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to 
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.” 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis in original; in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted). [3] We are a “free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 
(1967) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [4] It follows from that principle 
that “government may treat people differently because of their race only for the most 
compelling reasons.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S., at 227. [5] We have 
held that all racial classifications imposed by government “must be analyzed by a re-
viewing court under strict scrutiny.” Ibid. [6] This means that such classifications are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental in-
terests. [7] “Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based 
measures,” we have no way to determine what “classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ 
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority 
or simple racial politics.” Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plural-
ity opinion). [8] We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to “‘smoke out’ ille-
gitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough 
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” Ibid. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337–38 (2003) (bracketed sentence numbers added). 
Because the component ideas contained in this passage, along with the quotations from case 
law, are all so familiar to a constitutional lawyer, the reader is likely to gallop along content-
edly without pausing to consider whether this is really a coherent justification for strict scru-
tiny. I daresay, however, that were this explanation itself subjected to rigorous scrutiny, it 
would fail. 
 Sentences [5] and [6] are true statements of existing doctrine, sentence [1] accurately quotes 
the constitutional text, sentence [3] is just atmospherics. If this passage is to explain or justify 
existing constitutional doctrine, the other four sentences must be doing the work. Sentences 
[7] and [8] throw a strong decision-rule cast on the doctrine: that a racial classification is not 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest does not itself entail that the 
classification denies equal protection; rather, strict scrutiny serves to “smoke out” whether 
there is a violation. Government violates equal protection if it makes “illegitimate use” of 
race. What is an illegitimate use? Sentence [7] suggests that it is the use of race motivated by 
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Here, then, is the picture painted by the 
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engineering. Now, it is hard to imagine that the strict scrutiny test consti-
tutes any part of the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. An 
originalist judge or theorist who accepts strict scrutiny doctrine is there-
fore extremely likely to view it as a decision rule. Likewise, say, for a tex-
tualist. But for those who advocate a common-law254 or historicist255 ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation, it is perfectly plausible to view 
constitutional meaning in nearly organic fashion, just as the accretion 
over time of interpretive judgments by relevant actors and communities 
(especially but not exclusively judges). For such persons, the rule that ra-
cial classifications are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored 
to promote a compelling state interest can be part of what the Equal Pro-
tection Clause means at this particular historical moment. It does not fol-
low that they must or should deny the operative proposition/decision rule 
 
second paragraph: A person is unconstitutionally denied equal protection if she is disadvan-
taged relative to others because the government is motivated by notions of racial inferiority or 
racial politics. The implication is that a racial classification that is not so motivated and that 
bears a rational relationship (in the sense of ordinary degrees of over- and under-
inclusiveness) to a legitimate (but not compelling) state interest does not actually violate the 
Constitution. The twin prongs of strict scrutiny are evidentiary devices designed to ensure that 
the judiciary does not accidentally permit to stand a classification that was in fact impermissi-
bly motivated. 
 Yet the first paragraph, it seems to me, conveys a very different sense. Indeed, sentence [4] 
has the tone of an operative proposition: Government is constitutionally forbidden from clas-
sifying persons on the basis of race without compelling reason. If so, why? If this passage sup-
plies an answer to that question it must appear in sentence [2]. However, it does not. That 
sentence contains two observations: (a) that the Equal Protection Clause protects persons not 
groups—i.e., is a “personal right”; and (b) that race is “in most circumstances irrelevant” to 
the pursuit of legitimate state interests. But almost every trait is “in most circumstances” ir-
relevant to a stated end, a fact that does not provoke a demand for compelling justification, 
lest the personal right to equal protection be denied, on the occasions when the state claims 
that it is relevant. 
 So this is not an entirely satisfying account of strict scrutiny. On the fairest reading, though, 
strict scrutiny seems to rest on both evidentiary and justificatory rationales. Some demand for 
heightened justification is part of the operative proposition; narrow tailoring is supplied by 
the decision rule. Perhaps, then, the doctrine is best understood as follows. The operative 
proposition of equal protection prohibits states from treating people differently unless the 
public good pursued outweighs the harm to the disadvantaged persons. The decision rule di-
rects that, because racial classifications generally produce substantial harm, and because fully 
ad hoc balancing is cumbersome and unpredictable, courts should presume that the good does 
not outweigh the harm unless the good is “compelling.” Furthermore, because our unfortu-
nate history shows that states are especially likely to be pursuing illegitimate ends when em-
ploying racial classifications, the decision rule also directs courts to presume that the (puta-
tively compelling) interest claimed by the state is not the real interest pursued unless the 
classification is narrowly tailored to advance that (putatively compelling) interest. 
254 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 3. 
255 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, A Community Built on Words (2002). 
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distinction. The point is only that the mere fact that given doctrine is 
crafted in terms that depart from original understandings and text does 
not by itself entail that the doctrine is a decision rule. 
You may think that this indeterminacy, my admitted inability to re-
solve all debates about how various doctrines are properly classified, is a 
defect of the operative proposition/decision rule distinction. It is not a de-
fect. It is a virtue. I am proposing a (partial) conceptualization of the logi-
cal structure of constitutional adjudication. We should expect it to be valid 
over the range of plausible theories of constitutional interpretation. 
However, to say that there is no algorithm for sorting doctrine into one 
taxon or the other is not to say that there are no ways of thinking about 
the problem intelligently, or that reasons cannot be given in favor of one 
proposed classification over another. Those reasons, however, will them-
selves be dependent upon the values that the distinction promotes. So the 
two questions I have imagined—what is the test?, and what are the val-
ues?—are really just one. To understand the values or functions that the 
distinction serves is to understand how to classify. Accordingly, Section 
IV.A sketches some anticipated values of attending to the operative 
proposition/decision rule distinction. The discussion is brief and sugges-
tive because firm conclusions are impossible at the outset. Some benefits 
of treating the distinction seriously (as well, admittedly, as some costs) 
are likely to be hard to envision before a judicial and scholarly practice of 
doing so emerges. In any event, once armed with a fuller sense of the 
functions that the taxonomy could serve, we will be better positioned to 
think about how ambiguous doctrine could be most profitably classified. 
Section IV.B illustrates how awareness of the values of the distinction 
can help us apply it. 
A. Some Values of the Distinction 
At a high level of generality, we can identify at least two very broad 
sorts of reasons why the operative proposition/decision rule distinction 
can prove useful: because it can invigorate and enrich those aspects of 
American political culture that are deeply informed and shaped by con-
stitutional understandings but which depend little or not at all on the 
prospect of adjudication; and because it can contribute to the develop-
ment of more rational, efficacious, and legitimate constitutional doctrine, 
whether crafted by courts or legislatures. These points are abstract. Let 
me sketch what I have in mind. 
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1. Extra-adjudicatory Constitutionalism256 
a. Constitutional Culture 
Why do we care what the Constitution means? On the Holmesian “bad 
man” picture of law,257 the answer is simple: Knowing our judicially en-
forceable rights, duties, powers, disabilities, and the like enables us to 
better plan our lives. That is a fine answer as far as it goes, but many 
people doubt that it’s a complete one. In particular, many people suppose 
that our Constitution plays a role in the construction of our political cul-
ture and even in the shaping of our identities as Americans that far tran-
scends the Constitution’s operation in court.258 As Robert Post and Reva 
Siegel recently elaborated, “The Constitution . . . does not live in our so-
ciety as mere ukase. Disputes about the Constitution often raise deep 
questions of social meaning and collective identity . . . . [A]lthough con-
stitutional law may be useful for settling disputes, the Constitution itself 
is not reducible to this function.”259 If this is so, then all of us—citizens, 
 
256 A more familiar term is “extrajudicial constitutionalism.” As will be made clear, by “ex-
tra-adjudicatory constitutionalism” I will mean constitutionalism not dependent upon adjudi-
cation. Rules of constitutional law that govern adjudication are, necessarily, applied by courts; 
but they could be made by other branches. So if courts chose to defer to congressional inter-
pretations of the Constitution in the course of litigation, there is a plausible sense in which 
such a decision would reflect extrajudicial constitutionalism (constitutional meanings put forth 
by non-judicial actors) but would not be extra-adjudicatory constitutionalism. 
257 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“If 
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only 
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good 
one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer 
sanctions of conscience.”). I do not mean to claim here that the “bad man’s” reason for caring 
about constitutional meaning exhausts Holmes’s. For representative explorations of Holmes 
and his bad man, see Symposium: The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110 Harv. 
L. Rev. 989–1054 (1997); Symposium: The Path of the Law 100 Years Later: Holmes’s Influ-
ence on Modern Jurisprudence, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 1–278 (1997); Symposium: The Path of the 
Law Today, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 691–960 (1998). 
258 This is a recurrent theme in the work of James Boyd White. See, e.g., James Boyd White, 
When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Charac-
ter, and Community 240–47 (1984); see also, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 216, at 12 (1999) (ob-
serving that the Constitution contributes to “the opportunity to construct an attractive narra-
tive of American aspiration, and constructing such a narrative is an important constituent of 
the human good”); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 127 (arguing that the founders who thought most seriously about the subject envi-
sioned the federal courts as conducting “high political education” for the citizenry); Hans 
Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale L.J. 227, 251–56 (1972) (drawing at-
tention to the conceptual priority of constitutional norms to judicial review); Post & Siegel, 
supra note 191, at 17–30 (criticizing the Rehnquist Court’s § 5 jurisprudence for disregarding 
the social and political dimensions of American constitutionalism). 
259 Post & Siegel, supra note 191, at 28. 
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legislators, and executive officials alike—might have reason to think 
about what our Constitution requires or permits even when we think that 
to run afoul of any such constitutional meaning will not provoke a judi-
cial response. 
For this reason among others, “[w]e need processes, formal and infor-
mal, by which our constitutional understandings and commitments can be 
challenged, reinterpreted, and renewed.”260 Explicit announcements by a 
federal court, and especially by the Supreme Court, of what it takes the 
Constitution to mean constitute an obvious—indeed, the single most ob-
vious—locus for such processes to unfold.261 Yet those who focus on what 
we might call the extra-adjudicatory functions of constitutional law—the 
Constitution’s role in structuring debates of political morality, in creating 
national identity, and the like—are frequently critical of the performance 
of the courts. Akhil Amar speaks for many in deriding the Supreme 
Court for producing “a mindnumbing array of formulas, tests, prongs, 
and tiers, often phrased in highly abstract legal jargon—
‘overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness,’ ‘narrow tailoring,’ ‘interme-
diate scrutiny,’ and so on—that insulates and anesthetizes.”262 It might 
seem to follow (though Amar does not himself draw this lesson) that we 
should strive harder to create constitutional meanings not dependent on 
the courts’ handiwork. Perhaps we should, in Mark Tushnet’s evocative 
phrase, take the Constitution away from the courts.263 
 
260 Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. 
L. Rev. 4, 15 (2001). 
261 This is a central theme of Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: 
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2003). See, 
e.g., id. at 8 (arguing “that constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relation-
ship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture”). It finds ex-
pression too, for example, in Barry S. Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. 
Rev. 577 (1993) (claiming that courts exercising judicial review are engaged in a “constitu-
tional interpretive dialogue” with all segments of society); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme 
Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986) (argu-
ing that judicial review can invigorate republican self-government by modeling for the citi-
zenry the exercise of “practical reason”). 
262 Amar, supra note 3, at 46. An influential earlier critique of the modern Court's enthusi-
asm for awkward, cumbersome formulas was Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 
84 Mich. L. Rev. 165 (1985); see also, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution: 
The Supreme Court’s Obligation to Maintain the Constitution as Something We the People 
Can Understand (1992) (maintaining that the Court is obligated to comprehensibly explain 
the Constitution to those governed by it).   
263 Tushnet, supra note 216. Among contemporary scholars, perhaps the most steadfast and 
influential voice for a position of this sort has belonged to my colleague Sandy Levinson. See, 
e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988). See generally Legal Scholarship Sympo-
sium: The Scholarship of Sanford Levinson, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 553–794 (2003). For another 
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This, however, is an extravagant proposal. At the least, as Tushnet 
himself acknowledges, even constitutional populists might accord judicial 
interpretations “added weight because they come from experts who have 
thought seriously about the interpretive questions over a long period.”264 
If we can benefit from the courts’ expert judgments on constitutional 
meaning, but if institutional and pragmatic concerns are likely to con-
tinue to produce constitutional doctrine that is abstruse and legalistic, a 
partial solution is to separate that doctrine into its taxonomic compo-
nents.265 In particular, to distinguish operative propositions from decision 
rules will better enable the Justices to live up to their “professional obli-
gation to articulate in comprehensible and accessible language the consti-
tutional principles on which their judgments rest,”266 which will in turn en-
rich the Constitution’s political, cultural, and extra-adjudicatory value.267 
Revealingly, even while deriding the taxonomic distinctions pressed by 
Sager and Monaghan, Daryl Levinson recognized “that constitutional 
rights that are announced but that carry no sanction when violated might 
influence behavior by educating the public or shaping social norms.”268 
 
contribution to populist constitutionalism, see Richard Parker, Here, the People Rule: A 
Constitutional Populist Manifesto (1994). 
264 Tushnet, supra note 216, at x. 
265 For brief remarks in a similar spirit, see Klein, supra note 115, at 1070. 
266 Goldstein, supra note 262, at 19. 
267 Even if it is valuable for the Court to say “the Constitution commands X” while acknowl-
edging at the same time that institutional considerations convince it to apply a different deci-
sion rule in the course of adjudication, one might doubt, with Hans Kelsen, whether the op-
erative proposition in such circumstances truly is “law.” See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of 
Law and State (1945). I am not sure what would turn on the answer. In any event, if as H.L.A. 
Hart claimed, law has, or aspires to, an internal normativity, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law (2d ed. 1994), then it would seem entirely appropriate to conceive of constitutional op-
erative propositions as part of “constitutional law” no matter what form their corresponding 
decision rules might take. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 216, at x–xi (suggesting that it is appropri-
ate to call “constitutional decisions made away from the courts” law “because it is not in the 
first instance either the expression of pure preferences by officials and voters or the expres-
sion of unfiltered moral judgments [and because, [i]n short, it is not ‘mere’ politics, nor is it 
‘simply’ philosophy]”). 
268 Levinson, supra note 27, at 887 n.123; see also id. at 906 (“To the extent that declaring 
rights shapes understandings and preferences . . . there may be good reason for talking about 
right and remedy as if they were two entirely separate issues.”). One might suppose that this 
concession is in more tension with Levinson’s attack on the right/remedy distinction (and its 
cousins) than he acknowledges. It is true, as Fred Schauer emphasizes, “that ordinary people 
simply do not read judicial opinions.” Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1455, 1463 (1995). But I do not think that this observation undermines the instant point. 
Judicial statements of constitutional meaning are just the sort of thing—unlike decision 
rules—that should be able to seep easily into public discourse even absent widespread lay 
readership of the opinions themselves. 
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b. Conscientious State Actors 
These comments have related and obvious implications for constitu-
tionally proper behavior by state agents. A central theme from Sager’s 
“Fair Measure” was that governmental actors should feel themselves 
bound by the true constitutional norm even when the constitutional rule 
that judges will apply in adjudication effectively underenforces that 
norm.269 But the language of norm and rule, or concept and construct, 
threatens to obscure a key point. As the operative proposition/decision 
rule distinction makes clear, the question is not just whether a legislator 
should follow her own interpretation of the constitutional norm in lieu of 
the courts’ when she believes that the latter does not fully realize the 
former. There is a middle ground between independence and slavishness, 
between what Sandy Levinson dubbed the Protestant and Catholic orien-
tations toward constitutional law.270 Constitutional operative propositions 
and decision rules are both judicial products. Thus, a “conscientious legis-
lator”271 who is not confident of her abilities as independent interpreter of 
the Constitution may choose to follow the judge-announced constitu-
tional operative proposition even if she believes that the full doctrine 
would, because of an underenforcing decision rule, allow her greater lati-
tude. 
The same principle applies, mutatis mutandis, with respect to decision 
rules that overenforce operative propositions. Even if government offi-
cials should or do feel themselves obligated to obey judicial interpreta-
tions of the Constitution at all (as opposed to being obligated to obey 
their own good faith understandings of the Constitution), that obligation 
extends only to judge-determined constitutional meaning, i.e., constitu-
tional operative propositions, and not to those aspects of constitutional 
doctrine that are properly understood as decision rules. Thus a govern-
mental agent who complies with an operative proposition—but under cir-
cumstances in which she knows that her conduct would be adjudged to 
violate that operative proposition by virtue of an overenforcing decision 
rule—may be taking a risk, but violates no duty of constitutional obedi-
ence. That is, where a decision rule effectively overenforces the judicial 
view of constitutional meaning, legislators who do not anticipate litiga-
 
269 Sager, supra note 5, at 1227. 
270 Levinson, supra note 263, at 27–30. 
271 See Brest, supra note 212. 
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tion may, wholly honorably, choose to legislate to the full limits of the 
constitutional operative proposition.272 
2. The Making of Constitutional Doctrine 
Think now about adjudicatory constitutionalism—how constitutional 
law works in the courts. To distinguish operative propositions from deci-
sion rules can serve many values here, too. For example, it can help struc-
ture potentially productive debates about the legitimate judicial moves in 
constitutional implementation, it can facilitate sounder judicial refine-
ment of constitutional doctrine, and it can assist us to better understand 
Congress’s appropriate role in the shared enterprise of American consti-
tutionalism. 
a. Legitimacy 
When introducing the concept of “constitutional common law” nearly 
thirty years ago, Monaghan was keenly aware that its legitimacy could 
not be taken for granted. “Most writers,” he claimed, “view the Court’s 
authority to fashion remedial rules admittedly not required by the Con-
stitution as virtually self-evident.”273 But this complacency, he said, was 
mistaken. As he fully acknowledged, the crafting of rules binding on 
other departments of the federal government and upon the states “that 
are admittedly not integral parts of the Constitution and that go beyond 
its minimum requirements”274 threatens values of separation of powers 
and of federalism.275 
Despite the challenge, Monaghan ultimately concluded that the federal 
courts do indeed possess legitimate authority to craft constitutional 
common law.276 In reaching this conclusion, he was persuaded, in part, by 
analogies to the federal courts’ common law powers with respect to such 
areas as admiralty and foreign affairs law.277 But even in the arena of indi-
vidual liberties, Monaghan deemed “the affirmative case for recognizing 
 
272 I emphasize “may” because the fact that some action is constitutionally permissible does 
not, of course, entail that its commission would be honorable or even permissible all things 
considered. I am thinking, in particular, of cases in which a constitutional operative proposi-
tion underenforces our best understanding of political morality. 
273 Monaghan, supra note 4, at 9. 
274 Id. at 22–23. 
275 Id. at 34–38. 
276 Id. at 38. 
277 Id. at 10–14. 
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a constitutional common law . . . a strong one.”278 First, he explained, 
“[t]he Court’s history and its institutional role in our scheme of govern-
ment, in which it defines the constitutionally compelled limits of govern-
mental power, make it a singularly appropriate institution to fashion 
many of the details as well as the framework of the constitutional guaran-
tees.” Moreover, in light of the importance of uniformity in this area, 
“the desirability of some such undertaking seems clear.” Finally, “recog-
nition of that power is the most satisfactory way to rationalize a large and 
steadily growing body of Court decisions.”279 
Monaghan’s thesis provoked substantial commentary. The most sus-
tained and influential critique appeared three years later in an article, 
also in the Harvard Law Review, by two political scientists, Thomas 
Schrock and Robert Welsh.280 Despite having recognized the separation 
of powers and federalism based objections to constitutional common 
law’s legitimacy, they argued, Monaghan seemed to suppose that the de-
sirability of constitutional common law provides an adequate basis for its 
legitimacy.281 “[W]hat he is recommending,” Schrock and Welsh con-
cluded, “is neither constitutional nor common law but pragmatism with-
out either precedent or principle—judicial realism radicalized and ram-
pant.”282 But because “mere utility” is not a ground of constitutional 
authority, the constitutional principles of separation of powers and feder-
alism demand rejection of “the idea that the Supreme Court should as-
sume and exercise the power to impose on coordinate departments, and 
especially on the states, rules developed at a subconstitutional level.”283 
Notice that Monaghan staked himself to a fairly categorical claim, and 
that Schrock and Welsh responded in kind. Reflecting a similarly cate-
gorical view of the problem, many contemporary metadoctrinalists—
proponents and critics alike—seem essentially to take for granted the 
Court’s power to create doctrine that departs from interpreted mean-
ing.284 Perhaps, however, the legitimacy of constitutional doctrine (con-
 
278 Id. at 19. 
279 Id. 
280 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 154. There is some irony in the fact that this article ap-
peared in the very same issue as Sager’s “Fair Measure,” supra note 5. 
281 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 154, at 1126–31. 
282 Id. at 1124. 
283 Id. at 1171. 
284 So, for example, although the recent Forewords by Amar and Sunstein reflect significant 
hostility to constitutional doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 13 and 16, neither even 
hints that the creation of doctrine is illegitimate. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 3, at 80 (“A 
documentarian judge does not begin and end with the document. Rather, she begins with the 
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ceived as something other than judge-announced constitutional meaning) 
is not all or nothing. It could be, as commentators to the literature on su-
pervisory and inherent powers285 seem to agree, that the legitimacy of the 
 
document and then ponders how best to translate its wisdom into workable in-court rules, as 
contemplated by Article III.”). Similarly, in an article dedicated to defending Supreme Court 
constitutional decisions from criticisms that the Court has come to rely excessively on com-
plex multipart tests, Fred Schauer never once addressed the possibility that such doctrine-
making exceeds the proper scope of judicial power. See Schauer, supra note 268. Indeed, 
many commentators claim that doctrine-making is inescapable. See, e.g., Fallon, Implement-
ing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 26 (“The Court must craft doctrine as well as specify 
constitutional meaning through interpretation.”); id. at 42 (contending that many constitu-
tional norms “are too vague to serve as rules of law; their effective implementation requires 
the crafting of doctrine by courts”); Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 
141, at 6 (“In order for the [constitutional] text to serve as law, it must be rulelike. . . . For the 
Constitution to serve this purpose, it must be elaborated as a series of doctrines, formulas, or 
tests. Thus, constitutional interpretation necessarily is the unfolding of constitutional law. De-
bates over constitutional meaning become debates over the proper formulation of relatively 
narrow rules.”). 
285 Valuable studies on “inherent” and/or “supervisory” powers include Sara Sun Beale, Re-
considering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the 
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1433 (1984); Evan Caminker, Federal 
Courts: Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified Judiciary,” 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1513, 1526–30 
(2000); Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Judicial Independence Symposium: Judicial Power and the 
Rules Enabling Act, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 733, 754 (1984); James E. Pfander, Federal Courts: 
Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 
Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1442–59 (2000); James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the 
Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1515 (2001); Robert J. Pushaw, The 
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735 
(2001); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits of Ju-
dicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 761 (1997); William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in 
Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on 
the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs. 102, 128 (1976); Of-
fice of Legal Pol’y, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Truth in Criminal Justice” Series: The Judiciary’s 
Use of Supervisory Power to Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, reprinted in 22 U. 
Mich. J.L. Reform 773 (1989). 
 Although the distinctions between inherent and supervisory powers, and between those 
powers and “constitutional common law,” are vague, a few general observations can be made. 
While Monaghan suggested that constitutional common law was one of the federal courts’ in-
tegral powers, see Monaghan, supra note 4, at 10–26, courts generally use the term “inherent” 
powers with reference to those powers that are either necessary or at least beneficial to the 
exercise of integral powers. See Pushaw, supra, at 742–43. Inherent powers include the power 
to control litigation, via such means as evidentiary and procedural rulings, as well as the 
power to impose sanctions on parties and witnesses. Most commentators agree that the 
courts’ inherent powers include the power not only to make discrete rulings but also to estab-
lish rules for lower federal courts, even in the absence of specific congressional authorization. 
But see Office of Legal Pol’y, U.S. Dep’t of Justice report, supra, at 811 n.156 (“The proposi-
tion that courts have inherent rulemaking power is dubious at best.”). The federal courts’ so-
called “supervisory” power, exercised expressly by the Supreme Court since McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), is the authority to supervise the administration of criminal 
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power’s exercise depends upon the gravity of the need that calls it forth.286 
Yet there are other possibilities. To divide doctrine into interpreted 
meaning (“operative propositions”) and decision rules suggests that the 
legitimacy of the latter might depend, at least in part, on the reasons that 
underlie its creation. This is, of course, precisely the assumption that has 
shaped the long-standing debate over constitutional interpretation. Just 
as only some sorts of moves are supposed permissible when traveling 
from the Constitution to constitutional meaning, then, maybe only some 
moves (albeit different ones) can fairly be relied on to support a given 
constitutional decision rule. 
Metadoctrinalists tend to speak loosely, however, about the sorts of 
considerations that courts do, or should, rely upon when creating doc-
trine.287 But if the legitimacy of decision rules may depend upon their rea-
sons, some greater precision will prove useful.288 As a first pass, then, we 
 
justice in lower federal courts, an authority that includes “the duty of establishing and main-
taining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.” Id. at 340. Most commentators and 
courts classify the supervisory power as a species of inherent power. See, e.g., Beale, supra, at 
1464; Pushaw, supra, at 779–83. Unlike the federal courts’ constitutional common law making 
power described by Monaghan, the federal courts’ exercise of supervisory and other inherent 
rulemaking powers bind only the federal courts, not their state counterparts. 
286 While nearly all commentators acknowledge that the federal courts have an inherent or 
implied rulemaking power (perhaps deriving from the Vesting Clause of Article III), they dis-
agree regarding its scope; in particular, they disagree as to how “necessary” a claimed inher-
ent power must be. Compare, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 285, at 128 (arguing that “[o]nly 
when the particular assertion of privilege can fairly be said to be the least adequate power [a 
federal court] clearly must have to perform express duties enumerated in the Constitution” 
can the courts assume such authority), and Pushaw, supra note 285, at 847–50 (arguing that 
federal courts may exercise “implied indispensable” powers without congressional authoriza-
tion, but only Congress can exercise merely “beneficial” powers—those that are helpful or 
useful in implementing Article III), with Beale, supra note 285, at 1468–77 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court (but not the lower federal courts) may without congressional authorization, 
exercise those powers that are “reasonably appropriate and relevant” to the exercise of its Ar-
ticle III powers). 
287 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 3, at 79–80 (explaining that the concretizing of open-ended 
constitutional standards “call[s] for strategic, pragmatic, empiric, institutional, and second-
best judgments as to which the document gives rather little specific guidance. Judicial doc-
trines, working alongside rules laid down and practices built up by other branches, properly 
fill in the document’s outline, making broad principles workably specific in a court and in the 
world”); Strauss, supra note 38, at 193 (observing that “[o]ne customary way” to describe ju-
dicial constitutional doctrine-making “is that the court will attempt to minimize the sum of 
error costs and administrative costs,” and noting that “[t]his is misleading to the extent it sug-
gests that all of these interests can be reduced to a single currency, or that distributional con-
cerns are irrelevant,” but concluding that nonetheless “it is a useful shorthand”). 
288 This suggestion resembles Fallon’s observation that “when we recognize that the Court 
may sometimes under- as well as overenforce constitutional norms, we can appreciate the ur-
gency of assessing the grounds on which the Court determines whether to do so.” Fallon, Im-
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might identify six analytically distinct factors or families of factors that 
might appeal to a judge considering whether, and how, to form a consti-
tutional decision rule—considerations I label adjudicatory, deterrent, pro-
tective, fiscal, institutional, and substantive. No doubt some of these con-
siderations could be usefully subdivided and others could be added.289 But 
for present purposes a start is good enough. 
A decision rule of some sort is unavoidable because application of the 
operative propositions confronts epistemic uncertainty. The most obvious 
factor that a decision-rule-maker should consider, then, is how best to 
minimize adjudicatory errors—i.e., the sum of false positives and false 
negatives. Call this an adjudicatory consideration. It comes in two vari-
ants: A court could think that a particular decision rule is likely to mini-
mize either the sum total of adjudicatory errors, or the sum total of 
weighted errors, taking account of a difference in perceived social dis-
utility between false negatives and false positives.290 Either way, it is not 
inevitable that the more-likely-than-not burden of proof will best serve 
this goal.291 Most of the decision rules identified in Part III are likely to 
rest, at least in part, on adjudicatory considerations. 
By minimizing adjudicatory errors, a decision rule is likely at the same 
time to optimize compliance with the operative proposition. If addressees 
of the operative proposition perceive or anticipate that adjudication of 
that rule yields many false negatives, they may become less disposed to 
comply with the judge-announced constitutional meaning. Just as a court 
may craft constitutional doctrine to reduce the adjudicatory errors, then, 
it may also be motivated to secure greater compliance. Call an interest in 
 
plementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 7. But Fallon does not pursue such an assess-
ment very far. Although he does offer “[a] nonexhaustive list” of the sorts of “value argu-
ments” that courts do in fact employ when constructing constitutional doctrine, id. at 47–52, 
he does not explore the possibility that these features of contemporary practices are not all 
(equally) legitimate. Instead, his argument on this particular score seems largely to reduce to 
claiming that “[t]he measure of the soundness of constitutional doctrine—including ‘prophy-
lactic’ rules as well as three- and four-part tests—is whether it implements the Constitution 
effectively.” Id. at 42. Unfortunately, it’s not entirely clear what “soundness” means in this 
context. Is this a synonym for legitimacy? If it is not, then Fallon has not responded to the le-
gitimacy worry. If it is, then Fallon has responded, but not wholly satisfactorily because he 
does not provide—let alone defend—any metric by which effectiveness is to be measured. 
(One might suspect, though, that he has in mind the untheorized, common-sensical notion of 
effectiveness and success characteristic of Posnerian pragmatism.) See supra note 161. 
289 Cf. Sunstein, Judicial Minimalism, supra note 12, at 46–50 (partially unpacking the judi-
cial interest in minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs). 
290 Errors could come from good faith epistemic mistakes or from the danger that judges will 
intentionally manipulate loose standards. 
291 See infra text accompanying notes 404–07. 
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reducing violations of constitutional meaning a deterrent consideration. 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is surely the most salient ex-
ample.292 But the North Carolina v. Pearce decision rule that presumes 
vindictiveness from the absence of stated reasons for a longer sentence293 
might similarly be explained on grounds of deterrence. 
Of course, errors in adjudicating claims of unconstitutionality can cut 
two ways. Just as an excess of false negatives can water down the incen-
tives for other governmental actors to comply with the constitutional op-
erative proposition, an excess of false positives may produce overdeter-
rence or chilling effects. A protective consideration, then, is the obverse 
of a deterrent consideration. It reflects a possible judicial concern to en-
sure that the adjudicatory process not render other actors unduly timid. 
Protective and deterrent considerations are the two species of a broader 
genus of considerations we might call guidance-promoting.294 
In a broad sense, a decision rule is always designed to reduce “costs.”295 
A protective consideration, for example, is the interest in reducing exces-
sive timidity because such timidity is deemed socially costly. Among the 
costs that a legal system might be concerned to minimize, however, are 
some that involve direct monetary outlays—the monies that parties and 
the judicial system itself expend to litigate disputes, as well as private ex-
penditures to avoid litigation. A fiscal consideration drives a court to 
 
292 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (noting 
that the exclusionary rule “is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated”); United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915–22 (1984) (explaining that the deterrent function of the ex-
clusionary rule does not justify its application when police officers conduct a search in objec-
tively reasonable reliance of a warrant later determined to be invalid); United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as a “judicially created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent ef-
fect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved”). If the exclusionary 
rule is not a constitutional operative proposition then it represents a third category of consti-
tutional doctrine, what could be termed, straightforwardly, a remedial rule. As I have empha-
sized, the operative proposition/decision rule distinction is only an introduction to the project 
of doctrinal taxonomy. 
293 See supra Section III.B.2. 
294 Compare Hart and Sacks’s discussion of what they term a “self-applying regulation”—an 
official directive “which is susceptible of correct and dispositive application by a person to 
whom it is initially addressed.” Henry Hart & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process 120–22 (Wil-
liam Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 1994). Monaghan described Miranda and the lineup cases 
as exercises of the “traditional judicial function” of “providing guidance to primary actors 
(law enforcement personnel in these cases) in terms sufficiently specific to allow ‘self-applying 
regulation.’” Monaghan, supra note 4, at 20–21. 
295 For recognition, and caution, of this broad use of “costs” language in this context, see, 
e.g., Sunstein, Judicial Minimalism, supra note 12, at 46–47. 
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craft doctrine in such a way as to reduce these private and governmental 
litigation-related expenditures.296 
A fifth possible decision-rule-making consideration is famous from the 
justiciability literature. Alexander Bickel justified the passive virtues in 
large part as a way to conserve the court’s “moral authority” and to re-
duce interbranch friction.297 The very same considerations—what we 
might call institutional—could influence a court’s decision of whether, 
and if so how, to create a constitutional decision rule. Indeed, several of 
the decision rules already canvassed, including the “any conceivable pur-
pose” decision rule from equal protection doctrine, and the enrolled bill 
doctrine, seem patently motivated by institutional considerations. 
Suppose finally that none of the foregoing considerations singly or in 
combination militate against the customary more-likely-than-not decision 
rule. Nonetheless, judges could conclude, based on their own substantive 
value or policy judgments, that a particular constitutional provision, 
properly interpreted, carries its underlying norm or principle too far or 
not far enough. And they might, as a consequence, create a decision rule 
designed simply to better effectuate that norm. Call an interest in better 
operationalizing constitutional norms or policies in this way a substantive 
consideration.298 As an illustration, recall the nondelegation doctrine dis-
cussed earlier,299 and assume that a majority of the Court believed both 
that Article I, Section 1, properly interpreted, means that Congress may 
not delegate the authority to make “important” decisions and that to 
permit such delegations would be wiser social policy. Adoption of the 
“intelligible principle” decision rule might then have been adopted as a 
way to effectively expand Congress’s power to delegate beyond what the 
 
296 This includes many of the costs that courts and commentators often have in mind when 
defending a particular course as a means to reduce “unpredictability.” 
297 See Bickel, supra note 116; see also Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 33, at ch. 5 
(discussing the “prudential” modality of constitutional interpretation). For a scathing criticism 
of the Bickelian approach, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues: A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964); Her-
bert Wechsler, Book Review, 75 Yale L.J. 672 (1966). 
298 Cf. Field, supra note 154, at 893 (positing that “constitutional common law” arises when 
“the judiciary chooses the ‘best rule’ based upon its own notions of policy and upon whatever 
policies it finds implicit in the constitutional . . . provisions it does have an obligation to fol-
low”); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 154, at 1126–27 (“[T]he constitutional common law 
claims for the Court . . . power . . . to overturn acts of the political branches when, though ad-
mittedly not unconstitutional, these acts violate some subconstitutional judgment of utility or 
desirability.”); id. at 1153–58. 
299 See supra Section III.B.6. 
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Constitution allows. Were this an accurate account of the intelligible-
principle decision rule, it would rest on a substantive consideration.300 
This (nonexhaustive) catalogue of decision-rule considerations might 
seem useless to someone who believes either that federal courts lack au-
thority to create any constitutional decision rules or that courts enjoy 
carte blanche to craft decision rules for any reason at all. But neither of 
these positions is plausible. 
To deny federal courts power to create decision rules is not, it must be 
remembered, to maintain that constitutional adjudication should proceed 
without the benefit of decision rules at all. It is to claim, instead, that all 
facts made relevant by constitutional operative propositions (which is to 
say, by judicial determinations of constitutional meaning) must be as-
sessed on a case-by-case basis, without benefit of presumptions or other 
adjudicatory devices, under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
of proof. However, it is late in the day to take seriously the claim that the 
judicial creation of constitutional decision rules is categorically illegiti-
mate. This is not (contrary to the view of many contemporary theorists301) 
because constitutional doctrine that departs from judicial interpretations 
of constitutional meaning is inevitable or ineliminable, but only because 
it has staked a position that will be extremely costly to dislodge and be-
cause the most plausible test of legitimacy is not purely foundational but 
is, instead, at least partly a function of existing practices.302 Moreover, 
common law practice at the time of the framing authorized courts to cre-
ate and adapt standard adjudicatory devices like rebuttable and conclu-
 
300 If it is not clear what about this example is fanciful, see infra text accompanying notes 
304–05. 
301 See supra note 284. That courts find it useful to concretize often vague constitutional 
standards into doctrine cannot be doubted. That such doctrine is essential to “enabl[e] the 
document to work as in-court law,” Amar, supra note 3, at 79, is something else entirely. 
Courts could, after all, apply what they take to be constitutional meaning directly to the facts 
of every case without the benefit of “implementing frameworks,” id., so long as they are pre-
pared to rely very heavily on analogical reasoning. Indeed, this is much how constitutional law 
operated for the better part of two centuries. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 
1994 Term—Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 13, 74 (1995) (“In many ways, the 
Warren Court created modern constitutional law through its plethora of doctrines, rights, 
tendencies, and expectations.”). 
302 In this respect, an argument against the power to create decision rules runs into one of 
the problems that confronts a stringent commitment to originalism—namely, that it “entails a 
massive repudiation of the present constitutional order.” Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare De-
cisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 727 (1988). 
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sive presumptions and burden-shifting mechanisms when administering 
statutes.303 
At the other extreme, it is hard to credit that courts should enjoy effec-
tively unconstrained authority to craft constitutional decision rules. As 
even David Strauss has observed, constitutional doctrine that rests on “a 
judgment by the Court that the world would be a better place” with it 
“does indeed have a legitimacy problem” for “[j]udges do not have a 
general authority to implement their visions of the best world.”304 True, 
the bite of this concession depends on the amount of doctrine that rests 
on substantive considerations, and that there exists much of it might be 
doubted.305 Perhaps this is partly due to the widespread, if tacit, recogni-
 
303 See, e.g., 9 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 142 (3d ed. 1932); James Bradley 
Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 315–16 (1898). Not surpris-
ingly, federal courts today routinely “allocate burdens and levels of persuasion consistent with 
perceived demands of policy if a federal statute does not control.” Ronald J. Allen, Presump-
tions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Actions—An Anatomy of Unnecessary 
Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 892, 900 (1982). 
304 Strauss, supra note 38, at 194. 
305 To see why this might be, it helps to have in mind examples of decision rules that might 
be claimed to rest on substantive considerations. So return to our brief ruminations about the 
nondelegation doctrine. See supra Section III.B.6. Suppose that the Court concluded that the 
Constitution, as properly interpreted, actually—but unwisely—forbids Congress from delegat-
ing the power to make any “important” policy choices. Suppose, too, that the Court then 
adopted a decision rule directing that courts must find that a delegation did not implicate the 
power to make important choices if it contained an “intelligible principle” as a sneaky way to 
effectively allow broader delegations than it believed that the Constitution permits. But if this 
example suggests the illegitimacy of making decision rules for substantive reasons, it also sug-
gests how unlikely is such a practice. 
 It seems in this hypothetical that the Court chooses to realize its vision about the proper 
scope of legislative delegations by resorting to a substantive decision rule only as a result of its 
logically prior conclusion that the true constitutional operative proposition imposes severe 
constraints. But what reason is there to believe that Justices who believe that broad delega-
tions of law-making power are sensible would in fact interpret the Constitution to provide 
otherwise? The fact is that what is and is not a valid method of constitutional interpretation is 
not God-given, but chosen by the individual judge. Of course, such choices are constrained by 
professional practices. But this constraint is not very constraining for purposes of the non-
delegation example because a conclusion that constitutional limits on the delegation of law-
making powers are flexible and context-dependent can be easily reached via familiar (albeit 
contested) moves in constitutional interpretation. The more general lesson, I think, is that a 
judge who would employ substantive considerations in the construction of constitutional deci-
sion rules is apt, in good faith, to interpret the constitutional operative proposition in a way 
that makes resort to such substantive considerations unnecessary. But cf. Monaghan, supra 
note 4, at 44–45 (designating, as “the most troublesome feature of constitutional common 
law,” “its potential as a vehicle for reading into our law at a subconstitutional level values that 
judicial activists have ‘discovered’ in the general substantive guarantees of due process and 
equal protection”); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 154, at 1125 (objecting that constitutional 
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tion, even on the part of the most “Pragmatic” judges and scholars, that 
resort to substantive considerations in the shaping of constitutional doc-
trine is improper. 
If neither polar position in the debate over the legitimacy of constitu-
tional decision rules appears promising, then it should become obvious 
why it is helpful to think clearly about the discrete considerations that 
might present themselves in the process of constitutional doctrine-
making. Very simply, most participants to the legitimacy debate are likely 
to believe that the federal courts have constitutional power to rely upon 
some sorts of instrumental considerations in the creation of decision 
rules, but not others. The consideration that would seem to enjoy the 
strongest claim to legitimacy is an interest in reducing adjudicatory error. 
The practice of judicial review requires that courts have ways to reach 
constitutional holdings even though they do not know, say, what constitu-
tionally relevant conduct was engaged in, what the constitutionally rele-
vant purposes were, or what the constitutionally relevant effects will be.306 
Yet we should expect courts to try to resolve these constitutionally rele-
vant questions as accurately as (reasonably) possible. Since it is more 
than doubtful that the preponderance standard always best promotes ad-
judicatory accuracy,307 it is hard to imagine a convincing argument that 
would allow courts sometimes to create constitutional decision rules, but 
not for the purpose of minimizing adjudicatory error. From this premise, 
reasonable people might argue that courts have legitimate authority to 
create decision rules for the purpose of minimizing adjudicatory error but 
for no other purposes. Or, somewhat more liberally, that legitimate deci-
sion rules may be designed to minimize adjudicatory error and to pro-
mote guidance to the addressees of the operative proposition, but not, 
say, to reduce the incidence and aggregate expense of constitutional liti-
gation. Other possibilities could be identified and argued about at great 
length.308 
 
common law makes it “possible for a Court, animated by realism, to be constitutionally cau-
tious but subconstitutionally activist, even adventurist”). 
306 I have argued elsewhere that these are the three relevant dimensions of constitutional 
violation. See Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra note 205, at 19–29. 
307 See infra text accompanying notes 404–07. 
308 Insofar as courts craft decision rules to serve ends other than minimization of adjudica-
tory error, it may be appropriate for them to recast their holdings to convey when a given 
judgment of constitutionality vel non may not reflect a court’s best judgment on the matter. In 
particular, when application of an underenforcing decision rule yields the conclusion that a 
challenged action is not unconstitutional, that should be the announced judgment—“not un-
constitutional”—not that the action is “constitutional.” The obvious analogue, of course, ap-
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But not here. The critical point is that a willingness to think about con-
stitutional doctrine in terms that divide it into (among other categories) 
operative propositions and decision rules does not preempt normative 
debates about the legitimate judicial moves in constitutional implementa-
tion. Rather, it helps structure the sorts of debates that taxonomic explo-
rations cannot themselves dispose of. Although I have some views about 
the propriety of conceivable moves in the construction of decision rules, I 
am inclined to believe that the consistency of one’s answers to questions 
of this sort is much more important than is their content. A judge or 
theorist who would permit courts to rely on some considerations but 
would rule others out of bounds must assume the burden of distinguish-
ing the forbidden considerations from the permissible. As Herbert 
Wechsler famously argued, “[T]he main constituent of the judicial proc-
ess is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to 
every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons 
quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”309 Judges who 
take this admonition seriously can ensure that they live up to it only if 
they make clear, at least to themselves, just what the steps in their consti-
tutional analyses are. This requires that they separate constitutional op-
erative propositions from constitutional decision rules and think hard 
about what might justify construction of the latter. 
b. Doctrinal Refinement 
In addition to helping to structure discussions about what sort of doc-
trine is permissible, distinguishing decision rules from operative proposi-
tions can profitably aid judges in seeing what doctrines are most sensible. 
Constitutional doctrine is both fertile and mutable. Presumably, courts 
should be sensitive, when elaborating, modifying, or fine-tuning doctrine, 
to the particular considerations that underlay it in the first place. To take 
a simple example, when a court comes to decide whether a given doctrine 
should be applied retroactively (a question that might arise subsequent to 
the case that had announced the doctrine), the right answer might vary 
depending on whether that doctrine reflected interests in minimizing ad-
judicatory error as opposed, say, to providing better guidance for non-
 
pears in criminal cases. When a factfinder is unable to conclude that the defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict is “not guilty”—standing for “not found to be 
guilty”—as opposed to “innocent.” This way of proceeding would better serve interests in 
what I have called extra-adjudicatory constitutionalism. 
309 Wechsler, supra note 50, at 15 (emphasis added). 
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judicial actors.310 Classifying doctrine as either an operative proposition or 
a decision rule is likely to aid courts in isolating precisely which sorts of 
practical and institutional considerations generated the doctrine whose 
contours are being manipulated. 
To take another example, it is at least plausible—though not neces-
sary—that stare decisis should apply with different force to operative 
propositions and decision rules.311 Courts might feel themselves freer to 
be more avowedly experimentalist312 when announcing doctrine candidly 
described as decision rules. These comments are admittedly exploratory 
but, I hope, suggestive. We will see additional ways that the concept of 
decision rules can promote the more intelligent raising of doctrinal prog-
eny in the next Part.313 
c. The Congressional Role 
The proper role of non-judicial actors, especially Congress, in the mak-
ing of constitutional law is one of the hot topics in contemporary consti-
tutional scholarship.314 The issue is often posed in terms of how much def-
 
310 In mentioning this, I do not mean to suggest that the proper solution to the problem of 
retroactive application of judicial decisions will ever be reducible to a simple algorithm. How-
ever, the present jurisprudence of retroactivity is widely thought to be unnecessarily confused 
and confusing. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Ap-
proach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055 (1997); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous 
Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 1075 (1999). 
311 For example, the “traditionalism” that constitutes, for Strauss, one of the two basic nor-
mative foundations for common law constitutionalism (the other being “conventionalism”) is 
based on a humility toward judicial innovation and a concomitant preference for incremental-
ism. It is plausible to think that a court disposed to abandon precedent in an Amar-inspired 
manner might do less violence to the “traditionalist” interest in incrementalism by affording 
greater stare decisis weight to operative propositions than to decision rules, even if each has 
been a product of common law constitutionalism. 
312 See generally Dorf, supra note 14 (arguing for a less “Socratic” approach to jurispru-
dence, one focused on finding “provisional, workable solutions”). 
313 See infra Section V.D. 
314 See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123, 156 (1999) (describing the scope of judicial deference to constitutional 
interpretation by Congress and the President as “perhaps the central question” of constitu-
tional adjudication). Some of the more notable recent commentaries on the subject include 
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 
Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997); Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 
85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529 (2000); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political 
Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83 (1998); Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 
50 Duke L.J. 1335 (2001); Frank I. Michelman, Living With Judicial Supremacy, 38 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 579 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale 
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erence courts should give interpretive judgments reached by the other 
branches. This is an appropriate question. Framing the discussion in 
terms of relative “interpretive” competence and authority, however, risks 
setting too narrow a focus. The more general subject, as Fallon has em-
phasized, is one of constitutional implementation.315 And the distinction 
between constitutional operative propositions and decision rules makes 
clear that courts could afford Congress a more substantial role in that en-
terprise even if they choose not to defer to congressional interpretations 
of constitutional meaning. Let me identify two distinct ways that could 
occur.316 
Debates over judicial supremacy always return to James Bradley 
Thayer and his famous proposed “rule of administration” that courts 
should not declare an Act of Congress void “unless the violation of the 
constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt.”317 It 
is often thought to follow—certainly Thayer himself thought so—that 
courts should defer to any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution 
advanced by Congress.318 But neither Thayer nor most scholars who write 
in this tradition explicitly recognize that the process of determining 
whether a legislative act is permitted by the Constitution consists, at a 
minimum, of two discrete steps: (1) determining what the Constitution 
means, that is, what it permits, commands, or forbids, and (2) determin-
ing whether the legislation is consistent with that meaning. These are the 
stages, respectively, of interpretation and application. To be sure, judicial 
 
L.J. 1943 (2003); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State 
and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 656 (2000); Whittington, supra note 118. 
315 See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
316 This is in addition to a point we have already seen. As the Board of Trustees of the Uni-
versity of Alabama v. Garrett dissenters persuasively argued, when determining whether a 
congressional regulation of the states is congruent and proportional to the constitutional harm 
Congress claims to have sought to redress or prevent, hence authorized by § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the scope of that harm should be measured by reference to the constitu-
tional operative proposition alone, not to the operative proposition glossed by any accompa-
nying decision rule. See 531 U.S. 356, 381–83 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra text 
accompanying notes 185–92. 
317 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 140 (1893) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (Pa. 
1811)). For a sampling of commentaries on Thayer’s essay on the centennial of its publication, 
see One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1–468 (1993). On its ninetieth anniversary, Henry Monaghan described it as “the most 
influential essay ever written on American constitutional law.” Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury 
and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1983). 
318 E.g., Thayer, supra note 317, at 136 (contending that Congress, not the Courts, has “pri-
mary authority to interpret” the Constitution). 
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deference to a congressional judgment could operate at both stages. But 
it need not. A court could defer at the interpretation stage but not the 
application stage, or vice versa. Put another way, Thayer’s proposed rule 
of administration could be operationalized in two distinct ways: (1) when 
setting forth their understanding of what the Constitution means, the 
courts should respect all reasonable doubts in favor of an interpretation 
hospitable to national power, or (2) when determining whether chal-
lenged national action runs afoul of the courts’ interpretation of constitu-
tional meaning, courts should entertain all doubts in favor of the action. 
This second possibility speaks to what the constitutional decision rule 
should be.319 
In fact, there is reason to think that Thayer’s goal is more likely to be 
realized (if only partially) by deferential decision rules than by judicial 
deference to congressional judgments regarding the constitutional opera-
tive propositions. Thayer himself imagined that critics might object to his 
proposal on the ground that “the ultimate question here is one of the 
construction of a writing . . . and that it cannot well be admitted that 
there should be two legal constructions of the same instrument.”320 This, 
he said, “begs the question” because “the ultimate question is not what is 
the true meaning of the constitution, but whether legislation is sustain-
able or not.”321 In other words, he resisted the effort to tease the stages of 
interpretation and application apart, seeming to suggest instead that 
courts could and should just announce whether challenged legislation 
could stand without specifying what they took to be the constitutional 
premise supporting such a conclusion. 
Perhaps this strategy could work if the federal courts sat in judgment 
only of other national actors. But, of course, federal courts review the ac-
tions of states too, and interpretive deference to state courts, legislatures, 
and executives seems far less defensible. Indeed, Thayer himself made 
 
319 According to Keith Whittington, “the most important implications of the debate over ju-
dicial supremacy may relate to the proper degree of deference the branches should show to 
one another’s constitutional judgments.” Whittington, supra note 118, at 778. That is, he says, 
“the debate over judicial supremacy focuses more squarely on the institutional problem of 
who should make the final decision concerning contested interpretations.” Id. My point is that 
Whittington’s first observation is not entirely captured by his second. The courts could afford 
at least partial deference to another branch’s “constitutional judgments” not by deferring to 
that branch’s judgments about what the Constitution is most properly interpreted to mean but 
by deferring only to potentially contrary judgments about whether the constitutional mean-
ings, as judicially determined, are satisfied. 
320 Thayer, supra note 317, at 150. 
321 Id. 
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clear that his rule of reasonable doubt should govern coordinate branches 
only, not state legislators.322 This limitation is a larger problem for 
Thayer’s proposal than he recognized, because constitutional challenges 
to state conduct are likely to produce two important consequences: First, 
the federal courts will, not infrequently, adjudge the state action uncon-
stitutional; second, and as a consequence, they will (rightly) feel com-
pelled to provide more detailed explanations for such judgments than just 
that “the legislation is not sustainable.” Constitutional litigation involving 
state actors, in short, will force the federal courts to announce their views 
about constitutional meaning—announcements that Thayer had hoped 
would not be necessary in litigation challenging federal legislation. Once 
such judgments are announced, however, it will become more difficult for 
courts to defer to contrary interpretations put forth by Congress because 
so doing would produce what Thayer seems to acknowledge would be an 
embarrassment of “two legal constructions of the same instrument.”323 If 
this is so, then deference to Congress, if it is to exist, will find a more hos-
pitable home at the level of applying constitutional meaning, not deriving 
it. Thayerians may therefore do well to shift their focus from arguing for 
judicial deference to Congress’s constitutional interpretations—i.e., to 
Congress’s judgments about the constitutional operative propositions—to 
arguing for more deferential decision rules. 
I have just explained why the usual arguments for judicial deference to 
the interpretive judgments of Congress may find greater success if trans-
lated into arguments that courts should give greater deference to Con-
gress’s judgments about whether given policies conform to judge-
interpreted constitutional meanings. The argument becomes that courts 
should, on their own initiative, adopt more deferential decision rules. 
There is an even more profound way in which full appreciation of consti-
tutional decision rules could pave the way for a more robust congres-
sional role in the enterprise of constitutional implementation: The Court 
could permit Congress to substitute its judgment for the Court’s on just 
what the applicable decision rule should be. 
Recall our provisional catalogue of the considerations upon which 
courts are likely to rely when creating decision rules: minimizing adjudi-
catory error, promoting greater compliance with the constitutional opera-
tive proposition, reducing the extent to which an operative proposition 
chills socially valuable conduct, reducing constitutional litigation and its 
 
322 Id. at 154–55. 
323 Id. at 150. 
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associated costs, etc. We noted that reasonable people might disagree 
about which of these considerations courts should be permitted to rely 
upon at all. Insofar as judges do believe themselves authorized to take 
considerations like these into account in the shaping of constitutional de-
cision rules, it remains a wholly separate question whether the resulting 
judge-made decision rules should stand in the face of contrary factual or 
evaluative judgments made by Congress. Suppose, for instance, that a 
particular underenforcing decision rule rests on the Court’s conclusion 
that adjudication of the operative proposition in question by the usual 
preponderance-of-the-evidence decision rule is likely to chill a large 
amount of socially valuable behavior. Congress might disagree with ei-
ther or both of these judgments. It could think that the overdeterred be-
havior is not especially valuable (hence its chill not especially costly) or 
that little of it would be chilled by a decision rule that does not underen-
force the operative proposition. In either case, Congress might be moved 
to legislate that courts should apply a different decision rule. The ques-
tion for the courts would then become whether to allow the judge-made 
decision rule to be replaced by the Congress-made one.324 An appropriate 
analysis would no doubt be complex, depending on, among other things, 
a relative institutional-competencies analysis more sophisticated than le-
gal process armchair meditations.325 
3. Summary 
Here, to summarize, are some of the reasons why we should train our-
selves to view judicial constitutional doctrine not as an undifferentiated 
 
324 Miranda had stated explicitly that custodial statements could be admitted without warn-
ings if Congress or the states created alternative methods to effectively protect the privilege 
against self-incrimination. See 384 U.S. at 467. The point here is that neither Congress nor the 
Court should stand on ceremony. Even without an explicit invitation, Congress has author-
ity—which the Court should recognize in an appropriate case—to revise or supplant judge-
made decision rules. 
325 For views that are readily assimilable to this argument, see, for example, Robert A. Burt, 
Miranda and Title II: A Morgantic Marriage, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81; Ross, supra note 190; 
Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146. Note, however, this differ-
ence between Strauss’s view and mine. Referring to Monaghan’s distinction between Mar-
bury-shielded constitutional interpretation and congressionally reversible constitutional 
common law, Strauss argues in favor of a third category: congressionally reversible constitu-
tional interpretation. Strauss, supra note 146, at 960 & n.11. Instead of viewing this possibility 
as a middle ground between two poles, however, we could view it as the third box in a two-by-
two matrix. If so, a fourth possibility plainly emerges: doctrine that neither qualifies as consti-
tutional interpretation nor is congressionally reversible. Some decision rules—perhaps a great 
many—will fall in this box. 
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mass but, rather, in terms of such conceptually distinct components as 
operative propositions and decision rules. First, because our debates 
about political morality are so thoroughly couched in constitutional 
terms, being able to more clearly identify what the Supreme Court thinks 
the Constitution means will provide us richer argumentative and educa-
tive resources than is supplied by a mere understanding of what the con-
stitutional doctrine is. Second and relatedly, isolating judge-interpreted 
constitutional meaning from within judge-announced constitutional doc-
trine better informs governmental agents of their true (judicially deter-
mined) constitutional responsibilities, and thus better enables us to 
evaluate their performance. We might find that conduct that would, if ad-
judicated, be held constitutional nonetheless warrants criticism, or that 
conduct that would, if adjudicated, be held unconstitutional does not. 
Third, to focus on the process of decision-rule making as a conceptu-
ally distinct step in the logic of constitutional adjudication can enable 
clearer and more reasoned analysis and debate about the legitimate 
moves in the making of constitutional doctrine. It is not uncommon for 
theorists or judges who espouse a strict variety of textualism or original-
ism to (claim to) reject tout court judicial reliance on what we might 
loosely term pragmatic or institutional considerations in the exercise of 
judicial review. However, to recognize the inevitability that constitutional 
decision rules of some sort will exist and to acknowledge (as almost ines-
capable) that federal courts should have the authority to construct consti-
tutional decision rules for the purpose of minimizing adjudicatory error 
in the aggregate makes it impossible to maintain such a categorical 
stance. Once we grant as legitimate some recourse to pragmatism in the 
formation of constitutional doctrine, those hostile to a more thoroughgo-
ing judicial pragmatism are compelled to adopt more realistic and nu-
anced positions.326  
Fourth, by more clearly identifying the logic that undergirds particular 
doctrines, the distinction will make courts better able to develop and re-
fine those doctrines in more coherent and sensible fashion. Fifth, distin-
guishing decision rules from operative propositions creates more varied 
opportunities for courts to accommodate other branches’ “constitutional 
 
326 Some readers may notice that the argument here assumes the same shape as does Matt 
Adler and Michael Dorf’s recent analysis of what they term constitutional existence condi-
tions and constitutional application conditions. Adler & Dorf, supra note 227. In reply to ab-
solutists who would urge wholesale abolition of judicial review, Adler and Dorf contend that 
judicial review of what they term constitutional existence conditions is ineliminable, thus forc-
ing judicial review skeptics to draw and defend finer lines than they might otherwise. 
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judgments” (broadly construed) than does the debate over whether 
courts should defer to other branches’ interpretations of constitutional 
meaning, and thus facilitates development of more democratically legiti-
mate constitutional law. 
At bottom the point is this. The operative proposition/decision rule 
distinction may appear at first blush to divide the terrain of constitutional 
doctrine only slightly differently than had previous accounts. But this 
tweaking has the great virtue of being less susceptible both to Straussian 
doubts that the classificatory enterprise inevitably rests upon a false as-
sumption that constitutional meaning can be derived through a process 
divorced from practical and empirical considerations,327 and to objections 
(perhaps coming from a Scalian direction) that all doctrinal outputs other 
than judicial statements of constitutional meaning are illegitimate. And if 
the distinction between decision rules and operative propositions better 
tracks our experience of constitutional adjudication and better resists 
some forceful critiques, then we should expect that adopting it will not 
just mirror our reality more faithfully but will have consequences. That is 
how conceptual frameworks work. 
B. An Illustration 
This Part began by acknowledging that trying to classify ambiguous 
constitutional doctrine as either operative proposition or decision rule 
could be either futile or pointless. The previous Section does not demon-
strate otherwise. Nothing in this Article should be understood to advance 
the strong claim that how constitutional doctrine is best classified can al-
ways (or even usually) be successfully divined from judicial opinions, or 
that it would always be worthwhile even to try. Nor, looking forward, do 
I argue that, when announcing doctrine, a court should always make clear 
which aspects of that doctrine are operative propositions and which, if 
any, are decision rules. I do contend, though, that courts, scholars, and 
 
327 I have emphasized that this proposed start to a doctrinal taxonomy does not commit one 
to anti-Pragmatism. Even one who believes that we cannot isolate two distinct sorts of judicial 
processes (called, perhaps, “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional doctrine-
making”) based on the sorts of considerations that judges employ, can still endorse a distinc-
tion between operative propositions and decision rules in the belief that such a distinction 
usefully serves some of the functions just discussed (and/or others). That is, the distinction is 
consistent with the view that the formation of constitutional doctrine “is functional . . . all the 
way up.” See supra text accompanying note 150 (quoting Levinson, supra note 27, at 873). 
Consistent with, but not dependent upon. Indeed, this way of carving the domain of constitu-
tional doctrine has the great virtue that it can be employed as well by self-described textualists 
or originalists as by the Pragmatists. 
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litigators ought to reflect on the possible values of doctrinal taxonomy, 
and should think and speak in terms of operative propositions and deci-
sion rules when doing so would be productive. Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista,328 a case decided the same Term as Board of Trustees of the Univer-
isty of Alabama v. Garrett, provides a recent and illuminating example of 
how appreciation of the values that the decision rule concept serves can 
help courts and commentators make reasoned judgments about whether, 
and how, to try to classify ambiguous doctrine. 
The case arose after Gail Atwater, a mother driving with her two 
young children in the small city of Lago Vista, Texas, was pulled over by 
Officer Bart Turek and cited for the misdemeanor of driving without her 
seatbelt, or those of her children, fastened. Although Turek could have 
simply issued Atwater a citation, he arrested and handcuffed her and 
transported her to the police station. Arguing that the arrest was an un-
reasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Atwa-
ter sued Turek, the chief of the police, and the city. 
Four Justices would have upheld Atwater’s claim, reasoning straight-
forwardly that a custodial arrest is a seizure, that the Fourth Amendment 
proscribes “unreasonable seizures,” that whether a given seizure is rea-
sonable depends entirely upon the particulars of the situation,329 and that 
this particular seizure was patently unreasonable because legitimate state 
interests could have been served just as well by the simple issuance of a 
citation.330 A five-member majority disagreed, holding in an opinion by 
Justice Souter that the arrest did not violate Atwater’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights. 
To paraphrase Justice Scalia’s Dickerson v. United States dissent, the 
Atwater majority (which he joined) does not say that Officer Turek had 
engaged in a “reasonable seizure.” That would have been “preposter-
ous.”331 Indeed, Justice Souter could hardly have made plainer that Offi-
cer Turek had acted unreasonably. “If we were to derive a rule exclu-
sively to address the uncontested facts of this case,” the majority 
conceded, “Atwater might well prevail . . . . Atwater’s claim to live free of 
pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City 
 
328 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
329 “It is beyond cavil that the touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is 
always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of 
a citizen’s personal security.” Id. at 360 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
330 Id. at 369–71. 
331 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 448. 
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can raise against it specific to her case.”332 But this was not the sort of in-
quiry the majority wanted adjudications of Fourth Amendment cases to 
turn on, for 
a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by stan-
dards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government 
need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an 
occasion for constitutional review. Often enough, the Fourth Amend-
ment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, 
and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to 
draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair 
prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after 
an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable 
Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government’s side with an 
essential interest in readily administrable rules.333 
In short, the majority wanted a rule not a standard. And, dissatisfied with 
the rule Atwater proposed,334 the majority announced its own: “If an offi-
cer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a 
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the 
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”335 
This is the Atwater doctrine. But is it an operative proposition or a de-
cision rule? On its face, it looks like the former. That is, it purports to be 
a statement of just what the Fourth Amendment demands. On this view, 
it is per se reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for a 
police office to arrest anyone who commits any criminal offense under 
any circumstances, so long as the offense occurs in the officer’s presence. 
Yet there is reason for doubt. Simply put, per se analysis seems inconsis-
tent with the very concept of reasonableness.336 And in fact the Court had 
 
332 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346–47. 
333 Id. at 347 (internal citation omitted). 
334 Atwater proposed that the Court declare it constitutionally unreasonable for police offi-
cers to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of “breach[es] of the peace,” a 
category of nonfelony offenses “involving or tending toward violence.” Id. at 327. The major-
ity rejected this suggestion largely on the grounds that it was inconsistent with historical prac-
tice. Id. at 326–45. 
335 Id. at 354. 
336 See Sager, supra note 5, at 1244 n.104 (illustrating his observation that some “constitu-
tional provision[s] . . . simply do[] not lend [themselves] to under-enforcement analysis,” with 
“the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment, which explicitly calls for case-by-case 
balancing of state and private interests”); cf. Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of 
Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era 
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previously suggested that Fourth Amendment reasonableness calls for 
the all-things-considered exercises of judgment.337 For these reasons, the 
Atwater doctrine might be better conceived as a decision rule that courts 
should conclusively presume a full custodial arrest to be reasonable if 
they conclude (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the officer had 
probable cause to suppose that the arrestee had committed any offense in 
his presence. This characterization of the doctrine can explain how Atwa-
ter lost, even though not a single member of the Court seemed to doubt 
that she had been subjected to an unreasonable seizure. 
Even to ask the classificatory question might strike some readers as 
overly academic. What matters, the Pragmatist might insist, is to appreci-
ate the sorts of considerations that the Court relied upon. Atwater is just 
further confirmation that, as Strauss had argued, “courts create constitu-
tional doctrine by taking into account both the principles and values re-
flected in the relevant constitutional provisions and institutional reali-
ties.”338 In particular, the Court worried that, absent mediation by rule-
like doctrine, judicial implementation of the Fourth Amendment would 
risk social harm by encouraging police officers to become unduly timid339 
and would also generate excessive litigation.340 If it is proper for courts to 
 
Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 239 (2002) (presenting a 
blistering attack on the Atwater majority’s characterization of relevant historical practice). 
337 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990) (“[I]n order to satisfy the ‘rea-
sonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the 
many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is 
not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable. . . . Whether the basis for 
[arrest] authority exists is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement offi-
cials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is 
that they answer it reasonably.”). 
338 Strauss, supra note 38, at 207 (emphasis omitted). For a discussion of Strauss’s argument, 
see text accompanying notes 71–75. 
339 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351 (“An officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough to 
warrant jail time or not quite certain about a suspect’s risk of flight would not arrest, even 
though it could perfectly well turn out that, in fact, the offense called for incarceration and the 
defendant was long gone on the day of trial. Multiplied many times over, the costs to society 
of such underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly 
arrested and booked.”). Notice that the majority offers no hint that the Atwater doctrine 
(whether operative proposition or decision rule) rests on estimates about how best to mini-
mize adjudicatory errors. The Court expresses no concern that courts do a bad job of separat-
ing the reasonable from the unreasonable on a case-by-case basis. The problem, rather, is that 
police might do a bad job of assessing reasonableness “on the spur (and in the heat) of the 
moment.” Id. at 347. And if they are unsure whether an arrest is unreasonable, they are likely 
to err on the side of caution. This is an instance of what I have called a “protective” doctrine-
making consideration. 
340 Id. at 350 (observing that the dissent’s approach “would guarantee increased litigation 
over many of the arrests that would occur”). This is a “fiscal” consideration. 
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advert to such considerations in the crafting of doctrine, Atwater was le-
gitimate; if not, then it wasn’t.341 Surely we need not classify the doctrine 
as an operative proposition or a decision rule to see that. 
Surely. But the question is not whether we need the distinction; it is 
whether access to these concepts could prove useful. One way into the 
problem is to ask whether, had the distinction between constitutional op-
erative propositions and constitutional decision rules been part of Justice 
Souter’s conceptual toolbox, he might have perceived reasons to think 
one or the other characterization of the doctrine preferable. 
Consider these three reasons to favor the decision-rule characteriza-
tion of the Atwater doctrine over the operative-rule alternative. First, it is 
to be preferred on the dimension of social meaning. The Atwater decision 
was roundly denounced.342 A recurrent theme in the criticism was that the 
Court had condoned Turek’s behavior, a view of the case picked up even 
in reports neutral as to the outcome.343 Certainly the majority did not 
want to convey the impression that this sort of behavior was in fact “rea-
sonable.” It is plausible to suspect that the Court would have been able to 
more effectively communicate that message had it explicitly described its 
doctrine as a decision rule adopted only to help ensure that well-
intentioned officers in the future not be rendered unduly timid by fear of 
being adjudged, after the fact, to have acted unreasonably. 
 
341 For a debate long preceding Atwater regarding the propriety of bright-line judge-made 
rules to administer the Fourth Amendment, compare Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth 
Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 307 (1982), and Wayne LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standard-
ized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127 (defending many of the 
same protective considerations endorsed in Atwater), with Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line 
Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 227 (1984). For a recent and nuanced 
endorsement of LaFave’s position, see Dripps, supra note 94, at 1. 
342 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreason-
ableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 329, 331 n.4 (citing criticisms of 
the decision from the media). 
343 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, An Unreasonable View of the 4th Amendment, L.A. Times, 
Apr. 29, 2001, at M1 (questioning the Court’s analysis of what constitutes “unreasonable” 
conduct under the Fourth Amendment); Sandy Banks, Why A Mom’s Fate Should Worry Us 
All, L.A. Times, Apr. 27, 2001, at 1E (stating that “the U.S. Supreme Court sided with the 
cop, [agreeing] that even the most minor criminal offense can justify a trip to jail”); Mark 
Cloud, Extreme Searches, Chi. Trib., May 4, 2001, at 25N (jesting that the Court “didn’t let 
the 4th Amendment interfere with [the officer’s] good work”); A Decision Lacking Reason, 
Investor’s Bus. Daily, Apr. 26, 2001, at 22 (observing that the Court “ruled the officer’s action 
is allowed by the Constitution”); Municipal Court Practice Committee Report, New Jersey 
Lawyer, Feb. 25, 2002, at 365 n.3 (“In Atwater, a divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a po-
lice officer in Texas acted properly in arresting a woman for the minor offense of failing to 
wear a seatbelt.”). 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
104 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
Second, the decision-rule characterization is likely to open up more 
space for (appropriate) congressional involvement in the shaping of con-
stitutional doctrine. Suppose that Congress disagreed with the Court’s 
predictive judgment about how much well-intentioned police behavior 
the ad hoc, totality of the circumstances approach to Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness would chill, or with the Court’s evaluative judgment 
about how much litigation on the matter was excessive. Which branch’s 
judgments on these particular questions should prevail in determining 
what shape constitutional doctrine should take? One might reasonably 
conclude that Congress’s judgments on this question should trump those 
of the Court. Again, it is plausible to suppose that announcing the Atwa-
ter doctrine as a decision rule employing a conclusive presumption would 
be a particularly effective (though not essential) way to signal where and 
how Congress could intervene if it so chose. 
Third and relatedly, characterizing the doctrine as a decision rule 
might make it easier for the Court to itself revisit the doctrine if appro-
priate. When balancing the costs of overdeterring police from engaging in 
reasonable arrests against those of under-deterring them from engaging 
in unreasonable ones, the Court expressly observed “a dearth of horribles 
demanding redress.”344 But what if the Court substantially underestimated 
the incidence of unreasonable warrantless misdemeanor arrests? Or what 
if the Court was right at the time of its opinion, but facts changed? No 
doubt the Court could revise the doctrine in light of experience regard-
less of how the doctrine was classified. But it is plausible to suppose that 
the competing demands of stability and flexibility might find more effec-
tive reconciliation in the development of stare decisis practices that allow 
decision rules to be modified or abandoned somewhat more readily than 
operative propositions. 
The claim, to reiterate, is not that these interests could not be ad-
vanced if we lacked the operative proposition/decision rule distinction 
entirely, or if, possessed of the distinction, we classified the Atwater doc-
trine as an operative proposition. It is to suggest, though, that these inter-
ests could probably not be served as well. That you find these particular 
arguments in favor of the decision-rule reading of Atwater convincing is 
not critical. Additional arguments could lie in its favor; strong arguments 
may militate for the operative-proposition reading. The essential points 
are two: First, it is possible to give reasons for preferring one characteri-
zation of the doctrine over another even when the doctrine could be 
 
344 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353. 
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characterized either way; second, those reasons do not depend upon im-
plausible assumptions about the nature of constitutional adjudication. 
V. DICKERSON REVISITED: MIRANDA AS A DECISION RULE 
We are finally positioned to respond to Justice Scalia’s Dickerson dis-
sent. The response, in short, will be that the Miranda doctrine consists of 
a constitutional operative proposition directing courts not to admit into 
evidence statements that had been compelled by the state, administered 
by a constitutional decision rule directing that a court must conclusively 
presume a statement to have been compelled if it concludes (by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence) that the statement was elicited during cus-
todial interrogation not preceded by the requisite warnings or in which 
the suspect’s invocation of a right to silence or to counsel was not re-
spected. The Court chose this decision rule, furthermore, as a means to 
reduce adjudicatory error because it believed that compulsion was com-
mon yet very hard to discover. On this account, the Miranda doctrine is a 
legitimate exercise of judicial power on the modest (though not incon-
testable) assumption that courts are empowered to create error-
minimizing constitutional decision rules. 
Although the labels “operative proposition” and “decision rule” are 
unconventional, the foregoing interpretation of Miranda is, in broad 
strokes, familiar.345 But it has not been universally accepted. Regrettably, 
a lengthy analysis is necessary to elaborate and defend the claim, and to 
demonstrate some of what follows. 
Section V.A presents the basic claim. In order to make vivid, or even 
plausible, why the Court held as it did, and why the decision-rule inter-
pretation is sensible, we need a reasonably firm grasp on the operative 
proposition that the decision rule is intended to adjudicate. Accordingly, 
Section V.A explains more clearly and fully than have most other ac-
counts just what the operative proposition is and how the decision rule is 
designed to administer it. Section V.B shows that, if the account of Sec-
tion V.A is correct, then the charge that Miranda announced a prophylac-
tic rule (in the sense intended by Miranda’s critics) fails. A decision rule 
designed to minimize adjudicatory errors is not meaningfully character-
 
345 See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2(d) (2d ed. 1999); Cox, supra 
note 130, at 250–51 (concluding that “the thrust of the argument [in Miranda] seems to be that 
unless prophylactic measures are employed there will be inadequate assurance that any con-
fession obtained in secret is not procured by compulsion violating the privilege against self-
incrimination”); Huitema, supra note 76, at 263. 
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ized as “overprotecting” the constitutional operative proposition, or as 
“sweeping more broadly” than the judge-interpreted constitutional 
meaning. Perhaps, however, the account of Section V.A is not correct. 
And perhaps the reason it is not correct has something to do with the fact 
that the putative Miranda decision rule employs a conclusive presump-
tion. Section V.C confronts and rebuts the argument, voiced often by Jo-
seph Grano, that use of a conclusive presumption in a decision rule can-
not be designed to minimize adjudicatory error. In short, if the Miranda 
doctrine is properly classified in decision-rule terms, and if the decision 
rule rests on adjudicatory considerations, the doctrine is not rendered il-
legitimate by being operationalized in the form of a conclusive presump-
tion. Together, then, Sections V.B and V.C identify and defeat challenges 
to the defense of Miranda put forth in Section V.A. 
Section V.D turns from Miranda itself to its progeny, exploring how 
sensitive attention to the operative proposition/decision rule classification 
and to the actual considerations that could support the Miranda decision 
rule, bear upon how the Miranda doctrine ought to be more fully fleshed 
out, with regards, for example, to the propriety of an emergency “public 
safety” exception and the admissibility of fruits of an un-Mirandized 
statement. These inquiries are of more than academic interest as the Su-
preme Court will address the scope of the fruits doctrine this very 
Term,346 while some lower courts have questioned whether the public 
safety exception to Miranda survives Dickerson.347 Moreover, this discus-
sion constitutes, in effect, another test of the utility—and therefore the 
truth—of the conceptualization this Article advances. I will hope to show 
that this particular way of dividing the conceptual terrain offers a more 
satisfactory defense of Miranda’s legitimacy—while more clearly isolating 
its assumptions and its vulnerabilities—than do other accounts. 
 
346 See Missouri v. Seibert, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003) (granting certiorari to determine whether 
the Oregon v. Elstad rule that a statement elicited during a warned custodial interrogation is 
admissible despite the fact that the suspect had made an inculpatory statement in a prior un-
warned custodial interrogation applies even when the police officer’s failure to issue warnings 
in the first interrogation was intentional); United States v. Patane, 123 S. Ct. 1788 (2003) 
(granting certiorari to determine whether Dickerson overturns the Elstad-Tucker doctrine on 
fruits of un-Mirandized interrogations). 
347 See, e.g., Dyson v. United States, 815 A.2d 363, 370 n.2 (D.C. 2003) (noting that “at a 
minimum” Dickerson suggests that the New York v. Quarles exception be “narrowly con-
strued and strictly applied”); Allen v. Roe, 305 F.3d 1046, 1050 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ra-
tionale supporting Quarles’ public safety exception has been, to some degree, called into 
question by Dickerson.”). 
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A. The Miranda Doctrine Taxonomized 
As Stephen Schulhofer observed fifteen years ago, criticism of the 
Miranda rule “usually obscures the fact that Miranda contains not one 
holding but a complex series of holdings [that] . . . can be subdivided in 
various ways.”348 Even today, much confusion remains concerning pre-
cisely what Miranda held. This Section explicates “the Miranda doctrine” 
by distinguishing two outputs from that case: a constitutional operative 
proposition containing two discrete elements, and a constitutional deci-
sion rule. 
1. The Operative Proposition 
The Fifth Amendment commands that “[n]o person . . . be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”349 Everyone agrees 
that this means, at a minimum, that courts not “compel” defendants upon 
pain of conviction or contempt sanctions to testify at their trials.350 In con-
trast, say, to the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and 
seizures, this is a constitutional rule directed in the first instance to trial 
courts, not to the police. The question logically prior to the Miranda 
Court’s exploration of the need for specific warnings, accordingly, was 
whether anything that happens outside of trial could implicate the Self-
Incrimination Clause at all. Posing the question as “whether the privilege 
is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation,”351 the Court 
 
348 Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 436. Schulhofer himself carved up the decision as contain-
ing “three conceptually distinct steps” or “holdings”: (1) “that informal pressure to speak—
that is, pressure not backed by legal process or any formal sanction—can constitute ‘compul-
sion’ within the meaning of the fifth amendment”; (2) “that this element of informal compul-
sion is present in any questioning of a suspect in custody”; and (3) “that precisely specified 
warnings are required to dispel the compelling pressure of custodial interrogation.” Id. This 
analysis has proven influential, see, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 58, at 942; George C. Thomas 
III, Separated at Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 
99 Mich. L. Rev. 1081, 1083 (2001), and surely has much to recommend it. Its greatest defect, 
in my opinion, lies in the opacity of the second step. What does it mean for an “element of . . . 
compulsion” to be “present”? Plainly it does not mean that every unwarned custodial interro-
gation constitutes compulsion “within the meaning of the fifth amendment.” But if the pres-
ence of an “element” of compulsion, or (what might be the same thing) the existence of some 
“compelling pressure,” does not itself amount to compulsion in the constitutionally relevant 
sense, then the justification for step (3) remains unclear. 
349 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
350 The Court had earlier described the right to remain silent in an official inquiry as neces-
sary to avoid “the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Murphy v. Water-
front Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
351 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460–61. 
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answered in the affirmative. Its first holding, consequently, was “that all 
the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion 
exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.”352 
Unfortunately, this statement is ambiguous. It could mean either (a) 
that any action by government agents—including police—that compels 
someone to incriminate herself violates the Self-Incrimination Clause, or 
(b) that introduction within a criminal case of a defendant’s compelled 
statement violates that Clause even if the statement was compelled out-
side the formal criminal proceedings.353 Surely the latter is the better 
reading. Legal historians have found much to debate about the origins 
and scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.354 One point on 
which they agree, however, is that the privilege against self-incrimination 
was an evidentiary privilege.355 The Court’s first step, then, was to an-
nounce constitutional meaning. The constitutional operative proposition, 
that is to say, is a command to trial courts: “Do not admit evidence about 
statements made by criminal defendants that were in fact compelled by 
the police.”356 
 
352 Id. at 461. 
353 The ambiguity has been retained in subsequent characterizations. See, e.g., Oregon v. El-
stad, 470 U.S. 298, 352 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “by the time we decided 
Miranda, it was settled that the privilege against self-incrimination applies with full force out-
side the chambers of ‘formal’ proceedings”); Kamisar, supra note 58, at 917 (“The Miranda 
Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination applies not only to the proceedings in a 
courtroom or before a legislative committee, but to the ‘informal compulsion exerted by law-
enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.’”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461). 
354 Valuable recent contributions include Katharine B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century 
Origins of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist. 
235 (1998); R.H. Helmholz et al., The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and 
Development (1997); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047 (1994); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: 
Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1086 (1994). 
355 This was clearly the Court’s view when, seventy years before Miranda, it first held that 
the Self-Incrimination Clause barred admission in federal court of extra-judicially compelled 
confessions. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541–58 (1897). 
356 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Reply—Self-Incrimination and the 
Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder to Professor Kamisar, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1011, 1012 (1995) 
(“Rogue police can be cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized. Abusive actions in police stations, 
squad cars, and crime scenes are themselves unconstitutional—they are paradigmatic unrea-
sonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. But, if a defendant’s coerced 
‘confession’ . . . is never introduced in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment, on our reading, 
is not violated.”); Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146, at 958 n.8 
(“The Fifth Amendment is violated when compelled statements are admitted into evidence 
against the speaker in a criminal prosecution.”). In a speech delivered after Dickerson, Justice 
Stevens intimated a contrary position. See John Paul Stevens, How a Mundane Assignment 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
2004] Constitutional Decision Rules 109 
For this statement to be useful, of course, we need some idea of what 
compulsion means in this context. We need, that is, further elaboration of 
the operative proposition. Criminal procedure scholars have debated for 
decades what compulsion does mean, or should mean, or did mean for 
the Miranda Court, and this cannot be the place for a full rehearsal.357 Let 
us start instead with the Court’s own language. Recognizing that in the 
three actual cases before it, the Court “might not find the defendants’ 
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms,” Chief Justice 
Warren insisted that 
concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment 
rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. In each of the cases, the 
defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through 
menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compul-
sion is forcefully apparent. . . . To be sure, the records do not evince 
overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains 
that in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appro-
priate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the 
statements were truly the product of free choice.358 
This passage is maddeningly enigmatic. Does the Court mean to an-
nounce that compulsion for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is 
not limited to the “traditional” understanding of “involuntariness,” famil-
iar from the Court’s due process jurisprudence? Or is the point that even 
though the test of compulsion under the Self-Incrimination Clause is the 
same as the traditional due process test of involuntariness, and even 
though the Court might not find the statements at issue in the instant 
cases involuntary, hence compelled, “safeguards” were necessary to pro-
tect against involuntary/compelled statements in the future?359 Again, al-
though the question cannot be conclusively resolved, there are good rea-
 
Affected My Re-Examination of Miranda, 14 Oct. Chi. Bar Ass’n, Rec. 34, 36–37 (2000) (con-
tending that the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause “is implicated the moment that 
custodial interrogation commences” even if the suspect does not say a word). “Implicated” is 
a sufficiently imprecise word that we cannot be certain just what Justice Stevens means. But if 
he means that interrogation itself can violate the Clause, I think this is mistaken. The mistake 
rests, I think, on Justice Stevens’s failure to distinguish due process from self-incrimination 
constraints on police behavior. 
357 A useful overview, including citations to a handful of authorities, appears in 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2 (2d ed. 1999). 
358 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
359 See, e.g., Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Waning Protections: Police Interrogation Practices 
After Dickerson 56 (2001) (noting this ambiguity). 
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sons to favor the former reading—including that such a position was 
urged by petitioners at oral argument.360 Criminal procedure scholars, in 
any event, have reached a fairly wide consensus. As Schulhofer put it: 
“[C]ompulsion for self-incrimination purposes and involuntariness for 
due process purposes cannot mean the same thing.”361 
Assuming this is so, we need to know what the difference is. The 
Court’s due process cases were themselves far from pellucid, resorting as 
they did to such empty metaphors as the famous “overborne will.”362 Still, 
the root idea was adequately discernible. Most historians agree that the 
common law ban on “involuntary” confessions was principally driven by 
a concern to exclude confessions thought likely to be unreliable. How-
ever, the Supreme Court refused to fix the privilege on such a narrow 
 
360 Victor Earle, counsel in one of the Miranda companion cases, readily conceded at oral 
argument that there was “no sense” in which his client’s confession was coerced. Instead, he 
urged attention to “a substantial difference between” Fifth Amendment compulsion and “co-
ercing a confession,” which latter concern he attributed “to the generality of the totality of the 
circumstances under the due process clause.” “It is true,” he continued, “that the word ‘com-
pel’ is used in the Fifth Amendment with respect to the privilege, but it is quite different to 
say that the privilege is cut down and impaired by detention and to say a man’s will has been 
so overborne a confession is forced from him.” Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Proce-
dure: Cases-Comments-Questions 461 (10th ed. 2002) (quoting from unofficial transcripts of 
oral argument). 
361 Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 443. For an extended recent argument, see Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment Excep-
tionalism, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 941, 943–51 (2001) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Puzzling Persistence]; 
see also, e.g., Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the 
“New” Fifth Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 65–82 
(1966); LaFave, Constitutional Rules, supra note 115, at 858 (“[W]hat the Constitution pro-
tects against is not merely the more gross technique of police interrogation commonly the fo-
cus of attention under the old due process ‘voluntariness’ test . . . but also other circumstances 
which produce ‘compulsion’ in the fifth amendment sense.”); Ritchie, supra note 69; Stone, 
supra note 69, at 118 (contending that the Tucker Court’s “conclusion that there is a violation 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause only if a confession is involuntary under traditional standards 
is an outright rejection of the core premises of Miranda”); Thomas, supra note 348, at 1086–87 
(arguing that the “due process protection . . . the Miranda Court thought it was creating . . . 
substitut[ed] . . . Fifth Amedment ‘compulsion’ for due process ‘coercion’ as the relevant in-
quiry”). Strauss may be mistaken, therefore, in assuming that, to make adequate sense of 
Miranda, the notions of due process voluntariness and self-incrimination compulsion “can be 
equated.” Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146, at 962; see also 
Susan R. Klein, Essay, No Time for Silence, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1337, 1344 (2003) (“Regardless of 
whether the Court frames the issue as one of due process or privilege, the voluntariness test 
and the condemnation of coercive police practices should be identical.”). 
362 This formulation was introduced in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1940). The 
classic criticism is Yale Kamisar, What is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on 
Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 728, 755–59 
(1963); see also, e.g., Grano, Confessions, supra note 77. 
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base, candidly explaining six years before Miranda that “a complex of 
values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions 
which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary.”363 
And, according to Joseph Grano, “most commentators” have concluded 
that this complex of values fundamentally reduces to two: “(1) a desire, 
surviving from the common-law approach, to eliminate untrustworthy 
confessions and (2) a desire to control offensive police practices.”364 On 
the assumption that self-incrimination compulsion is more expansive than 
due process voluntariness, it follows that a statement may not reflect a 
“truly . . . free choice,” hence is “compelled,” even if the magnitude of 
pressure exerted by the police was not so great as either to provoke wor-
ries that a resulting confession would be unreliable or to constitute a 
morally offensive police practice.365 Regardless of whether this would pre-
sent an attractive or persuasive vision of what represents (in an inescapa-
bly evaluative assessment) adequate freedom, it is a perfectly coherent 
position to maintain.366 
 
363 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). 
364 Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 65; see also, e.g., White, supra note 359, at 39–48; 
Kamisar, supra note 362. One treatise identifies a third value of protecting the dignity of 
criminal defendants by excluding statements secured under circumstances, even if not involv-
ing inherently obnoxious police practices, that significantly constrained the individual’s free-
dom of choice. 2 LaFave et al., supra note 357, at 446. As will be seen, I suggest that Miranda 
makes most sense as treating the two concerns identified by Grano to undergird the due proc-
ess “involuntariness” test, while locating something like this third concern only in the Self-
Incrimination Clause. 
365 In speaking of degrees of pressure, I am ignoring other circumstances, most notably (but 
perhaps not exclusively) deception on the part of the police, that might be thought to render 
subsequent admission of a resulting statement unconstitutional on either due process or self-
incrimination grounds. For a characteristically careful examination of this problem, see 
George E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confes-
sions, 1975 Wash. U. L.Q. 275. My sense, which I will not defend, is that deception can make 
out a due process violation but should not constitute compulsion for self-incrimination pur-
poses. See, e.g., State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003). 
366 For just one illustration of how this could be, consider Harry Frankfurt’s well-known the-
ory of freedom grounded in the distinction between first- and second-order desires. Harry G. 
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in The Importance of What We 
Care About 11–25 (1988). Very roughly, Frankfurt argues that a person’s choice is free when 
it issues from a first-order desire that is itself consistent with a second-order desire. If I eat a 
second piece of cheesecake without anyone having pressured me to do so, that is a free choice 
in one sense: it is consistent with my first-order desires. But I may not really want to have that 
second piece. Indeed, even as I reach for it, I may know that I do not “really” want it. I may, 
in Frankfurt’s terms, have a second-order desire that I not have the first-order desire on which 
I act. When my action is consistent with a first-order desire that is itself not consistent with my 
second-order desires, that action may plausibly be said not to be “truly free” or to lack “free 
will.” See, e.g., id. at 18 (contending that a drug addict who takes a drug in conformity to a 
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first-order desire under circumstances in which his second-order desire is that he not act on 
that first-order desire “may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling statements that the 
force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that it is not of his own 
free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to take it”). It is not important 
for present purposes whether an account of free will along these lines can provide a successful 
response to the threat of determinism, as Frankfurt claimed for it. For doubts, see, for in-
stance, Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. Phil. 205 (1975). The point is only that it provides an 
account of free choice by which a choice can be unfree even if the phenomenology of the ex-
perience is such that the agent would not conclude that she “had no choice” or that her will 
was “overborne.” In short, it illustrates how a statement can be not “truly the product of free 
choice” without being “involuntary.” And it does so by conceptualizing human choice and ac-
tion in a way that gives some content or substance to the Court’s evident (if largely unarticu-
lated) intuition that differences in the magnitude of pressure a person experiences translate 
into a more nuanced range of normatively meaningful distinctions than is implied by recourse 
to a simple pair of opposites such as “free” and “unfree,” or “voluntary” and “involuntary,” 
and that does not depend upon attributions of wrongful conduct by others. It is therefore a 
plausible candidate for the account of freedom at work in Miranda. Indeed, I think it plausi-
ble (though not at all essential) that the Miranda Court did in fact have an image of true free-
dom something like this inchoately in mind. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 (“Unless ade-
quate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free 
choice.”); id. at 467 (“[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of 
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not oth-
erwise do so freely.”). 
 Grano thinks such an account untenable. In his view, it is impossible to avoid 
[t]he unremarkable conclusion that the Fifth Amendment, if properly applied to police 
interrogation at all, prohibits coerced or involuntary confessions. That is, in the context 
of police interrogation, to “compel” a suspect to become a witness against himself can 
only mean to “coerce” a suspect to become a witness against himself. 
Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 135; see also Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell 
the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 662, 
684 (1986) (arguing that due process “voluntariness” and self-incrimination “compulsion” can 
each “be understood only as a synonym for coercion”). Furthermore, Grano argues that the 
concept of “coercion” necessarily entails “a claim that the alleged coercer engaged in wrong-
ful conduct.” Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 99. Grano grounds this latter assertion on 
an important analysis of coercion by the philosopher Alan Wertheimer. See generally id. at 
64–69; Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (1987). Wertheimer’s insightful and illuminating analysis 
has influenced my own views on coercion. See Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions 
of Coercion Claims, 8 Legal Theory 45 (2002). Nonetheless, that analysis does not support 
Grano’s attempt to equate compulsion and coercion. As the Frankfurt example illustrates, 
there is no reason why a view of what constitutes the normatively adequate freedom of party 
A must be cashed out by reference at all to the wrongful character of the behavior engaged in 
by some other party, B. That is, we could conclude that A’s conduct was “compelled” by B’s 
conduct because (1) B’s conduct had some specified sort of causal relationship to A’s conduct, 
and (2) A’s conduct was not sufficiently free in the sense of not cohering adequately with A’s 
higher-order wants, or not being adequately integrated with more stable characteristics of her 
personality, without believing that such a conclusion entails that B’s conduct warrants criti-
cism.  
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This is not to say that every incriminating statement that is not “truly 
free” is compelled within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.367 
If I walk into the local police precinct determined to confess to a particu-
lar crime, my decision to do so could be not “truly free” in the Court’s 
normatively freighted sense because, say, I’m in the grip of an uncharac-
teristically melancholic or self-hating mood or because I’m responding to 
pressures exerted by private third parties. Yet it seems extraordinary to 
conclude that that fact alone would make my statement compelled for 
constitutional purposes.368 A second condition, then, must be that the 
state has somehow brought pressure to bear for the purpose of eliciting a 
statement. If this is right, then an out-of-court statement is compelled for 
Self-Incrimination Clause purposes (according to the Miranda Court) if 
two conditions are satisfied: The statement must be not “truly free” in the 
sense that it issues from psychological pressures incompatible with the 
Court’s vision of appropriate freedom or dignity, and it must have been 
elicited by police pressure exerted for the specific purpose of overcoming 
the suspect’s unwillingness to talk.369 
 
 Still, we need not press this objection to Grano too strenuously. For even while arguing that 
the two clauses should be interpreted to prohibit the very same police pressures, Grano, Con-
fessions, supra note 77, at 131–41, Grano agrees that the Miranda Court took the view “that 
coercion for Fifth Amendment purposes should be a less demanding concept than coercion 
for due process purposes and that, accordingly, involuntariness should have different mean-
ings under the two amendments.” Id. at 135. Put another way, he does not deny that we 
could—and that the Court did—“regard police practices as wrongful under the Fifth Amend-
ment [Self-Incrimination Clause] that would be insufficiently wrongful to make out a due 
process claim of involuntariness.” Id. at 138. 
367 However, it does entail that refusals to confess (just like confessions themselves) can be 
“not truly free,” for a first-order desire not to confess might be inconsistent with a second-
order desire that one be the sort of person who accepts responsibility. This observation (for 
which I am grateful to Larry Alexander) does not undermine my effort to supply a possible 
conceptual grounding for the Miranda Court’s apparent view that Fifth Amendment compul-
sion need not collapse into due process involuntariness, see supra note 366, but it might draw 
even further into question the soundness of the Court’s impulse to interpret compulsion in 
terms of something as broad as “true freedom.” Very possibly too much of noncoerced hu-
man conduct is not “truly free” to make that latter concept a plausible constitutional touch-
stone. 
368 Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that a statement is “involuntary” 
for due process purposes only when the product of coercive police activity); Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 535 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is “no rational foundation” to conclude that 
“accused persons [are] so lacking in hardihood that the very first response to the very first 
question following the commencement of custody must be conclusively presumed to be the 
product of an overborne will”). 
369 See, e.g., id. at 457 (explaining that the “interrogation environment is created for no pur-
pose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere car-
ries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
114 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
2. The Decision Rule 
Once this first holding of Miranda is properly understood we are better 
positioned to appreciate its second holding—the holding that, I will 
claim, announced a constitutional decision rule. 
a. The Rule Itself and a Common Misconception 
Casual references to the Miranda decision, by courts and academics 
alike, frequently characterize it as requiring police to issue the warnings. 
Kenneth Starr, for example, explained in a recent book that Miranda an-
nounced “the new rule . . . that police must give a person in custody cer-
tain warnings about his or her rights.”370 Certainly snippets from the ma-
jority opinion can be read to support this view. For example, the Court’s 
declaration that, “[i]n order to combat these [inherently compelling] 
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively ap-
prised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully hon-
ored,”371 appears to order police officers to issue the specified warnings 
prior to interrogating a suspect. This reading gains additional support 
from Justice Clark’s separate opinion where he describes the Court as 
 
destructive of human dignity”). I am therefore agreeing with Schulhofer that “[t]he policy 
served by the [Self-Incrimination Clause] is not limited to preventing inhuman degradation or 
breaking the will, but extends to all governmental efforts intended to pressure an unwilling 
individual to assist as a witness in his own prosecution,” Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 445, yet 
claiming that he overlooks this critical first condition when contending that “pressure imposed 
for the purpose of discouraging the silence of a criminal suspect constitutes prohibited com-
pulsion whether or not it ‘breaks the will.’” Id. Such a statement is compelled only when the 
state imposes pressure for the forbidden purpose and when the statement is not, in fact, “truly 
free.” 
370 Kenneth W. Starr, First Among Equals: The Supreme Court in American Life 193 (2002). 
Judge Friendly’s influential critique of Miranda likewise characterizes the decision as “for-
bid[ding] the police” from questioning suspects “without first endeavoring to make it likely 
that they will not be answered.” Friendly, supra note 52, at 277. For a large number of similar 
examples, see Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda, 112 Yale L.J. 447, 
449 n.4 (2002); see also, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 706 (1993) (“Miranda’s inno-
vation was its introduction of the warning requirement: It commanded the police to issue 
warnings (or establish other procedural safeguards) before obtaining a statement through cus-
todial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (“Miranda, of course, 
required police interrogators to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and set forth a now-familiar set of suggested instructions for that 
purpose.”); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) (“Miranda’s holding has the virtue of 
informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custo-
dial interrogation.”). 
371 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also id. at 471 (stating that the warnings are “an absolute 
prerequisite to interrogation”). 
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“fashion[ing] a constitutional rule that the police may engage in no cus-
todial interrogation without . . . advising the accused that he has a right 
under the Fifth Amendment to the presence of counsel during interroga-
tion and that, if he is without funds, counsel will be furnished him.”372 
Were this requirement part of the Miranda doctrine, it would not be a 
decision rule. Perhaps it would be an operative proposition—though one 
of dubious legitimacy. Or perhaps recognition of doctrinal rules of this 
sort would provoke further taxonomic line-drawing. But it is unnecessary 
to speculate because reliance on these stray passages is misplaced. Any 
apparent commands to the police are much better construed to offer only 
conditional guidance: Give these warnings, the Court’s opinion advises, if 
you want subsequent statements to be admissible. 
To begin, “[t]he constitutional issue” that called for decision concerned 
precisely “the admissibility of statements,” and not the propriety of their 
extraction.373 Yet more important is the language Chief Justice Warren 
uses whenever the lengthy majority opinion pauses to offer what looks 
like more formal statements of its holding. In the opinion’s introduction, 
for example, the Court encapsulates the holding thusly: “[T]he prosecu-
tion may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of 
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards ef-
fective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”374 This rule from 
Miranda, accordingly, would be addressed to the trial courts, not the po-
lice—just like the operative proposition itself.375 It is a direction that they 
 
372 Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting in part, and concurring in part). 
373 Id. at 445. 
374 Id. at 444 (emphasis added). And after spelling out the required warnings in detail, the 
Court summarizes the holding in even plainer terms: “[U]nless and until such warnings and 
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of inter-
rogation can be used against [the defendant].” Id. at 479. To be sure, this articulation of the 
holding differs from the one quoted in text in one significant respect: Whereas the latter 
makes only the unwarned statement itself inadmissible, this seems to require suppression of 
the unwarned statement as well as any fruits thereof. For present purposes, though, the im-
portant point is only that these two formal pronouncements similarly resolve the ambiguity of 
whether the Miranda doctrine constrains courts or police; how best to resolve the new ambi-
guity that they combine to create is reserved for later. See infra Section V.D.3. As far as in-
terpreting Miranda itself, though, I agree with Judge Friendly that this passage “can be better 
read as referring only to the statements themselves, which are repeatedly mentioned in the 
opinion, rather than as disposing of so large an issue in so casual a fashion.” Friendly, supra 
note 52, at 279. 
375 This is the core thesis of Clymer, supra note 370, and a point that several earlier commen-
taries had also taken pains to make clear. See, e.g., infra note 377; Susan R. Klein, Miranda 
Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 
143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 417 (1994). Understanding that the doctrine that Miranda created as a 
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must not admit any statements given during custodial interrogation 
unless the statements were proceeded by the specified warnings and their 
protections waived.376 Appropriately, then, Dickerson itself begins: “In 
Miranda . . . we held that certain warnings must be given before a sus-
pect’s statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted 
in evidence.”377 
b. The Rationale 
But why? On this score the Court is reasonably clear. At the very be-
ginning of its analysis the Court cautions that “[a]n understanding of the 
nature and setting of . . . in-custody interrogation is essential to our deci-
sions today.”378 The critical feature, of course, is that “[i]nterrogation still 
takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in 
a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation 
 
means of implementing its interpreted meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause is not an or-
der to the police to give the specified warnings prior to subjecting any suspect to custodial in-
terrogation, but rather, an instruction to the trial courts not to admit certain custodial state-
ments into evidence, has practical consequences. It is precisely this distinction between 
Miranda as a rule governing the admission of evidence and as a rule commanding behavior by 
police that led the Court to hold just last term that the mere fact of an un-Mirandized interro-
gation gives suspects no legal claim against the police interrogators. Chavez v. Martinez, 123 
S. Ct. 1994, 2003–04 (2003). For a thorough discussion of the pre-Chavez case law, see 
Clymer, supra note 370, at 486–93. 
376 According to Schulhofer, “the heart of Miranda . . . lies not so much in the famous warn-
ings as in the cut-off rule—that if at any time the suspect indicates a desire to remain silent, all 
questioning must cease.” Schulhofer, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 361, at 954. 
377 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431–32. In his dissent, though, Justice Scalia vacillated between 
these two readings of Miranda, compare, e.g., id. at 446 (criticizing the majority for not 
straightforwardly announcing “that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda 
warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States”), with id. at 447 
(describing, as “the fairest reading of the Miranda case itself,” “the proposition that . . . the 
admission at trial of un-Mirandized confessions . . . violates the Constitution”), thus provok-
ing some commentators to chide him for ignoring the difference. “[E]ven under Miranda,” 
Strauss explained, “what the Constitution (arguably) prohibits is the admission into evidence 
obtained by custodial interrogation without warnings. It seems doubtful that questioning a 
suspect in custody without warnings would violate the Constitution if the statements were 
never used as evidence, unless the interrogation were in some other way abusive.” Strauss, 
Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146, at 958–59 n.8; see also, e.g., Craig 
M. Bradley, Supreme Court Review behind the Dickerson Decision, 36 JTLA 80, 81 (Oct. 
2000) (characterizing the Miranda right as a trial right, not a right during interrogation). As 
already indicated, Strauss’s point that Miranda is addressed to courts, not cops, is right and 
important. The references, though, to “what the Constitution . . . prohibits” and what “would 
violate the Constitution” are inconsistent with my thesis that the Miranda warnings are part of 
the constitutional decision rule, not part of the operative proposition. They are entirely con-
sistent, however, with the anti-taxonomic thrust of “The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules.” 
378 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
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rooms.”379 And because courts cannot know what has occurred in the in-
terrogation, they cannot know whether the resulting statement was com-
pelled. This would be true no matter how compulsion were defined. But 
the Court’s expansive construal of what compulsion means exacerbated 
the difficulty in determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether any given 
statement had in fact been compelled. Some statements would be truly 
free, some would not be, and a trial court’s answer would be little better 
than a guess.380 
Under circumstances like these, how can a tolerable degree of adjudi-
catory accuracy be achieved? One obvious answer would be to presume 
all custodial statements to be compelled. If interrogation exerts the sort 
of pressures likely to elicit incriminating statements that are not “truly 
free,” and if the accuracy of case-by-case inquiries is close to random, 
then courts might maximize right answers simply by presuming all such 
statements to have been compelled hence inadmissible. Sure, such a deci-
sion rule would yield many false positives, but conceivably fewer than the 
sum of false positives and false negatives generated by a simple prepon-
derance decision rule. The Court did not adopt this solution, and sought 
instead to reduce the “inherently compelling”381 character of the interro-
gation. That is precisely what the warnings are supposed to do by making 
suspects aware that they may remain silent or ask for an attorney, and 
that the police know it.382 The hope was that issuance of the warnings 
would reduce the proportion of custodial statements that were compelled 
(in what the Court took to be the constitutionally relevant sense), thereby 
making it plausible to suppose that a trial court could achieve greater adju-
dicatory accuracy by investigating compulsion case by case than by glob-
ally presuming it.383 In other words, the Court had concluded that trial 
 
379 Id. at 448. 
380 This was a common criticism of pre-Miranda efforts to determine whether an out-of-court 
confession was “involuntary” for due process purposes. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—
Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 954–84 (1966). 
381 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
382 See id. at 467–79. 
383 A very first cut at formalizing these assumptions would go something like this. Let S1 be 
the set of (possibly inculpatory) custodial statements in a pre-Miranda world; C1 is the set of 
such statements that were compelled (in the constitutionally relevant sense); and F1 is the set 
of such statements that were not compelled (in the constitutionally relevant sense), hence (in 
the constitutionally relevant sense) free. S1 = C1 + F1. 
 Let the courts’ accuracy rate in determining (by application of the more-likely-than-not de-
cision rule) whether any given statement was compelled or free be .x (.x > .5). Let C1/S1 = .y. If 
.y > .x, then adjudicatory accuracy would be higher if courts conclusively presume any given 
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courts would minimize errors in the adjudication of the constitutional op-
erative proposition by (a) conclusively presuming that a given out-of-
court statement was compelled if it was given in a custodial setting with-
out the benefit of warnings, and (b) assessing case-by-case via a prepon-
derance standard whether other out-of-court statements (non-custodial 
or custodial-but-warned) were compelled.384 This is a complex rule in-
structing courts how to proceed so as to minimize adjudicatory error. 
Notwithstanding its unusual form, conceptually speaking it is a quintes-
sential decision rule. 
Critics, and even some supporters, often describe the genesis of the 
Miranda doctrine in alternative, or additional, terms as “designed to de-
ter potential police overreaching.”385 Because a decision rule’s legitimacy 
is likely to be most secure insofar as it is designed to reduce adjudicatory 
error, and because Miranda’s correct doctrinal consequences (i.e., the 
 
statement to have been compelled than if courts try to ascertain whether the statement is 
compelled or free on a case-by-case basis. 
 If police issue warnings, then we may suppose that possibly inculpatory custodial statements 
decrease, and, furthermore, that both sorts of statements decrease—compelled and free. 
Thus: S1 > S2; C1 > C2; F1 > F2. Very possibly, though, the issuance of warnings results in a pro-
portionally larger reduction of compelled statements than of free statements. If so, C2/S2 = .z, 
where .y > .z. If .x > .z, then the Miranda decision rule reduces adjudicatory accuracy relative 
both to case-by-case adjudications under the more-likely-than-not decision rule and to a deci-
sion rule that conclusively presumes all custodial statements to have been compelled. 
 This is, to be sure, a simplified and imprecise model. To note just one source of simplifica-
tion, it does not incorporate errors in adjudicating whether the Miranda strictures were com-
plied with. However, greater formalization would not, at this point, be worth the candle. I aim 
only to explicate a little more clearly the basic assumptions that support reading the Miranda 
decision rule as designed to minimize adjudicatory error. 
384 As several scholars have observed, this second part of the rule has been ignored in prac-
tice. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 115, at 1070 & n.184 (citing other commentators). 
385 Monaghan, supra note 4, at 20 n.105; see also, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the 
Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible “Prophylactic” Supreme Court In-
ventions, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 299, 300 (1996) (“[T]he Miranda mandate is not a constitutional re-
quirement. Rather, the Court has held specifically that Miranda rules are only ‘safeguards’ 
whose purpose is to reduce the risk that the police will violate the Constitution during custo-
dial questioning.”). Supreme Court Justices have often described Miranda in these terms. 
Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146, at 968 (explaining “another 
of the problems Miranda sought to avoid” was creating incentives for the police “to try to co-
erce incriminating statements by subtle, undetectable means”); Strauss, supra note 38, at 200 
(describing “the Miranda rules [as a] relatively rigid doctrine[] designed to reduce the likeli-
hood that . . . the police . . . will violate the law, and designed to improve a reviewing court’s 
chances of identifying violations when they occur”). See, e.g., infra note 452 (discussing Elstad 
and Tucker). 
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proper outcomes in its progeny) should depend upon the reasons that 
undergird it, some thoughts on this claim are warranted.386 
Even assuming, as I argue and as the Court’s recent decision in Chavez 
v. Martinez387 supports, that the decision rule is addressed to courts and 
not to cops, there is no reasonable doubt that it is intended to affect po-
lice behavior. The Miranda majority expected and hoped that police offi-
cers wanted inculpatory statements to be admitted and would, therefore, 
issue the warnings (and respect their invocation by suspects). So it would 
be foolish to assert that the Miranda Court was indifferent as to whether 
cops issued the warnings. Naturally, the Court wanted the cops to issue 
them. The Miranda doctrine is, as Grano says, “forward-looking.”388 
Whether this means that the decision rule was designed “to reduce po-
lice overreaching,” however, necessarily depends on what police over-
reaching is taken to mean. If it refers to police behavior that violates the 
Constitution, then Miranda is not designed to reduce police overreaching. 
Miranda is presented entirely as a decision giving effect to the Self-
Incrimination Clause, not the Due Process Clause. And the police just 
cannot violate the Self-Incrimination Clause, no matter how hard they 
try. If, on the other hand, “police overreaching” is shorthand for “police 
behavior that compels suspects to confess,” then Miranda was designed 
to reduce police overreaching. As I have conceived and defended it, the 
Miranda decision rule could plausibly minimize adjudicatory error (rela-
tive to doctrines that would administer the Court’s announced operative 
proposition either by means of a simple more-likely-than-not decision 
rule or by means of a conclusive presumption that all custodial state-
ments were compelled) only on the assumption that it would result in 
fewer statements having been compelled. 
It seems, then, that I am endorsing the view that the decision rule was 
designed for two purposes: to minimize adjudicatory error and to reduce 
 
386 I am grateful to Yale Kamisar and Susan Klein for pressing me on this point. 
387 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2003–04 (2003); see supra note 375. 
388 According to Grano, “[w]hether or not a rule is prophylactic depends entirely on how the 
Court describes the rule and its underlying rationale.” See Grano, supra note 70, at 111. In 
particular, a rule is prophylactic if it is designed either “to establish understandable per se 
rules for [governmental agents] to follow” or to overcome “the difficulty of detecting constitu-
tional violations on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 105. Put another way, “A prophylactic rule 
may be intended to insure either that constitutional violations will not occur in the future or 
that a constitutional violation did not occur in the case before the court.” Id. at 105 n.22. Al-
though Grano treats both of these interests as amounting to prophylactic rules, it is telling 
that he distinguishes between the two for purposes of legitimacy, noting, in particular, that 
“[f]orward-looking prophylactic rules raise the most difficult legitimacy questions.” Id. 
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“police overreaching” (in this narrow stipulated sense). In fact, however, 
I believe that is a very misleading description. It is misleading because it 
implies the wrong sort of relationship between these two purposes. 
At bottom, the question is whether these purposes are independent or 
causally linked. Consider the institution of criminal punishment. Some 
people (call them “mixed theorists”) believe that it can be explained or 
justified as serving two purposes: to make criminals suffer and to deter 
the commission of crimes. Others will dispute this. No, they may say, 
punishment is justified only for the purpose of deterring crime.389 Now, 
one could say that these two camps do not disagree: Surely the deter-
rence theorists recognize that general deterrence would be served only if 
persons considering crime believe that punishment inflicts suffering and, 
moreover, that specific deterrence requires that those who are punished 
do in fact experience the punishment as a form of suffering. Therefore, 
despite their protests to the contrary, the deterrence theorists, like the 
mixed theorists, endorse, as a purpose of punishment, that criminals be 
made to suffer. 
One could say this. But it would miss the critical point of distinction, 
which is that the mixed theorists believe that punishment serves two in-
dependent purposes—the infliction of deserved suffering and the deter-
rence of crime—whereas our deterrence theorists believe that the inflic-
tion of suffering is only a mediate purpose in service of the more ultimate 
purpose of deterring crime. Moreover, it is comfortable and familiar to 
capture this distinction just as our deterrence theorist has—namely, that 
she, unlike her opponents, does not describe or justify punishment as 
serving the purpose of inflicting suffering. 
With this contrast in mind, we should want to know whether the 
Miranda decision rule is designed to encourage police not to compel 
statements only as a means to achieve the end of increasing adjudicatory 
accuracy or, instead, as an end in itself (by which we are likely to mean, 
rather, that it is a means in a distinct causal chain). 
There are powerful reasons, I think, to believe that the former charac-
terization is more apt. To appreciate the first reason, suppose that, even 
pre-Miranda, courts were very good at identifying which custodial state-
ments were compelled and which were not. If so, then as far as adjudica-
tory accuracy were concerned, there would be no reason to require warn-
 
389 Obviously, this is a brutally oversimplified characterization of debates over the justifica-
tory theories of punishment. The caricature is nonetheless adequate to illustrate the instant 
point. 
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ings as a precondition for admissibility. In contrast, there would remain a 
reason to require the warnings if deterring cops from securing compelled 
statements was an independent goal. Put another way, if deterring police 
overreaching were an independent goal then there would have been no 
reason for the Miranda Court to observe that trial courts were not good 
at sorting the compelled from the not compelled because the doctrine 
that the Court ultimately announced would be justified even were the 
case otherwise. Therefore, the heavy emphasis that the Court placed on 
trial courts’ inability to determine stationhouse compulsion on a case-by-
case basis is itself evidence that deterring police overreaching was not an 
independent purpose for the warnings rule but only a means to ensure 
greater adjudicatory accuracy. More fundamentally, it is hard to see what 
warrant the Court would have to seek to reduce compulsion by the police 
if such behavior (contrasted, it must be recalled, with coercion by the po-
lice, which is a violation under the Due Process Clause) does not violate 
the Constitution, and if courts can do a constitutionally adequate job of 
determining, after the elicitation of a given statement, but before its ad-
mission, that the statement was compelled. 
For these two reasons, I conclude that “deterring police overreaching” 
is best understood only as a mediate purpose in service of the more ulti-
mate purpose of increasing adjudicatory accuracy. It is the latter objec-
tive that determines the doctrine’s legitimacy, and contribution to that 
latter objective is the touchstone by which Miranda’s progeny should be 
measured. In short, then, it will be most perspicuous to continue to main-
tain that the Miranda decision rule is designed to reduce adjudicatory er-
ror—i.e., to improve the accuracy of judicial determinations of facts made 
relevant by constitutional meaning—even while understanding that it 
does so by the particular means of reducing the occasions on which 
prosecutors seek to introduce against a defendant statements that had 
been compelled by the police, by the means of reducing the incidence of 
police-compelled statements, by the means of inducing police to warn 
suspects of their rights.390 To characterize the Miranda doctrine as resting 
 
390 Compare this explanation for the Miranda warnings from a unanimous Burger Court: 
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are [1] to ensure that the police 
do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, [2] to relieve the “inherently 
compelling pressures” generated by the custodial setting itself, “which work to under-
mine the individual’s will to resist,” and [3] as much as possible to free courts from the 
task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particu-
lar confessions were voluntary. 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (brackets added) (internal citations omitted). 
This looks like at first blush like three independent rationales. But that is quite misleading. 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
122 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
on deterrent considerations as opposed to, or more than, adjudicatory 
ones likely reflects the misapprehension that some aspect of the Miranda 
doctrine (either operative proposition or decision rule) is directed to the 
police.391 
B. Prophylactic Decision Rules? Understanding Overprotection 
Supposing the argument of Section V.A is correct, does Miranda an-
nounce a “prophylactic rule?” To reiterate a point made earlier,392 al-
though the answer depends on precisely which of the many possible defi-
nitions of “prophylactic rule” we choose, for present purposes the choice 
is made for us. Justice Scalia, following Grano, argued in Dickerson as 
 
Rather, by reducing the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogations, the 
warnings make it less likely that a custodial statement will have been the product of coercion, 
thereby making judicial determinations of whether particular confessions were voluntary 
more likely to be correct than they otherwise would be. 
391 That is so if the “deterrent considerations” that the speaker has in mind are akin to an 
interest in discouraging police overreaching. But we can introduce yet a further complication: 
Although the doctrine is not most usefully understood as designed to deter undesirable police 
behavior, it necessarily is intended to deter constitutional violations. Many constitutional 
commands apply to non-judicial actors (legislators and executive agents) and the judiciary sits 
in judgment. As Hans Linde observed, “the Constitution is addressed to government, and 
concerns judges only as a consequence.” Linde, supra note 258, at 255. But the Self-
Incrimination Clause, like much in the Fifth through Eighth Amendments, governs the con-
duct of courts in the first instance. It is a conditional directive to trial courts that takes 
(roughly) the following form: “if a criminal defendant’s extra-judicial statement was com-
pelled, then do not admit it into evidence against him.” If, as I have just argued, the Miranda 
decision rule is designed to reduce adjudicatory errors, the reduction of adjudicatory errors is 
itself designed, in this context, to reduce constitutional violations. Furthermore, the very same 
reasoning that leads me to conclude that we should view the Miranda decision rule as de-
signed to serve the (relatively ultimate) purpose of minimizing adjudicatory error rather than 
the (more mediate) purpose of deterring police overreaching should entail that we do even 
better by viewing the rule as designed to serve the (yet more ultimate) purpose of preventing 
constitutional violations. 
 I am going to resist this logic. Every doctrine designed to reduce errors in the adjudication 
of constitutionally relevant facts is also designed to reduce constitutional violations whenever 
the erroneous judicial findings sought to be reduced constitute predicates for some sort of 
constitutional violation—i.e., with respect to all constitutional provisions that govern the con-
duct of courts in the first instance. In a case of that sort the causal relationship between “re-
ducing adjudicatory error” and “reducing constitutional violations” is necessary, not contin-
gent. More particularly, then, any device designed to reduce a trial court’s erroneous 
determinations that a particular statement was not compelled is designed, ipso facto, to re-
duce the incidence of unconstitutional admissions of compelled statements. So to say that the 
Miranda decision rule is designed to reduce the introduction, in violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause, of “compelled” statements is less revealing than characterizing it as 
serving purposes that I have labeled adjudicatory. 
392 See introduction to Part II, supra. 
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follows: (1) Miranda employed a prophylactic rule; (2) prophylactic rules 
are illegitimate; (3) therefore, Miranda employed an illegitimate rule. 
The present question, then, is whether the Miranda decision rule is a 
“prophylactic rule” in any sense of that term that would make the argu-
ment sound. 
As already described, the proponents of this syllogism define a prophy-
lactic rule as a judge-made rule that “overenforces” or “overprotects” 
judge-interpreted constitutional meaning. Thus a decision rule is a pro-
phylactic rule if it overenforces or overprotects its corresponding opera-
tive proposition. What I’d like to point out here is that, if constitutional 
doctrine is divided into operative propositions and decision rules, the no-
tion of overprotection is surprisingly complex. What can it mean for a de-
cision rule to overenforce or overprotect an operative proposition? 
One possible understanding of “overenforce” is to enforce “too 
much.” On this view, a decision rule overenforces its operative proposi-
tion if its application yields “too many” erroneous legal judgments that 
the operative proposition has been violated. But “too many” by what 
standard or by whose lights? Obviously, the content of “too many” can-
not be merely “more than would be legitimate,” for we would then need 
to know the standard of legitimacy. Premise (2) above is just tautological 
if “prophylactic rule” is defined as a rule that results in more false posi-
tives in the adjudication of operative propositions than would be legiti-
mate. Put another way, if judgments of appropriateness or legitimacy are 
incorporated by definition into the concept of “prophylactic rule,” then 
Justice Scalia’s argument that the Miranda doctrine is illegitimate because 
it is a prophylactic rule becomes vacuous. 
So here is a second candidate for the baseline against which claims of 
“overenforcement” are to be measured: A decision rule overenforces its 
operative proposition (hence is a prophylactic rule) if application of the 
decision rule yields more false positives in adjudication than would adju-
dication of the operative proposition by the “preponderance of the evi-
dence” decision rule. We could define prophylactic rules in this way. But 
then we would need an argument to establish that overenforcement as 
measured against this baseline is illegitimate. Two sorts of claims seem 
most likely. The first is that it is illegitimate for the courts to adopt any 
decision rule for a specific context that is likely to yield more false posi-
tives or more false negatives in judicial administration of the correspond-
ing operative proposition than would the preponderance decision rule 
but must, instead, rely on a globally applicable preponderance decision 
rule. But this claim is virtually equivalent to (and more straightforwardly 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
124 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
expressed as) the claim that courts lack legitimate power to create deci-
sion rules. Although such a claim is not demonstrably false, it seems ex-
ceedingly implausible.393 The second claim is the slightly narrower one 
that it is illegitimate for courts to adopt any decision rule that is likely to 
yield more false positives in judicial administration of the corresponding 
operative proposition than would the preponderance standard even 
though courts may adopt a decision rule likely to yield more false nega-
tives than the preponderance standard. In other words, a decision rule 
can legitimately underenforce relative to the preponderance decision rule 
but not overenforce relative to the preponderance decision rule. This po-
sition is a logically coherent position, but the path toward a successful de-
fense of such an asymmetry will be far from smooth.394 
Consider a third possibility: A decision rule is a prophylactic rule if it 
results in more total adjudicatory errors than would the preponderance 
standard. To say that this is what a prophylactic rule means (or, more 
precisely, what a prophylactic decision rule means) in the context of a 
broader argument that such rules are illegitimate, is just to maintain that 
courts may not create decision rules for reasons other than minimizing 
adjudicatory error. This strikes me as just the sort of proposition about 
which reasonable people could disagree, and just the sort of disagreement 
for which the operative proposition/decision rule distinction is intended 
to clear space.395 
Unfortunately for Miranda’s critics,396 this particular fleshing out of 
what it means for a rule to overenforce or overprotect constitutional 
meaning does not imperil Miranda. A decision rule designed to minimize 
adjudicatory error is not, according to this elucidation of the Scalia-
Grano account, a prophylactic rule. And, as shown in the previous Sec-
 
393 See supra Section IV.A.2.a. 
394 Very briefly: The most plausible justifications for judicial review must depend to some 
extent on the claim that courts are better positioned than are the more democratically ac-
countable branches to protect certain valuable interests against infringement by temporal ma-
jorities. So to adopt a metarule governing its practice that would systematically privilege our 
polity’s majoritarian commitments over our liberal ones by permitting the underenforcement 
of rights but not their overenforcement borders on self-contradiction. For a similar (if argua-
bly understated) observation, see Strauss, supra note 38, at 207. 
395 See supra text accompanying note 326. 
396 I am speaking here of those critics who deny Miranda’s legitimacy, not those who charge, 
for example, that Miranda announced an erroneous operative proposition (because it should 
have concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not bar introduction of statements compelled 
outside of court by the police, or because it adopted an overly expansive understanding of 
“compulsion”), or that the Court’s choice of decision rule was unwise. This Article takes no 
position on the soundness of these or other such criticisms. 
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tion, the Miranda decision rule is most plausibly understood as having 
been intended to minimize total errors in the adjudication of the Fifth 
Amendment operative proposition.397 Therefore, Miranda is not a pro-
phylactic rule in the sense that Justice Scalia’s argument appears to re-
quire.398 
C. The Conclusive Presumption Red Herring 
Section V.A argued that the Fifth Amendment doctrine announced in 
Miranda can be usefully and fairly broken into an operative proposition 
directed to judges (do not admit a statement against a criminal defendant 
that has been compelled) and a decision rule designed to minimize errors 
in adjudicating the operative proposition (conclusively presume that a 
statement has been compelled if given during custodial interrogation 
without specified warnings or if given after warnings that had not been 
waived). Section V.B showed that, if this is right, the Miranda doctrine is 
not vulnerable to attack on grounds of its being a prophylactic rule. This 
Section addresses a direct challenge to the description of Miranda that 
 
397 No doubt Justice Scalia would deny this. In his Dickerson dissent, for example, Justice 
Scalia pronounces that “what is most remarkable about the Miranda decision—and what 
made it unacceptable as a matter of straightforward constitutional interpretation in the Mar-
bury tradition—is its palpable hostility toward the act of confession per se, rather than toward 
what the Constitution abhors, compelled confession.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 449–50 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). The suggestion, perhaps, is that although the Justices in the Miranda majority 
recognized that the Constitution prohibits only some subset of confessions—“compelled” 
ones—they crafted doctrine to effectuate a disapproval of all confessions even though they 
knew that such a disapproval rested on their own very different judgments of political moral-
ity. Put in terms introduced earlier, see supra Section IV.A.2.a, Justice Scalia might be claim-
ing that the Miranda decision rule was based on substantive considerations. Cf. Strauss, supra 
note 38, at 194 (speculating that Grano’s true objection to Miranda stems from his suspicion 
“that Miranda reflects not a genuine effort to minimize the sum of administrative costs and 
error costs but only a judgment by the Court that the world would be a better place if law en-
forcement officers were required to comply with Miranda”). Justice Scalia could be correct. 
But the fairer reading of Miranda is that the majority Justices’ hostility to confession 
(grounded in solicitude for the dignity of criminal defendants) undergirded the Court’s expan-
sive interpretation of what constitutes compulsion. And no matter how open to criticism that 
construal was (and, I repeat, I am not defending it), it is a statement of constitutional mean-
ing, not a constitutional decision rule. Once the Court chose to interpret the Self-
Incrimination Clause as broadly as it did, then, there seems to be slight basis to deny that it 
turned to adjudicatory considerations at the stage of decision rulemaking. Surely the 
Dickerson majority could reasonably have concluded that the Miranda doctrine rested on that 
Court’s estimation of how best to minimize adjudicatory errors. But see infra Section V.D 
(acknowledging that this interpretation is in tension with at least some of Miranda’s progeny, 
notably Harris and Quarles). 
398 The Nollan doctrine, however, might be. It depends on just what considerations support 
the nexus decision rule. See supra Section III.B.4. 
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Section V.A offered. According to that challenge, use of a conclusive 
presumption by the putative Miranda decision rule demonstrates that the 
decision rule is not designed to minimize adjudicatory error because con-
clusive presumptions cannot serve to minimize error in the adjudication 
of an operative proposition.399 
This Section responds to that charge in three steps. First (and wholly 
unoriginally), it briefly considers and (provisionally) rejects the straight-
forward assertion that a conclusive presumption cannot minimize adjudi-
catory errors relative to feasible alternatives. Second, it addresses and re-
buts the arguments that Grano marshaled from evidence scholarship to 
support this superficially implausible assertion. This subsection is long 
and can be skimmed or skipped by readers who are already persuaded af-
ter the first step that a decision rule that employs a conclusive presump-
tion can serve the goal of error minimization. Turning last from the gen-
eral claims of evidence scholarship to the more narrowly focused worries 
of constitutional law, I entertain the argument that regardless of whether 
federal courts generally have constitutional power to craft decision rules 
to serve adjudicatory aims, and even if a conclusive presumption can be 
designed to realize such goals, the courts’ legitimate authority does not 
 
399 Even if true, this argument would not get its proponents very far unless married to the 
additional premise that, as a matter of constitutional legitimacy, courts have power to create 
decision rules to minimize adjudicatory error, but for no (or significantly limited) other pur-
poses. As I have emphasized several times now, the taxonomic enterprise cannot resolve that 
question. Accordingly, this Section proceeds on the assumption that that additional premise 
could be true. 
 The conclusive-presumption objection could alternatively be broken down this way: (1) As 
a matter of constitutional taxonomy, we should reserve the “decision rule” label for only 
those doctrinal rules designed to minimize adjudicatory error; (2) courts have legitimate au-
thority only to announce constitutional meanings and to craft constitutional decision rules, 
but not to make other sorts of constitutional doctrine; (3) a conclusive presumption cannot be 
designed to minimize adjudicatory error; therefore, (4) purported decision rules that employ a 
conclusive presumption are illegitimate. I disfavor this way of proceeding because it can work, 
if at all, only for people who accept premise (2). Scholars or judges who believe that courts 
may have legitimate authority to craft doctrinal devices (beyond operative propositions) to 
serve interests other than adjudicatory-error minimization could accept premise (1) only if 
they are then prepared to develop a much richer doctrinal taxonomy in which each type of 
rule is defined in terms of the consideration that supports it. But if multiple considerations are 
legitimate, then it will become an inordinate challenge to articulate the principles needed to 
classify individual rules that are supported by more than one such consideration. We can 
avoid this challenge by allowing decision rules to rest, as a conceptual matter, on varied judi-
cial considerations, and then leaving for separate normative argument which of the conceptu-
ally possible considerations are permissible. Simply put, clear thinking is aided by describing 
the concepts in ways that are not hostage to resolution of the normative issues in dispute. 
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extend to the making of decision rules that employ conclusive presump-
tions. This argument, too, I conclude, is not persuasive. 
1. The Argument Straight-Up 
The gist of the critics’ argument is that conclusive presumptions “can-
not be defended” on the theory that “they assist federal reviewing courts 
in accurately resolving” contested factual disputes because they guaran-
tee adjudicatory errors.400 As Schulhofer conceded, “one can imagine a 
case in which a law professor-suspect knows his rights and is not in fear of 
abuses, in which he tells all in response to the first question, not because 
of any sense of pressure but simply because he wants the truth to come 
out.”401 In such a case, directing lower courts to conclusively presume 
compulsion from the absence of warnings produces false positives that 
would be avoided were the court allowed to treat the presumption as re-
buttable. The conclusive presumption is thus supposed not to be adopted 
for the purpose of error minimization. 
If this is all there is to the argument, it is fallacious. To see why, it 
would be helpful to pin down precisely what sort of rebuttable presump-
tion Grano thinks would necessarily yield fewer adjudicatory errors than 
the conclusive presumption at issue. If the imagined alternative to the use 
of a conclusive presumption is a presumption that merely shifts upon the 
party against whom the presumption lies the burden to deny the pre-
sumed fact by a preponderance of the evidence,402 then it should be obvi-
 
400 Grano, supra note 70, at 145; see also id. at 141 n.271 & 144–45 (arguing that if the Pearce 
rule is irrebuttable, then “[e]xcept in a pickwickian sense, [it] cannot be viewed as a proce-
dural rule [a rule that ‘helps the reviewing court to determine correctly the constitutional is-
sue before it’] designed to assist the reviewing court in accurately resolving the vindictiveness 
issue”). 
401 Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 448. 
402 This was Morgan’s theory of how rebuttable presumptions should work. See, e.g., Ed-
mund M. Morgan, Some Problems of Proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 
74–81 (1956). However the dominant view, sometimes called the “bursting bubble” theory, 
holds that a rebuttable presumption shifts only the burden of producing evidence with respect 
to the presumed fact; if and when that burden is satisfied, the presumption disappears. For a 
compact summary of the debate see, for instance, McCormick on Evidence § 344 (Edward W. 
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Cleary, McCormick on Evidence]. The argument in text 
is that a conclusive presumption does not necessarily produce more adjudicatory errors than 
do rebuttable presumptions even as Morgan conceived of them. A fortiori the same is true 
with respect to rebuttable presumptions that shift only the burden of production. 
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ous that conclusive presumptions do not necessarily produce more adju-
dicatory errors.403 
It is common to suppose that a preponderance standard yields roughly 
equal numbers of false negatives and false positives and that any upward 
departure from the standard increases false negatives more than it de-
creases false positives.404 But this claim crucially depends upon the as-
sumption that the factfinder’s degree of subjective confidence regarding a 
given factual proposition, given certain evidence, accurately corresponds 
to the statistical probability that that proposition is true. Put more pre-
cisely, it depends upon the assumption that factfinders accurately assess 
the probative value of different types of evidence. And this is simply un-
true. Take one common example. Study after study confirms that fact-
finders substantially overvalue eyewitness testimony.405 Therefore, if fact-
finders could effectively be instructed to credit eyewitness testimony only 
when convinced of its accuracy to some heightened standard of certainty 
(say, sixty-five percent), such an instruction could actually reduce total 
false positives as much as it increases false negatives, or more, thereby 
reducing total adjudicatory errors. 
All that this shows, of course, is that increasing the quantum of proof 
can, perhaps counterintuitively, reduce total adjudicatory errors. It can 
do so whenever factfinders systematically overestimate or underestimate 
the probative value of a particular type of evidence, or are otherwise sys-
tematically biased for or against a particular class of litigant. Therefore a 
conclusive presumption can minimize adjudicatory errors relative to a 
 
403 For solid presentations of this argument, see, for instance, Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 
450–51; Strauss, supra note 38, at 193. 
404 Indeed, that is why the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal law is justified 
with the adage that it is worse to convict one innocent person than to allow ten guilty persons 
to go free. This adage implicitly acknowledges that departures from the preponderance stan-
dard increase total adjudicatory errors. Having just introduced the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard, it is worth mentioning that this is part of the due process operative proposi-
tion; it is not a constitutional decision rule. That is, the court has interpreted the Due Process 
Clause as requiring that a criminal defendant not be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
unless the prosecution proves all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
405 See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, 
Psychology and the Law 181–96 (1995); Elizabeth D. Loftus & James M. Doyle, Eyewitness 
Testimony: Civil and Criminal 1–8 (3d ed. 1997); John C. Brigham and Robert K. Bothwell, 
The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 
Law & Hum. Behav. 19, 19–30 (1983); Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in Identi-
fication Cases, 12 Law & Hum. Behav. 41, 41–55 (1988); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror 
Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 333, 333–39 (1989). 
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presumption that is rebuttable by disproof of the presumed fact by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. This does not by itself demonstrate, how-
ever, that a conclusive presumption can minimize total adjudicatory er-
rors relative to an alternative presumption that can be overcome only by 
disproof of the presumed fact to some very high standard of confidence. 
Take the example of the law professor-suspect. We would have to assume 
an implausible degree of systematic epistemic bias to believe that the 
conclusive presumption that a non-warned confession was compelled 
would reduce total adjudicatory errors relative to a presumption that 
could be rebutted, for example, “only by evidence ‘so strong as effec-
tively to eliminate all doubt whatever that the statement was volun-
tary.’”406 Therefore, the charge would go, a conclusive presumption can-
not serve to minimize adjudicatory error relative to all conceivable 
alternatives.407 
This argument founders on an unrealistic assumption about human ra-
tionality and cognitive processes. Human beings are not calculating de-
vices that can follow directions of this sort very well.408 That is why the 
common law recognized only two quantum of evidence standards: the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for criminal offenses and the pre-
ponderance standard for everything else. Even the now-familiar “clear 
 
406 Strauss, supra note 38, at 192. Compare the notion of “presumptive formalism” floated in 
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 544–48 (1988). 
407 A distinct but related objection is that, even assuming arguendo that conclusive presump-
tions can possibly minimize total adjudicatory errors, the conclusive presumption adopted in 
Miranda cannot be said to do so, or is otherwise somehow illegitimate, because the Court 
never “even considered, let alone tested,” a rebuttable presumption before taking “the more 
drastic step” of making the presumption conclusive. Grano, supra note 70, at 154. It is not 
clear just what to make of this observation. My best guess is that it is an evidentiary claim: 
The fact that the Court did not test fashioning the warnings requirement into some form of 
rebuttable presumption demonstrates that it was not really motivated by adjudicatory consid-
erations. But even insofar as we should care about the explanatory reasons for the Court’s ac-
tion as opposed to the guiding or justificatory ones, the Court’s failure to explicitly consider 
use of a rebuttable presumption in lieu of the conclusive one it did adopt is only one piece of 
evidence, and not, to my mind, a particularly powerful piece. 
408 Consider Bentham’s proposal that witnesses be encouraged to describe their subjective 
confidence levels in mathematical degrees instead of in terms of ordinary language. See 1 Jer-
emy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice 73–80 
(John Stuart Mill ed. 1827). To this, Bentham’s contemporary, the Swiss legal scholar Etionne 
Dumont, responded: “I cannot deny that, where different witnesses have different degrees of 
belief, it would be extremely desirable to obtain a precise knowledge of these degrees, and to 
make it the basis of the judicial decision; but I cannot believe that this sort of perfection is at-
tainable in practice. I even think, that it belongs only to intelligences superior to ourselves, or 
at least to the great mass of mankind.” Id. at 106. 
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and convincing evidence” standard was unknown at common law.409 Fact-
finders who are instructed on an “effectively no doubt” standard pre-
dictably will apply standards of rather greater leniency. So the fact, if 
true, that a very high standard of proof for rebutting a presumption 
would, if strictly followed, produce fewer adjudicatory errors than would 
a conclusive presumption, does not prove that a rebuttable presumption 
of near-conclusiveness would, in actual practice, yield fewer adjudicatory 
errors than a fully conclusive presumption.410 
2. The Argument from Authority 
Instead of directly engaging the intuitively sensible contention that 
conclusive presumptions can reduce adjudicatory errors (weighted or 
unweighted) relative to any plausible adjudicatory alternative, Grano ef-
fectively shifts the ground of argument by invoking authority. “Conclu-
sive presumptions differ in kind, not simply degree, from rebuttable pre-
sumptions. Indeed, conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary or 
adjudicatory devices at all, but rather substantive rules of law . . . .”411 This 
important conclusion rests upon the following passage, which Grano 
quotes from McCormick on Evidence: 
In the case of what is commonly called a conclusive or irrebuttable pre-
sumption, when fact B is proven, fact A must be taken as true, and the 
adversary is not allowed to dispute this at all. For example, if it is 
 
409 See, e.g., Zelman Cowen & P.B. Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence 244 (1956). Even 
today, it is not entirely clear whether English law recognizes intermediate standards. See 
Adrian Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence 83 (4th ed. 1996) (“The notion of a third and 
intermediate standard of proof lying between the standards required in criminal and civil 
cases has not found favour in the courts.”). 
410 It is therefore not surprising to find that Grano has wavered on the significance of the dis-
tinction between rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions. In a 1985 article he seemed to 
concede, albeit grudgingly, that the federal courts do have power to create constitutional doc-
trine in the form of rebuttable presumptions. See Grano, supra note 70, at 148 (concluding 
that “[t]he federal courts arguably have implied authority to promulgate rebuttable presump-
tions and rules allocating the burden of proof concerning constitutional questions”). By 1993, 
however, he deemed it “far from obvious that the Supreme Court through the vehicle of ap-
pellate reversal should be able to force state courts to employ a rebuttable presumption they 
prefer not to employ,” and admitted to a new belief that his 1985 views “ceded too much con-
stitutional ground.” Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 196 & 294 n.176. Still, even in 1993 
Grano took pains to insist that there did exist a critical difference between rebuttable and ir-
rebuttable presumptions. See id. at 294 n.181 (“The examples in the text make inexplicable 
Professor David Strauss’s assertion that the alleged difference in kind rather than degree be-
tween rebuttable and conclusive presumptions ‘rings false’ and ‘proves false.’”) (quoting 
Strauss, supra note 38, at 192). 
411 Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 77, at 179. 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
2004] Constitutional Decision Rules 131 
proven that a child is under seven years of age, the courts have stated 
that it is conclusively presumed that he could not have committed a fel-
ony. In so doing, the courts are not stating a presumption at all, but 
simply expressing the rule of law that someone under seven years old 
cannot legally be convicted of a felony.412 
 Although this passage has a certain, if hard to articulate, intuitive 
force, it does not, on its face, support Grano’s assertion. For two reasons, 
it does not obviously establish that a “conclusive presumption” cannot be 
adopted for what I have called adjudicatory considerations—namely, er-
ror minimization. First, even assuming that this passage provides a good 
example of a “conclusive presumption,” that it is not a “presumption” 
properly so-called (as McCormick claims) does not establish (as Grano 
claims) that it is not an “evidentiary or adjudicatory device” because 
“presumptions” are either a subset of “evidentiary or adjudicatory de-
vices” or a cross-cutting category. Evidentiary or adjudicatory devices are 
not plausibly a subset of “presumptions.” Furthermore, if the (negative) 
claim that a conclusive presumption is not a presumption cannot establish 
that it is not an adjudicatory error-minimizing device, nor can the (af-
firmative) claim that a conclusive presumption is, instead, a “rule of law.” 
After all, a constitutional decision rule supported by adjudicatory consid-
erations likewise is a rule of law. Such a doctrine is a legal rule (not, say, a 
hortatory norm or a rule of etiquette) that tells judges how to reach con-
clusions on disputed matters. 
So we have reason at the outset to be suspicious of Grano’s argument. 
But not too suspicious, for it turns out that Grano’s conclusion does in 
fact reflect the orthodoxy of evidence scholarship. As one student horn-
book puts it: “‘Conclusive presumptions’ are not evidentiary devices. 
They are not evidence rules at all. They are new rules of substantive 
law.”413 On its face, this is a more helpful statement for Grano than is the 
 
412 Id. (quoting Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 402, § 342, at 966) (Grano’s 
emphasis removed). 
413 Roger C. Park et al., Evidence Law § 4.08, at 106 (1998); see also, e.g., Richard O. Lem-
pert et al., A Modern Approach to Evidence 1299 (3d ed. 2000) (“Most authorities now rec-
ognize that so-called conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary presumptions at all, but 
rather substantive laws making X, irrespective of Y, decisive of the parties’ rights and duties 
through the irrebutable fiction that X’s existence always establishes Y.”). This passage says 
much less than might first appear. The latter part of the sentence is undeniable, but also un-
denied. That conclusive presumptions make the basic fact decisive (for purposes of litigation) 
of the parties’ rights and duties through an irrebutable fiction that the basic fact always estab-
lishes the presumed fact is not, I think, a proposition that authorities could even debate. It is 
simply a definition of conclusive presumptions. The claim that conclusive presumptions are 
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one from McCormick. So Grano is right to think his pivotal claim—that 
conclusive presumptions are not adjudicatory devices—is supported by 
evidence scholars. The question to address, then, is whether the evidence 
scholars are right. 
Strictly read, the passage from McCormick does not support the 
proposition that conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary devices in 
the sense (the only sense that presently matters) of being designed to re-
duce adjudicatory error. Although it is orthodoxy in evidence scholarship 
that conclusive presumptions are not “true” presumptions,414 McCormick 
happens to choose a particularly inapt example to demonstrate it. 
McCormick defines presumption as “a standardized practice, under 
which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to 
their effect as proof of other facts.”415 By this standard definition, a con-
clusive presumption differs from a rebuttable presumption only in that 
the latter allows the party against whom the presumption lies to rebut the 
particular facts that are presumed, whereas the former does not. The is-
sue then becomes whether this difference warrants withholding the “pre-
sumption” label from its conclusive variant. An affirmative answer is 
equivalent to the claim that the necessary conditions for something being 
properly labeled a presumption are, in the first place, that it has the con-
ditional form of “if [basic fact] then [presumed fact]”; and, secondarily, 
that the linkage is rebuttable, not conclusive. 
But by that definition, the passage from McCormick upon which 
Grano stakes his claim still cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that a 
conclusive form of a presumption is not a true presumption because 
McCormick’s example does not contain a presumption that meets the 
first requirement of presumptions. Here is one common example of a 
presumption cited by McCormick: Proof that a person has disappeared 
from home and whose whereabouts have been unknown for a specified 
 
not evidentiary presumptions at all might look like a debatable claim, but this too the authors 
resolve by definitional fiat. See id. at 1297 (defining “true presumptions” as devices that “give 
the basic fact an influence beyond its normal probative value without having conclusive ef-
fect”) (emphasis added). 
414 See, e.g., Park et al., supra note 413, § 4.08, at 105; 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law § 2492, at 307 (James H. Chadbourne ed., rev. ed. 1981) (“In strictness there 
cannot be such a thing as a ‘conclusive presumption.’”). 
415 2 McCormick on Evidence § 342, at 433 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter, 
Strong, McCormick on Evidence]; see also, e.g., Park et al., supra note 413, § 4.08, at 102 (“A 
presumption is a rule providing that proof of a designated fact has a predetermined effect in 
establishing the existence of another fact. It thus expresses a legal relationship between cer-
tain facts (what we will call the ‘foundational’ or ‘basic’ facts) proved by a party and certain 
other facts (what we will call the ‘presumed facts’).”). 
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period of time (often seven years) raises a presumption under certain cir-
cumstances that she is dead.416 The foundational fact (“fact B” in 
McCormick’s terms) concerns the person’s absence; the presumed fact 
(“fact A”) is that she is dead. This presumed fact is legally material for a 
variety of purposes, such as administering the person’s estate or deter-
mining the eligibility of the person’s spouse to remarry. If the Miranda 
decision rule is construed as an adjudicatory device (by which I will mean 
constitutional doctrine justified as a means to reduce adjudicatory er-
rors), the foundational facts are that the statement sought to be admitted 
was made during custodial interrogation not proceeded by warnings; the 
presumed fact is that the statement was compelled. This presumed fact is 
legally material because the Miranda operative proposition takes the 
Fifth Amendment to bar admission of compelled statements. 
In McCormick’s example, the foundational facts are that a given child 
“is under seven years of age”; the presumed fact would be that she “could 
not have committed a felony.”417 But here’s the rub: This “presumed fact” 
does not mean that the child did not commit the acts in the world of 
which she stands accused—such as stealing the candy bar or pulling the 
trigger. It means, instead, that she “did not have criminal intent,” by 
which McCormick really means, I think, that she is not legally competent 
to have committed a felony.418 In contrast to the above examples, then, 
this is not a fact that is made legally relevant by other legal rules; it is just 
itself a statement of a legal rule: Children under seven cannot be con-
victed of felonies. To see this more clearly, imagine that we were to re-
move the presumptions in all three cases. In the first two examples, the 
presumed facts—that an absent person is dead, or that a given statement 
was compelled—would nonetheless remain facts that must be proven for 
certain legal consequences to obtain. But were the presumption removed 
from McCormick’s example, there would remain no (formerly presumed) 
fact left to prove. Absent McCormick’s presumption, that is, it is not the 
case that the child’s attorney would have to resort to other means to 
prove that the child “could not have committed the felony.” In short, 
 
416 Strong, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 415, § 343 at 441. For another example, see 
id. § 344, at 444 (stating that if “plaintiff proves that a letter was mailed, that it was properly 
addressed, and that it was never returned,” then “[s]uch evidence is generally held to raise a 
presumption that the addressee received the letter”). 
417 Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 402, at 966. 
418 But see infra note 422. 
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“fact A” in McCormick’s example is not a “fact” in the relevant sense, 
but only a statement of the legal consequence of “fact B.”419 
The illustration, therefore, does not demonstrate that a conclusive (or 
irrebuttable) form of what McCormick calls a presumption is not “really” 
a presumption by virtue of its conclusiveness; it shows only that some 
things that people—including judges—call a conclusive presumption do 
not have even the minimum required attributes of what is properly called 
a presumption, conclusive or otherwise.420 All this is true, but it has no 
bearing on the debate over Miranda. Whatever else might be said of con-
ceptualizing Miranda to set forth a conclusive presumption as a form of 
decision rule, there is no question that it satisfies the fundamental re-
quirement for presumptions, properly so-called: It provides that “certain 
facts [(custodial interrogation without warnings)] are held to call for uni-
form treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts [(com-
pulsion)].”421 
This all might seem something of a quibble because McCormick’s ex-
ample could be reformulated so as to satisfy the initial condition of pre-
sumptions. This is done in the margin.422 But this fact does not moot my 
objection. It illustrates that when we confront examples employed to 
pump our intuitions that a given “presumption” is not really an adjudica-
tory device or is otherwise somehow illegitimate, we must guard against 
the fallacy of equivocation: The “presumption” that is thereby con-
demned might be a very different sort of thing than the “presumption” 
that is at issue in the debate over “conclusive presumptions.” 
 
419 See 1 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1, at 4 (Peter Tillers ed., 
rev. ed. 1983). 
420 Indeed, hornbooks and treatises on evidence routinely criticize courts for referring to 
burdens of proof and permissive inferences as “presumptions.” See, e.g., 2 Strong, McCor-
mick on Evidence, supra note 415, § 342, at 433–37. 
421 Id. at 433. 
422 Suppose the law were that a person cannot be convicted of a felony if he is unaware of 
the moral character of his actions (which may be a principle undergirding the criminal law but 
is not itself a rule of positive law), and suppose further that a child under seven were conclu-
sively presumed not to be aware of the moral character of his actions. This legal rule would 
satisfy the threshold requirement for presumptions because it would now mediate (as it did 
not in the initial example) between basic facts (that the child is under age seven) and the le-
gally material facts that are to be presumed (that the agent is unaware of the moral character 
of his acts). Therefore, if this presumption were, by virtue of its conclusiveness, not an adjudi-
catory device, but rather a substantive rule, perhaps Grano’s condemnation of Miranda would 
stand. But the entire thrust of this Section is to demonstrate that the precedent is false: A pre-
sumption of this sort could serve to minimize adjudicatory error. 
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This warning is important to keep in mind because, as it happens, 
every single example that Grano advances in support of his contention 
that conclusive presumptions are not adjudicatory devices suffers from 
just this defect. Responding to Strauss’s charge that the distinction be-
tween rebuttable and conclusive presumptions “proves false” because 
there is no practical difference between a barely rebuttable presumption 
and a conclusive one,423 Grano turned to Faretta v. California424 to illus-
trate the difference. “In Faretta,” Grano explained, 
the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment confers both the 
right to have the assistance of counsel and the opposite right to proceed 
pro se. Nevertheless, in effect creating a rebuttable presumption against 
waiver of counsel, the Court emphasized that demanding waiver criteria 
must be satisfied before the right of self-representation is triggered. 
Had the Faretta Court gone further, however, and adopted a conclusive 
presumption that an unrepresented defendant has not made a valid 
waiver, its presumption would have been the equivalent of a rule of law 
that waiver of counsel, and thus self-representation, is neither protected 
constitutionally nor permitted. Unlike a rebuttable presumption against 
waiver, a conclusive presumption against waiver could not have coex-
isted with a right of self-representation. Conclusive presumptions are 
substantive rules of law, not adjudicatory devices.425 
Grano is right that “a conclusive presumption that an unrepresented de-
fendant has not made a valid waiver . . . would have been the equivalent 
of a rule of law that . . . self-representation, is neither protected constitu-
tionally nor permitted.”426 But this cannot support the conclusion that the 
conclusive presumption at issue in Miranda is a substantive rule of law, 
not an adjudicatory device, because the presumptions involved are en-
tirely different. Recall the definition of presumption quoted above: “A 
presumption is a rule providing that proof of a designated fact has a pre-
determined effect in establishing the existence of another fact.” Neither 
the actual Faretta decision nor Grano’s hypothetical variant, however, in-
volves a presumption in this sense; there is no foundational fact, and no 
presumed fact. What Grano terms Faretta’s “rebuttable presumption 
against waiver of counsel” is more properly understood as a rule estab-
 
423 Strauss, supra note 38, at 192. 
424 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
425 Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 77, at 187. 
426 Id. 
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lishing a heavy burden of proof on the defendant who seeks to represent 
himself to establish that he knows the consequences of his waiver and 
acts (in some normatively loaded sense) “voluntarily.” A heavy burden of 
proof is not the same as a rebuttable presumption. Just as hornbook law 
advises that conclusive presumptions are not true presumptions, so too 
does it insist that neither are “[a]ssignments of the burdens of proof prior 
to trial.”427 Consequently, the Faretta example simply does not speak to 
the question Miranda raises—namely, whether a rule providing that 
proof of a designated fact has a conclusive effect in establishing the exis-
tence of another fact is (whether called “presumption” or not) an adjudi-
catory device in the sense that, if sensibly chosen, it serves to minimize 
error in the adjudication of the presumed fact. 
Perhaps having an inkling that his other examples did not work, Grano 
has offered, as a “final example” of the supposedly critical difference be-
tween rebuttable and conclusive presumptions, 
a statute that adopts negligence rather than strict liability as the tort 
standard for a particular activity. Perhaps because of a belief that acci-
dents do not normally occur unless the operator of the activity is negli-
gent, a court might adopt a (rebuttable) presumption of negligence trig-
gered by the mere occurrence of an accident. (If X, an accident, occurs, 
Y, the operator’s negligence, will be presumed barring proof to the con-
trary.) While such a presumption might be unwise and empirically un-
sound, and while it would impose on the operator the burden of dis-
proving negligence, it would remain consistent, in letter if not in spirit, 
with the statutory standard of negligence. The same could not be said 
about a conclusive presumption of negligence triggered by the mere oc-
currence of an accident. Under such a rule, liability would exist regard-
less of what the operator could prove, were such proof permitted, about 
lack of negligence. That is, Y, the operator’s negligence, would now be 
legally immaterial. Such a “presumption” would really constitute a sub-
stantive rule of strict liability and, as such, it would represent a rejection 
of the statutory standard.428 
At first glance, this example appears to rectify the error of the Faretta ex-
ample, for the putative presumption now explicitly mediates between a 
foundational fact (the accident) and the presumed fact (the operator’s 
negligence). On second glance, however, the seeming difference evapo-
 
427 2 Strong, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 415, § 342, at 436. 
428 Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 197. 
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rates. Because the foundational fact is necessarily present in every case in 
which the presumed fact is at issue—adjudication of negligence presup-
poses an accident—the rebuttable presumption predicated on proof of 
the foundational fact is, again, not a presumption at all (in the evidence 
scholars’ stipulative sense). Rather, it is merely a somewhat convoluted 
way to (as Grano rightly put it) “impose on the operator the burden of 
disproving negligence.” This is therefore merely the Faretta example in 
different clothing. So while the example might justify the conclusion that 
a rule requiring courts to find a statement given during custodial interro-
gation compelled if the defendant is a human being “would really consti-
tute a substantive rule” that courts must find all statements given during 
custodial interrogation compelled, it does not speak to the actual pre-
sumption at work in Miranda.429 
My purpose in all this is not to reprove Professor Grano. After all, 
“[t]he word ‘presumption’ has perhaps suffered from more misuse and 
inconsistent use than any other evidentiary term.”430 The point, rather, is 
that the conclusive presumption at work in Miranda has a precise struc-
 
429 The negligence example would have a true rebuttable presumption were the rule, say, 
that negligence is presumed if the operator was using a cell phone at the time of the accident. 
Parity with Miranda would then be achieved by asking whether making this rebuttable pre-
sumption conclusive would be inconsistent with its being an adjudicatory rule. Notice how this 
differs from Grano’s original hypothetical. As we have seen, that hypo does not implicate a 
true presumption because it does not mediate between a contingent basic fact and the pre-
sumed fact. However, there is another reason it is so effective at pumping an intuition that the 
conclusive presumption is inappropriate. Not only is the putative judicially created adjudica-
tory device functionally equivalent to a substantive rule of law different from the one the leg-
islature enacted, but that functionally equivalent rule is one that we may assume the legisla-
ture considered and specifically rejected. Perhaps something still could be said in the court’s 
defense: Maybe the legislature had what proved to be a naïve faith in the ease with which ex 
post judgments of negligence could be made. But this is a weak argument. Presumably legisla-
tors were aware that negligence assessments might prove to be harder than they assumed. The 
fact that they nonetheless adopted a rule instead of leaving it for judicial law-making in a 
common law style suggests that they were willing to take that risk. Besides, the wisdom of one 
rule versus the other depends not only upon the relative frequency of Type I and Type II er-
rors but also upon an evaluation of their relative social costs. It is the combination of these 
circumstances that renders the hypothesized judge-made conclusive presumption such chutz-
pah. The propriety of a judge-made rule that negligence shall be conclusively presumed from 
cell phone usage at the time of the accident might well turn upon whether the legislature con-
sidered making cell phone usage negligence per se and judgments about the ease with which 
the legislature could do so if it wanted. Obviously, considerations like this tend to make the 
case for the Miranda Court’s resort to a conclusive presumption look stronger. 
430 Park et al., supra note 413, § 4.07, at 102; see also, e.g., 2 Strong, McCormick on Evidence, 
supra note 415, § 342, at 433 (describing presumption as “the slipperiest member of the family 
of legal terms”); Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 
Mich. L. Rev. 195, 196–207 (1953). 
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ture not shared by many of the other imaginable evidentiary devices that 
tend—much too loosely—also to be called conclusive presumptions. 
Without much more argument than Grano supplies, the fact (if true) that 
they are not truly adjudicatory devices cannot be relied upon to demon-
strate that the Miranda doctrine is not either. 
So let us turn away from intuition-pumping examples and toward ar-
guments. What reasons can be given for the proposition that a conclusive 
presumption is not an adjudicatory device? Put another way, what could 
the evidence scholars say in response to the tentative conclusion reached 
in the previous subsection? Unfortunately, the evidence scholarship in-
sisting that this is true is notably reticent in explaining the assertion. 
The obvious reason is that administering any given rule by means of a 
conclusive presumption is identical in effect to amending the rule itself 
and administering it without a presumption at all. Take a “substantive 
rule of law” (R) of the form “if y then z” served by a conclusive presump-
tion (CP) of the form “if x then conclude y.” The presumption could al-
ways be mooted by recasting the legal rule to turn on fact x instead of, or 
in addition to, fact y. That is, R could become R1: “If x or y, then z.” This 
is plainly true. But so what? Why should this truth convert what we origi-
nally wrote as an adjudicatory device—“determine that the defendant 
does not know the moral character of her actions if she was under 
seven”—into a substantive rule? This is not so obvious. After all, if (R + 
CP) is functionally equivalent to R1, the equivalence necessarily works in 
both directions. Why could we not, with equal logic, conclude that every 
substantive rule of law is “really” a different substantive rule adminis-
tered via a conclusive presumption? More precisely, why must the trans-
formation always work in the former direction, never the latter? Why is it 
not enough to observe that (R + CP) and R1 are identical, without assert-
ing too that the latter is more real than the former?431 
Wigmore provides an answer. After distinguishing between two types 
of adjudicatory devices based on the purposes they are designed to 
serve—rules of auxiliary probative policy and rules of extrinsic policy—
Wigmore explained that conclusive presumptions always fell in the latter 
category. Conclusive presumptions serve to exclude evidence of certain 
kinds of facts “because its admission would injure some other cause more 
than it would help the cause of truth and because the avoidance of that 
injury is considered of more consequence than the possible harm to the 
 
431 For a more fully developed argument along similar lines, see John M. Phillips, Note, Irre-
buttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 449 (1975). 
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cause of truth.”432 And the Supreme Court deemed this view “obviously 
correct” seventy years ago.433 
It is not obviously correct. Notice how Roger Park explains his asser-
tion that conclusive presumptions are rules of substantive law: “In virtu-
ally every case, they exist because of a policy-based determination that 
the existence of certain facts should establish a factual issue and that so-
ciety would not be served by permitting contrary evidence.”434 That this is 
true in some cases can hardly be doubted. Take, following Park, the rule 
that “the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent 
or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.”435 Very 
likely, such a presumption is adopted for policy reasons, particularly that 
disputes over paternity would be harmful to the child. And yet, by ob-
serving, with greater care than did either Wigmore or the Court, that this 
is true in “virtually every case,” Park has given the game away. Whether 
“virtually every case” is accurate or an overstatement is beside the point. 
The point, rather, is that, by negative implication Park concedes that it is 
not true in every case. So the question becomes why a conclusive pre-
sumption is not an evidentiary device in those other cases. Moreover, ab-
solutely no reason has been given why it is not an adjudicatory rule when 
it exists—as arguably it does in Miranda—for the primary purpose of 
minimizing total adjudicatory errors. 
In sum, there appears no remotely persuasive argument to support 
Park’s implicit assertion that even the exceptional conclusive presump-
tion adopted for the purpose merely of accommodating epistemic doubt, 
and not to achieve other policy goals, is not an evidentiary device but 
rather a rule of substantive law. It turns out, ironically, that the standard 
assertion that a conclusive presumption is not a true evidentiary device is 
itself just a conclusive presumption—namely, that all conclusive pre-
sumptions should be conclusively presumed to be adopted for policy rea-
sons, hence to be substantive rules of law. There may be good policy rea-
sons to adopt this presumption, but as statement of existential fact it is 
 
432 1 Wigmore, supra note 419, § 11, at 689. 
433 United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272, 285 (1934). Interestingly, the Court 
had previously explained that “all presumptions as to matters of fact, capable of ocular or tan-
gible proof, such as the execution of a deed, are in their nature disputable. No conclusive 
character attaches to them. They may always be rebutted and overthrown.” Lincoln v. French, 
105 U.S. 614, 617 (1881) (emphasis added). The negative implication seems to be that pre-
sumptions as to matters of fact that are not capable of such proof—matters that are not of 
brute fact—might support a conclusive presumption. 
434 Park et al., supra note 413, § 4.08, at 106. 
435 Id. at 105 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
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false. Put simply: Rules that take the form of a conclusive presumption can 
rest on the “adjudicatory” or “evidentiary” consideration of reducing ad-
judicatory errors. Wigmore’s assertion to the contrary is wrong. 
3. The Argument from Constitutional Legitimacy 
Although Grano relies on evidence scholarship for what appears to be 
a conceptual claim—that conclusive presumptions just cannot serve to 
minimize adjudicatory error—it is possible that his intended point is 
more provincial—namely that, even if a given conclusive presumption 
can actually minimize adjudicatory error relative to any plausible alterna-
tive, a decision rule that employs a conclusive presumption is nonetheless 
an illegitimate exercise of federal judicial power. In other words, consti-
tutional decision rules that contain conclusive presumptions are illegiti-
mate because, “[r]egardless of how they are explained, conclusive pre-
sumptions pertaining to constitutional violations have the effect of 
amending the Constitution, a task not assigned to the judiciary.”436 
The language of “effects” is important. Compare this possible objec-
tion to Congress’s power to enforce the substantive provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: Federal legislation predicated on Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits more conduct than do the 
Amendment’s substantive provisions is illegitimate because, “regardless 
of how they are explained, prophylactic rules have the effect of interpret-
ing the Constitution, a task not assigned to Congress.” Yet as a long line 
of Supreme Court decisions culminating in City of Boerne v. Flores437 
makes clear, this claim would be false. Because bona fide prophylactic 
legislation is perfectly valid despite having the same effect as invalid sub-
stantive legislation, the critical task is to distinguish the legislation on 
grounds other than effect. So too for conclusive presumptions crafted by 
the federal judiciary as constitutional decision rules: pace Grano, “how 
they are [correctly] explained” is precisely what determines whether they 
are legitimate. 
Admittedly, we cannot always be certain how a given doctrine is cor-
rectly explained. A court might invoke adjudicatory considerations in de-
fense of a given decision rule that takes the form of a conclusive pre-
 
436 Grano, supra note 70, at 154; see also Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 198 (“To ex-
plain, applaud, or defend Miranda in terms of a conclusive presumption rationale . . . is to as-
sert for the Supreme Court the power of constitutional amendment. There is no other way to 
describe it.”). 
437 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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sumption when it was actually influenced by doctrine-making considera-
tions whose legitimacy is less secure, including substantive ones. That is, 
conclusive presumptions are dangerous because they may enable courts 
to engage in illegitimate forms of doctrine-making under the guise of pur-
suing adjudicatory ends.438 What follows? Should constitutional scholars 
seek to promulgate a norm that would forbid the judiciary from realizing 
adjudicatory considerations in the form of a conclusive presumption? 
Should the judiciary itself adopt such a “prophylactic rule”? If so, on 
what authority? May the Court conclusively presume that any doctrine 
which employs a conclusive presumption is not designed to minimize ad-
judicatory error? Would application of such a conclusive presumption 
minimize adjudicatory error? This line of attack seems too rife with para-
dox to provide a promising route for Miranda’s detractors. 
D. Miranda’s Progeny 
The distinction between judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and 
constitutional decision rules has shown some of its worth by contributing 
new insights and arguments to long-standing debates over Miranda’s le-
gitimacy. The Dickerson majority (or some members thereof) could have 
replied to Justice Scalia’s dissent as follows: (1) the Miranda warnings re-
quirement was part of a constitutional decision rule designed to minimize 
errors in adjudicating whether out-of-court statements had been com-
pelled within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause (as Miranda 
interpreted that particular constitutional provision); (2) constitutional 
decision rules are ineliminable, hence cannot be categorically illegitimate; 
(3) while the extent of the Court’s constitutional authority to craft deci-
sion rules may be reasonably debated, the creation of decision rules to 
minimize adjudicatory error has the strongest claim to legitimacy; (4) 
such a device is not a “prophylactic” rule in the Grano-Scalia sense be-
cause it does not overenforce constitutional meaning as measured against 
the appropriate baseline; rather, it was adopted to optimally enforce con-
stitutional meaning; (5) use of a conclusive presumption is common to 
constitutional decision rules (including the decision rule adopted by Jus-
tice Scalia himself in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission), and is not 
incompatible with an interest in reducing adjudicatory error. None of 
this, it should hardly bear mentioning, is to extol Miranda. Like any other 
judicial product, it might have been wise or foolish. But, on the reading 
 
438 See Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 188, 194. 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
142 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1 
thus far developed, it is not susceptible to the charge of judicial usurpa-
tion.439 
There is more. I hypothesized earlier that attention to the distinction 
between judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and constitutional de-
cision rules might also assist the project of doctrinal development. This 
Section pursues that idea by briefly examining what rooting the Miranda 
doctrine’s legitimacy in adjudicatory considerations implies for some of 
Miranda’s progeny.440 
1. Retroactivity 
Early questions concerned Miranda’s retroactive application. In John-
son v. New Jersey, the Court held that Miranda governed the admissibil-
ity of statements obtained prior to its announcement, but not if the trial 
had already commenced.441 Yale Kamisar, among the most stalwart of 
Miranda’s defenders, has concluded that “[t]he Court probably should 
have held that Miranda affected only those confessions obtained after the 
date of the decision.”442 This would be right if the purpose of the Miranda 
doctrine were to deter “police overreaching.” But if Miranda is best ex-
plained as a decision rule resting on adjudicatory considerations—and 
surely if such a description is deemed necessary to its legitimacy—then 
unwarned custodial statements should be presumed compelled no matter 
 
439 This is a response to the familiar contention (of which Justice Scalia’s Dickerson dissent is 
just one example) that Miranda was an illegitimate exercise of judicial power. However, this 
response does not fully resolve the issue presented in Dickerson because, even granting 
Miranda’s legitimacy, it remained to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 constituted a per-
missible exercise of Congress’s authority to displace a judge-crafted decision rule. Of course, 
that question cannot be fully answered without articulating and defending a theory of the cir-
cumstances in which the judiciary should defer to decision rules put forth by Congress, tasks 
that this Article does not even attempt. See supra Section IV.A.2.c. 
 With that caveat, I admit to skepticism that Congress is better positioned than is the Su-
preme Court to determine what decision rule would minimize adjudicatory errors. Largely for 
this reason, I am strongly disposed to believe that had the Dickerson majority defended 
Miranda’s legitimacy in the way I have described, refusal to give effect to § 3501 would have 
been proper. I am under no illusion, however, that these brief remarks are adequate to re-
solve the question. Furthermore, even assuming that the Court was correct to refuse to give 
effect to § 3501, that does not mean that Congress could not try again to craft an alternative 
decision rule to replace the one announced in Miranda, or that—depending upon the particu-
lar rule proposed—the Court ought not acquiesce. 
440 For an extensive discussion of the qualifications and exceptions to Miranda, see Alfredo 
Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 461 
(1998). This Section discusses only a few. 
441 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966). 
442 Kamisar, supra note 58, at 937 n.278. 
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when the custodial interrogation occurred. Indeed, because the pivotal 
event for Miranda’s purposes is the admission of statements into evi-
dence at trial and not their elicitation prior to trial, to apply Miranda to a 
trial that commenced after it is not, properly understood, a “retroactive” 
application even if the custodial interrogation had preceded Miranda. 
2. Impeachment 
Whether unwarned statements may be admitted against a criminal de-
fendant for impeachment purposes should depend, in the first instance, 
upon the scope not of the decision rule, but of the operative proposition. 
The straightforward question is whether introduction of a compelled 
statement for impeachment purposes violates the constitutional guaran-
tee that no person be compelled “to incriminate himself.” The correct an-
swer is not self-evident. But some language in Miranda suggested that the 
answer was yes.443 In any event, thirteen years after Miranda the Court 
made this answer explicit.444 If courts minimize adjudicatory errors by 
presuming unwarned statements to have been compelled within the 
meaning of the operative proposition of Fifth Amendment doctrine, the 
error-reduction justifications for the Miranda decision rule would seem to 
apply in the impeachment context too. Harris v. New York,445 which held 
that unwarned statements could be admitted for impeachment, seems 
wrong.446 
3. Fruits 
Are the evidentiary fruits of an un-Mirandized custodial interrogation 
admissible? The Court has strongly indicated that they are. In Michigan 
v. Tucker, the Court held admissible statements by a witness discovered 
as a result of an interrogation during which police had failed to advise the 
 
443 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 (“[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defen-
dant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the state-
ment given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are 
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warn-
ings and effective waiver required for any other statement.”). 
444 New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459–60 (1979) (prohibiting impeachment by immu-
nized grand jury testimony). The Court had held the previous year that a suspect’s statements 
made involuntarily for due process purposes were not admissible for impeachment. Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398–402 (1978). As I have emphasized, those are distinct inquiries. 
445 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971). 
446 For similar criticism, see Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: 
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 
Yale L.J. 1198 (1971). 
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suspect of his right to free counsel.447 In Oregon v. Elstad the Court held 
that evidence of a suspect’s voluntary statement made after complete is-
suance of the Miranda warnings was not rendered inadmissible just be-
cause the suspect had made an initial inculpatory custodial statement that 
had not been preceded by the warnings.448 The full significance of these 
decisions was doubtful: Tucker had engaged in a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis that emphasized, among other things, that the cus-
todial interrogation preceded the Miranda decision,449 and Elstad had 
questioned whether the second statement was in fact a consequential 
“fruit” of the first failure to issue warnings.450 But lower federal courts 
have routinely read these decisions as standing for the general proposi-
tion that fruits of a custodial statement not preceded by Miranda warn-
ings were admissible even though the statement itself would not be.451 
The Court’s analyses in these cases are far from satisfactory.452 Yet in-
sofar as the Miranda decision rule rests on adjudicatory considerations, 
 
447 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974). 
448 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985). 
449 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 (“We consider it significant to our decision in this case that 
the officers’ failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel occurred prior to 
the decision in Miranda. Although we have been urged to resolve the broad question of 
whether evidence derived from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be 
excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place, we instead place our holding on a 
narrower ground.”) (citation omitted). 
450 See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310–14 (rejecting argument that “the psychological impact” 
of having made an initial inculpatory statement compromises the voluntariness of a subse-
quent inculpatory statement on a “cat-out-of-the-bag” theory); id. at 347 n.29 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Notwithstanding the sweep of the Court’s language, today’s opinion surely 
ought not be read as also foreclosing application of the traditional derivative-evidence pre-
sumption to physical evidence obtained as a proximate result of a Miranda violation.”). 
451 See 3 LaFave et al., supra note 115, § 9.5(b), at 388 & n.37. 
452 This is largely due, I think, to the Court’s failure adequately to distinguish the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule from the Miranda doctrine. Writing for the Court in Tucker, 
then-Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the exclusionary rule serves a deterrent purpose: “to 
compel respect for the [Fourth Amendment] guaranty in the only effectively available way—
by removing the incentive to disregard it.” 417 U.S. at 446 (internal quotations omitted). Ob-
serving that “[i]n a proper case this rationale would seem applicable to the Fifth Amendment 
context as well,” he explained that “[b]y refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of [will-
ful or negligent] conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or 
in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.” Id. at 
447. This deterrent purpose would not be well-served, though, by excluding statements ob-
tained prior to the Miranda decision. Furthermore, then-Justice Rehnquist continued: “When 
involuntary statements or the right against compulsory self-incrimination are involved, a sec-
ond justification for the exclusionary rule has been asserted: protection of the courts from re-
liance on untrustworthy evidence.” Id. at 448. But the Court found that this consideration did 
not justify suppressing the statements at issue either. 
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the general proposition for which Tucker and Elstad now stand—namely, 
that Miranda does not itself bar admission of the fruits of an un-
Mirandized confession—is probably correct, and certainly defensible. 
The core premise, of course, is that the police violate no aspect of consti-
tutional doctrine by failing to issue the Miranda warnings. This is true 
whether the failure be inadvertent or willful. The cost is that any state-
ment elicited will be inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief in a subse-
quent criminal trial of the suspect being interrogated. But the Self-
Incrimination Clause has been construed not to protect a criminal defen-
dant from being compelled to surrender nontestimonial evidence against 
himself,453 much less does it protect the accused from the testimonial evi-
dence of others. In short, then, admission into evidence of anything other 
than the defendant’s own statements does not violate the Self-
Incrimination Clause, nothing in Miranda being to the contrary. And the 
mere fact that a custodial interrogation proceeded without warnings vio-
lates no other rule from Miranda, so there is no poisonous tree, hence no 
poisonous fruit.454 
 
 Writing for the Elstad Court eleven years later, Justice O’Connor announced (claiming to 
rely on Tucker, among other cases) that “a procedural Miranda violation differs in significant 
respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment, which have traditionally mandated a 
broad application of the ‘fruits’ doctrine.” 470 U.S. at 306. And yet she proceeded to agree 
with Tucker “that neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth 
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence would be served by suppression” of the 
putative fruits before it. Id. at 308. However, a true appreciation of the differences between 
the judge-made Miranda prophylactic doctrine and the judge-made Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary doctrine should have driven the Court to recognize that the Tucker analysis was 
both mistaken and incomplete. It was mistaken because the former is simply not designed, as 
is the latter, to deter bad conduct by the police. It was incomplete because the Court assumed 
that the only other reason for the Fifth Amendment exclusion of “compelled” testimony was 
to guard against untrustworthy evidence. Although historians debate whether this was the 
sole or predominant original rationale for the Self-Incrimination Clause, Miranda had de-
scribed the “one overriding thought” underlying the Clause as “the respect a government—
state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.” 384 U.S. at 460. 
Analysis of the admissibility of evidence derived from an unwarned custodial statement could 
not be adequate without considering how the Miranda doctrine was designed to serve that 
value. 
453 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). 
454 Justice O’Connor cogently advanced this basic argument in her separate opinion in New 
York v. Quarles. See 467 U.S. 649, 665–72 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). It is developed at length in Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth 
Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857 (1995). In 
reply, Yale Kamisar has argued that this position is inconsistent with settled case law which 
holds that the Self-Incrimination Clause requires that witnesses compelled to testify in non-
criminal proceedings on pain of contempt be granted not just use immunity but derivative use 
immunity as well. See Yale Kamisar, Response: On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Co-
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I anticipate at least two objections. First, allowing the admission of 
fruits reduces police officers’ incentives to issue the Miranda warnings.455 
That may be true. The short response, though, is that the Miranda deci-
sion rule is best conceived as an effort to minimize adjudicatory error in 
the determination of whether an out-of-court statement by the accused 
was compelled. So long as this objective is met, how police officers treat 
suspects is a matter of indifference to Self-Incrimination Clause doc-
trine—even post-Miranda. This is not to say, of course, that how police 
officers treat suspects is a matter of indifference to constitutional doc-
trine as a whole. The Due Process Clauses, for instance, have been inter-
preted to prohibit the police from engaging in certain egregious interro-
gation practices. But whether police conduct has violated due process is a 
question separate from whether they have issued the Miranda warnings. 
The second argument against the admissibility of fruits of unwarned 
custodial interrogations, accordingly, challenges that this should be so. 
Interrogation practices that “overbear” a suspect’s will so as to elicit “in-
voluntary” statements violate substantive due process. The in-court ad-
mission of such statements against the accused violates procedural due 
process. Admission of the fruits of such an interrogation should therefore 
likewise be unconstitutional—on the theory either that procedural due 
process itself proscribes the admission of fruits obtained in certain ways, 
or that exclusion of such fruits by means of a constitutional remedial rule 
is proper to deter substantive due process violations by the police. How-
ever, the argument continues, it is hard to determine on a case-by-case 
basis whether any unwarned statement which has borne fruit was actually 
“involuntary.” Therefore the very same reasoning that alone could justify 
recourse to a conclusive presumption in Miranda justifies recourse to the 
identical decision rule for purposes of vindicating a suspect’s due process 
 
erced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 929 (1995). I think Professor 
Kamisar is right, which compels me to conclude that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not 
demand the derivative-use rule. At the same time, I think it plausible that the derivative-use 
rule could be derived from the Due Process Clause, and that such a conclusion need not entail 
that the Due Process Clause requires suppression of the fruits of a custodial statement that is 
“compelled” (within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause) but not “involuntary” or 
“coerced” (within the meaning of the Due Process Clause itself). However this is a digression 
not worth pursuing here. 
455 For this argument, see especially Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. 
Rev. 109 (1998) (documenting widespread police practices of questioning “outside Miranda” 
and arguing that the practice is antithetical to the language and purposes of Miranda); David 
Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 805 
(1992); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 145, at 71 n.29 (asserting that “[t]here is simply no way 
to interpret Miranda as a decision permitting such questioning”). 
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rights: Courts should conclusively presume that an unwarned custodial 
statement was involuntary for due process purposes, rendering any fruits 
of such a statement consequently inadmissible. 
The defect in this argument is simply that, as we have seen, due process 
“involuntariness” is a different, and less capacious, concept than self-
incrimination “compulsion.”456 So even assuming arguendo that the 
Miranda decision rule (conclusively presume that an unwarned custodial 
statement was compelled) can serve to minimize adjudicatory errors 
when administering the operative proposition of Self-Incrimination 
Clause doctrine, it need not follow that the same decision rule, mutatis 
mutandis (conclusively presume that an unwarned custodial statement 
was involuntary), would minimize adjudicatory errors for purposes of 
administering the Due Process Clause. In sum, we can agree that fruits of 
a custodial due process violation should be excluded without concluding 
that the case-by-case approach to adjudicating claimed violations of due 
process fails to minimize the adjudicatory error rate. Of course, if the 
Court fails to recognize the difference between “compulsion” for pur-
poses of the Self-Incrimination Clause and due process “voluntariness,”457 
then the proposition that fruits of unwarned custodial statements may be 
admissible becomes much harder to reconcile with Miranda. 
Notice that I have just defended what I have called the “general 
proposition” for which Tucker and Elstad are thought to stand—that 
Miranda does not bar the admission of the fruits of a statement that the 
Miranda conclusive presumption renders inadmissible. That defense is 
enough to justify the narrow holding of Tucker.458 It is not enough, how-
ever, to justify the result in Elstad. For even assuming that the Elstad 
Court was correct not to exclude a subsequent confession on the theory 
that it is the fruit of an un-warned, hence inadmissible, prior confession, a 
separate question is whether the subsequent confession should be barred 
on the ground that it was itself “compelled” within the meaning of the 
 
456 See supra Section V.A.1. 
457 It is therefore not surprising that the conflation of compulsion and involuntariness in 
Tucker and Elstad was specifically objected to by astute contemporary critics. See, e.g., 
Kamisar, supra note 69, at 153; Ritchie, supra note 69, at 430–31. 
458 To put the point in terms raised by a case that the Supreme Court is likely to decide by 
the time this Article leaves the printer, United States v. Patane, cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1788 
(2003) (mem.) (No. 02-1183), there is no good reason to believe that Dickerson undermines 
Tucker. 
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Self-Incrimination Clause.459 Instead of answering that the initial failure 
to issue warnings necessarily rendered the subsequent statement inadmis-
sible (or, for that matter, that the belated issuance of warnings necessarily 
rendered the subsequent statement admissible), the Court held that the 
trial court must engage in an all-things-considered assessment of whether 
the subsequent statement was voluntary. 
To reiterate a theme I have been hammering at, this last point was ei-
ther wrong or, at best, imprecise, insofar as it conflates Fifth Amendment 
compulsion with due process involuntariness. The Court should have said 
that the existence of a prior unwarned statement (i.e., a statement that is 
conclusively presumed to have been compelled) does not justify a conclu-
sive presumption that the subsequent, warned, statement was also com-
pelled but, rather, that whether the second statement was compelled, 
hence inadmissible, should be assessed by the default more-likely-than-
not decision rule. 
If modified in this way, the Elstad holding seems consistent, if barely, 
with the reading of Miranda I have put forth.460 If Miranda is justified as a 
way to minimize adjudicatory error, the critical question must be 
whether, when trying to determine whether a warned statement made 
subsequent to an unwarned one is compelled, presuming compulsion in 
such cases will enable courts to minimize adjudicatory errors in the ag-
 
459 As the Court aptly noted, this question implicates a different metaphor: not whether a 
subsequent statement is a “tainted fruit of a poisonous tree” but whether it can be deemed 
sufficiently free once the “cat is out of the bag.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303–04. 
460 The holding would be consistent. Not consistent is Justice O’Connor’s repeated refer-
ences to statements made during custodial interrogations that, albeit unwarned, were volun-
tary. See, e.g., id. at 303 (observing that “the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but un-
warned admission from the defendant”); id. at 307 (“Failure to administer Miranda warnings 
creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise 
voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from 
evidence under Miranda.”); id. at 318 (concluding that “there is no warrant for presuming co-
ercive effect where the suspect’s initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation 
of Miranda, was voluntary”). If, as Justice O’Connor suggests, compulsion, coercion, and in-
voluntariness are all synonyms, then to believe that courts can identify with acceptable accu-
racy those unwarned statements that are voluntary flies in the face of the theory that both ex-
plains, and can justify, the Miranda decision rule. Justice O’Connor rightly observes that 
“[w]hen police ask questions of a suspect in custody without administering the required warn-
ings, Miranda dictates that the answers received be presumed compelled.” Id. at 317; see also 
id. at 307 n.1 (“A Miranda violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-
line legal presumption of coercion . . . .”). But for her to then cavalierly describe statements 
as, albeit unwarned, neither compelled nor coerced, marks a signal failure to appreciate why 
Miranda created the presumption it did. 
BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC 4/7/04 10:46 AM 
2004] Constitutional Decision Rules 149 
gregate. This is an empirical question, one that Miranda itself simply can-
not answer. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Elstad majority, thought not, seem-
ing to repose faith in trial courts’ abilities to assess the “psychological im-
pact” of the earlier statement case by case.461 Justice Brennan, in dissent, 
derided the majority’s “marble-palace psychoanalysis”462 and purported 
to rely more heavily on “the realities of police interrogation and the eve-
ryday experience of lower courts.”463 Quoting heavily from standard in-
terrogation manuals, Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) ob-
served that “interrogators describe the point of the first admission as the 
‘breakthrough’ and the ‘beachhead’ which once obtained will give them 
enormous ‘tactical advantages.’”464 This being so, Justice Brennan thought 
that courts would more accurately assess whether a given custodial 
statement was compelled by presuming that it was if it followed a custo-
dial admission not preceded by warnings. In Justice Brennan’s eyes, how-
ever, this presumption, unlike the one announced in Miranda, should not 
be conclusive. “The correct approach,” he concluded, “is to presume that 
an admission or confession obtained in violation of Miranda taints a sub-
sequent confession unless the prosecution can show that the taint is so at-
tenuated as to justify admission of the subsequent confession.”465 As an a 
priori matter, all of these decision rules—the majority’s endorsement of 
an all-things-considered, more-likely-than-not rule, the dissent’s prefer-
ence for a weighty but rebuttable presumption,466 and even a Miranda-
inspired conclusive presumption—strike me as potentially defensible. 
Perhaps significantly, though, even the Elstad majority assumed that 
the cops’ initial failure to read the suspect his Miranda warnings was an 
“oversight.”467 A case presently before the Court, Missouri v. Seibert,468 
 
461 Id. at 311–14. 
462 Id. at 324 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
463 Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
464 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
465 Id. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
466 In Justice Brennan’s view, the fact of an initial, unwarned, custodial confession should not 
merely shift the burden onto the prosecution to establish by a more-likely-than-not standard 
that a subsequent, warned, custodial confession was not compelled. Rather, the prosecution 
should be required to “convincingly rebut[] the presumption.” Id. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
467 Id. at 316. 
468 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003) (No. 02-1371). 
Another case, United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 
1480 (2003) (No. 02-6320), also raises the question of how an initial unwarned statement af-
fects the admissibility of a subsequent warned statement. There is no indication that the cops’ 
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raises the question whether Elstad applies even when the initial failure 
was intentional.469 The short answer to that question, I think, is no. Simply 
put, it is hard to see how whether the police officer acts intentionally or 
merely negligently when failing to issue warnings affects whether the sus-
pect subsequently confesses freely in accordance with Miranda’s under-
standing of the operative meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.470 
But perhaps that is the wrong question. At the least, it is not the only 
question that the facts of Seibert raise. The officer in that case did not 
only deliberately refrain from issuing the Miranda warnings in the first 
place. Additionally, after eliciting a confession from Seibert and only 
then providing the warnings, the officer referred back to the earlier inter-
view several times.471 In this respect, too, Seibert is distinguishable from 
Elstad, for the Elstad majority had specifically noted that the officers did 
not “exploit the unwarned admission to pressure respondent into waiving 
his right to remain silent.”472 This is a distinction with a difference. I have 
claimed (admittedly, without elaboration) that an officer’s reasons for 
failing to give warnings the first time have little bearing on whether a 
statement given during a second interview was compelled in what the 
Miranda Court intimated was the constitutionally relevant sense. The of-
ficer’s behavior during that subsequent interview, in contrast, bears 
mightily on whether any statements thus elicited were “truly free” in the 
thick sense that Miranda endorses. The Court might well conclude, ac-
 
initial failure to issue warnings was deliberate. That initial questioning did, however, occur 
after Fellers had been indicted, thus implicating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See 
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (requiring knowing and intelligent waiver of right to 
counsel for post-indictment questioning); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (sup-
pressing post-indictment statements that had been deliberately elicited). Indeed, just as this 
Article was going to press, the Court decided Fellers, holding unanimously that the lower 
courts erred in applying Elstad by rote to hold Feller’s second statements admissible. Fellers 
v. United States, 72 U.S.L.W. 4150 (2004). Explaining that it had not previously “had occasion 
to decide whether the rationale of Elstad applies when a suspect makes incriminating state-
ments after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier po-
lice questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment standards,” the Court remanded to the 
Eighth Circuit “to address this issue in the first instance.” Id. at *12 (slip op. 6). 
469 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2003 WL 21840372 (No. 02-1371) (“Is the rule ‘that a 
suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby dis-
abled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda 
warnings’ abrogated when the initial decision to withhold the Miranda warnings was inten-
tional?” (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318)). 
470 See supra Section V.A.1. 
471 See Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 702. 
472 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316. It is not distinguishable, though, from the Elstad-era practice. See 
id. at 329–32 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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cordingly, that trial courts must presume—conclusively or, at a minimum, 
rebuttably—that a suspect’s statement was compelled, hence inadmissible 
against him, if it was elicited during a custodial interrogation in which po-
lice officers had exploited any statements that the suspect had given dur-
ing a previous custodial interrogation not preceded by the Miranda warn-
ings. Such a decision rule would very possibly minimize adjudicatory 
errors in the aggregate and would therefore be wholly consistent with 
both Elstad and Miranda. 
4. Emergency Exception 
In New York v. Quarles,473 the Court announced “a ‘public safety’ ex-
ception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a sus-
pect’s answers may be admitted into evidence.”474 In that case, a police of-
ficer arrested a rape suspect in a supermarket and, after handcuffing him 
and finding an empty shoulder holster, asked where the gun was. The 
suspect nodded in a particular direction and responded, “the gun is over 
there.”475 The trial court subsequently suppressed the gun and the state-
ment, however, because the officer had not issued the Miranda warn-
ings.476 The Supreme Court held the gun and the statement admissible, 
reasoning that failure to issue warnings was justified by the compelling 
public need “that further danger to the public did not result from the con-
cealment of the gun in a public area.”477 
A public safety exception that makes a custodial statement itself ad-
missible though unwarned would be defensible were the Miranda doc-
trine conceived of, and justified as, a remedial rule designed to deter “po-
lice overreaching.” In that event, the Court must be interested in how the 
social costs of the conduct it wishes to deter balance against the social 
costs of foregoing beneficial conduct that its doctrine might chill. It is per-
fectly sensible, then, to carve out an exception to the general rule for a 
 
473 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
474 Id. at 655. 
475 Id. at 652. 
476 Id. 
477 Id. at 657. Justice O’Connor rejected the majority’s newly hatched “public safety” excep-
tion, and therefore would have held the suspect’s statements inadmissible. Id. at 660 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But she agreed that the gun was ad-
missible because, as mentioned above, she reasoned that the police officer had done nothing 
wrong to warrant “poisonous fruit” analysis. It is perhaps revealing on the latter point that 
Justice Marshall’s dissent challenged only the majority’s proposed exception, refraining from 
debating Justice O’Connor’s analysis of the fruits question on the ground that the state had 
not raised it below. Id. at 688 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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subset of cases in which the costs of that rule are likely to be especially 
high. And perhaps the Quarles modification of the Miranda doctrine 
would do just that. But insofar as the Miranda doctrine is a decision rule 
justified on the strength of adjudicatory considerations, this reasoning 
seems inapposite. If Miranda can only be defended as a means to mini-
mize total adjudicatory errors, then crafting a public safety exception was 
an error.478 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past dozen or so years, constitutional scholars have turned 
with marked energy and enthusiasm to problematics of “constitutional 
doctrine”—a collection of judicial work product more comprehensive 
than what an earlier generation would have termed “constitutional mean-
ing.” Central questions have concerned how doctrine relates to meaning, 
and what implications might follow for debates over the legitimate meth-
ods of constitutional interpretation. The Court has itself begun to strug-
gle with these questions in such important and disparate decisions as 
Dickerson, Garrett, and Atwater. 
Notwithstanding this notable metadoctrinal turn, the domain described 
by the phrase “constitutional doctrine” remains, for the most part, a con-
ceptually undifferentiated mass of “interpretations, reasons, principles, 
and frameworks.”479 This is unfortunate. For, as Peter Birks has taught, 
the law’s long-term coherence and effectiveness depend, in significant 
measure, on taxonomic understanding. Law that does “not properly un-
derstand itself” will “be erratic and doomed to ridicule.”480 It is time, ac-
cordingly, to work toward a taxonomy of constitutional doctrine. 
 
478 Again I am disagreeing with Dorf and Friedman, who argue that Quarles was rightly de-
cided. See Dorf & Friedman, supra note 145, at 79 n.77 (“Few rights are absolute, and all 
Quarles does is to acknowledge that some balancing is appropriate.”). To my mind, they have 
Quarles and Tucker backwards. See id. at 80 & n.78 (deeming Tucker “dubious”). We come to 
opposite conclusions because, failing to distinguish the Miranda operative proposition from 
the Miranda decision rule, Dorf and Friedman read the decision as imposing a command 
upon the police as a matter of constitutional interpretation. See id. at 78 (contending that, ac-
cording to “Miranda’s core holding, . . . what the Fifth Amendment requires is . . . that an ac-
cused learn of the right not to speak with the police, and that the interrogation take place in a 
manner that permits the suspect to exercise that right at any time”); id. at 106 (“Miranda es-
tablishes a constitutional right to procedures that are adequate to inform a suspect of his right 
to remain silent in the face of custodial interrogation . . . .”). In contrast, my view, to repeat, is 
that the warnings aspect of Miranda is neither judicial interpretation of constitutional mean-
ing, nor a command to the police. 
479 Amar, supra note 3, at 79. 
480 Birks, supra note 1, at 3. 
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Reasons for the relative poverty of our present taxonomic understand-
ing of constitutional doctrine are no doubt multiple and complex. A ma-
jor part of the causal story, though, is that early classificatory efforts, es-
pecially Henry Monaghan’s “Constitutional Common Law,” purported to 
divide constitutional doctrine into domains of true constitutional rules 
and of subconstitutional rules, where the former were understood as the 
product of abstract, principled reasoning while the latter relied upon 
messy inquiries into likely consequences and institutional realities. But 
this, many scholars argued, presented a false image of constitutional ad-
judication, which was reputed to be instrumental “all the way up.” This 
hostility to taxonomic projects that depended—or were perceived to de-
pend—upon the assumption that some constitutional doctrine emerged 
through a process uncontaminated by “policy, pragmatism, and poli-
tics”481 easily carried over into a hostility toward the taxonomic project it-
self. 
In light of this background what we need is a taxonomy consistent with 
Pragmatism. That is, we need a classificatory scheme that neither de-
pends upon, nor rules out, the anti-Pragmatist assumption that there ex-
ists a meaningful sort of constitutional interpretation not involving prac-
tical, instrumental, interest-balancing considerations—or at least not 
involving such considerations in quite the same way as do other sorts of 
constitutional interpretation. 
A first step toward such a taxonomy—and only a first step—is to dis-
tinguish statements of judge-interpreted constitutional meaning from 
rules directing how courts should adjudicate claimed violations of such 
meaning. I have called these constituents of constitutional doctrine “con-
stitutional operative propositions” and “constitutional decision rules,” re-
spectively. Attention to these two conceptually distinct species of consti-
tutional doctrine can, I have maintained, pay a wide range of dividends. 
For example, it could help courts craft better doctrine, it could promote a 
richer and more meaningful popular constitutional culture, and it could 
generate a more fully developed sense of Congress’s proper role in the 
project of constitutional adjudication. That these hopes are not just idle 
fancy is borne out by close examinations of the Court’s recent decision in 
Dickerson and, through Dickerson, Miranda. Among other things, the 
operative proposition/decision rule distinction has helped make clear 
how the Dickerson majority could have better replied to Justice Scalia’s 
 
481 Levinson, supra note 27, at 857. 
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overblown attack on Miranda’s legitimacy, and how Miranda’s progeny 
should be reshaped in light of Miranda’s reaffirmance. 
Of course, even within the parameters that this Article defines for it-
self, there is much it leaves undone. It does not prove that courts enjoy 
legitimate authority to create decision rules. It does not resolve which 
considerations in the making of decision rules are legitimate and which 
are not. It does not provide an algorithm for sorting operative proposi-
tions from decision rules. It does not conclusively establish that the most 
controversial aspect of the Miranda doctrine is in fact a decision rule, let 
alone a decision rule that is explicable or justifiable as a means to mini-
mize adjudicatory error. And this is just a partial list. 
All this is true. But, I daresay, to have hoped for much more would re-
flect inappropriate expectations for what constitutional theorizing of a 
conceptual or analytical bent can accomplish. Rarely can it compel assent 
to contested propositions. A conceptualization is a tool. Its truth lies in its 
utility—its power to reveal possibilities and relationships that had lain 
fully or partly obscured, to focus argument by identifying more sharply 
the nature and extent of what lies in dispute, and to point us in the direc-
tion of more promising lines of inquiry. 
This Article has endeavored to make clearer a conceptualization of the 
practice of constitutional adjudication that, I believe, undergirds much of 
contemporary constitutional theorizing and underlies many of the most 
difficult cases that reach the Supreme Court, but which had desperately 
wanted for a more complete and precise fleshing out. No doubt a very 
long way toward completion and precision remains. Still, even incre-
mental improvements in detailing the conceptual map of the practice of 
constitutional adjudication can purchase large improvements in our abil-
ity to negotiate the terrain. 
 
